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Abstract 
This thesis explores the history and development of the field of public opinion 
inquiry relating to the Arab region. Interrogating epistemological questions of 
who claims the right to produce knowledge, and by what means, this thesis seeks 
to explain the rise of global public opinion polling, with a specific focus on the 
methods and practices by which Arab public opinion has been pursued, 
captured, claimed, and (re)presented by international pollsters. In the literature, 
engagement with the construct “Arab public opinion” has tended to focus on the 
hard results of polls and surveys, or the methodological obstacles that preclude 
the empirical pursuit of public opinion in non-democratic contexts. I argue that 
public opinion (in the form of hard results) cannot be divorced from the 
theoretical and epistemological legacies inherent in its construction. The pursuit 
of public opinion by empirical means is a political act, and must be analysed as 
such. 
This thesis traces the development of the field of Arab public opinion inquiry in 
three stages through the twentieth and twenty-first centuries, beginning with 
epistemic interventions into to the region by colonial actors, followed by the 
embedding of foreign inquiry in the local setting through the institutionalisation 
of social science research, and culminating in the rise of local, indigenous 
epistemic actors who seek in part to reclaim knowledge of the self through 
processes of localisation. The argument is supported with theoretical and 
empirical research, including in-depth interviews with over fifty international 
pollsters, practitioners, and public opinion experts. Overall, this thesis provides a 
sociological and epistemological account of the dominance of Western scientific 
norms in global public opinion inquiry, and explores the meaningful ways in 
which the local reclamation of knowledge on this front is taking place today.  
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Introduction 
 
Western research is more than just research that is located in a positivist tradition. It is 
research which brings to bear, on any study of indigenous peoples, a cultural orientation, 
a set of values, a different conceptualisation of such things as time, space and subjectivity, 
different and competing theories of knowledge, highly specialised forms of language, and 
structures of power. 
Linda Tuhiwai Smith (1999, 42) 
 
What do the people think? This deceivingly complex and evasive question 
represents the basic starting point for any attempt to understand public opinion, 
on practically any matter. How people have gone about answering this question 
unravels a history of the development and institutionalisation of particular 
modes of knowledge production and of the construction of public opinion. For 
many, public opinion is something of a holy grail from which we might source 
valuable knowledge about ourselves and others as members of social collectives. 
To capture public opinion is therefore to lay claim to knowledge about the social 
world.  
This thesis is about the pursuit and capture of public opinion knowledge as it 
relates to the Arab region. Since the early 2000’s, the term “Arab public opinion” 
has become increasingly prevalent in popular and political discourse. Particularly 
in the post-September 11 environment, an externally-driven fixation with 
recording the tides of opinion among societies in the Arab world has been 
palpable, and opinion polls as a technical means of obtaining this type of 
knowledge have proliferated. Predominately Western scholars, practitioners, 
politicians, and media outlets have contributed to this epistemic buzz. As Justin 
Gengler writes, “global interest in Arab public opinion has been spurred by 
dramatic events and trends, including the terrorist attacks of 9/11, the ensuing 
war in Iraq and more recently the Arab Spring uprisings. These and other events 
have highlighted the importance of how ordinary Arab citizens think and act, 
even if they may often have a limited influence on formal decision-making in 
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government” (2017). Indeed, in the wake of 9/11, the American research centre 
Pew broadened its global attitudes research to probe opinion relating to terrorism 
and Islam “on the eve of the Iraq war” in countries with significant Muslim 
populations (Pew Research Centre 2005). In 2002, James Zogby published his 
book What Arabs Think and in 2013 Shibley Telhami published The World through 
Arab Eyes, both of which relied on Arab-region polls and surveys that they had 
conducted. Marc Lynch wrote of changing ideas about the “Arab street” (2003a) 
and the need to take Arab opinion seriously (2003b). In 2006, the New York 
Times reported on a “tide of Arab opinion” (MacFarquhar 2006), while a study 
on the determinants of Arab opinion sought to uncover a theoretical basis for 
Arab attitudes toward the West, as found in the polls (Furia and Lucas 2006). In 
the same year, the Arab Barometer was launched in an effort to conduct 
systematic regional polls that provided “insight into the social, political, and 
economic attitudes and values of ordinary citizens across the Arab world”. And 
other major research initiatives have emerged: the Arab Reform Initiative 
launched in 2005, the Arab Opinion Index in 2011, and the Middle East Public 
Opinion Project in 2013, for instance.  
The sudden fascination and fetishisation of Arab public opinion seems to suggest 
that prior to the surge in interest, it eluded capture or understanding. This 
phenomenon of the rapid proliferation of polling and survey research provides 
the impetus for this thesis. As a study of the rise of global polling and the pursuit 
of Arab public opinion, the thesis explores the development of the field of 
inquiry. By interrogating the production of knowledge and claims to knowing, I 
seek to understand the actors, methods, and practices by which Arab public 
opinion has been pursued, captured, claimed, and (re)presented by the world of 
polling. I argue that the practice of inquiry itself is a political endeavor, and that 
the field of Arab opinion research must be held accountable for the construction 
of Arab publics, just as global opinion research has contributed to the 
construction of global publics. 
1 The Question 
Stated simply, this thesis is about public opinion inquiry pertaining to the Arab 
region and its peoples. More precisely, it is driven by the fundamental question: 
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How can we explain the rise and proliferation of public opinion data relating to the Arab 
region in recent years?  
Toward answering this question, a research agenda was devised that generated 
sub-questions: First, what constitutes the field of public opinion inquiry, which 
produces this data? Second, who are the actors involved in the conduct of 
inquiry, and where are they positioned—geographically, historically, 
commercially, or epistemologically? 
An effort to define and map the field followed from these two sub-questions. 
Together with that of the rise and proliferation of public opinion data in the Arab 
region, a final, broader question was raised; namely, what is this a case of? This 
final question asks what the phenomenon of Arab public opinion inquiry tells us 
about the construction of the political world more broadly, and gathers the 
conceptual and theoretical resources necessary for locating this research agenda 
within the realm of International Relations (IR).  
Whereas the main driving question seeks to uncover a particular social and 
political phenomenon, the sub-questions lead me to demarcate the field of 
inquiry at the heart of it. Mapping this field requires disentangling the practices, 
ideas, and assumptions by which knowledge of public opinion in the Arab region 
is and has been pursued. In considering the above questions, I wish to de-
essentialise the very concept of “public opinion” as an object of analysis, and 
refocus the analytical gaze toward the historical and cultural conditions that have 
shaped how particular processes of knowledge production develop, spread, and 
evolve. I take the exploration of the current field of Arab public opinion inquiry 
as an opportunity to interrogate actors and practices in the field. As such, 
understanding the pollster and the act of polling are central to my research 
agenda.  
As a form of knowledge production and as a political artefact, public opinion 
polls and surveys are interesting for at least two reasons. First, we are interested 
in what they tell us about our political and social realities, which means to say, 
we rely deeply on the content of public opinion research. It is this content—what 
people say that they think, feel, believe, and hope—that has traditionally been of 
interest to political theory. Scholarship relating to public opinion and polling has 
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largely focused on the end-product, i.e., the results of questions asked, 
perceptible trends and anomalies, the cognitive effects of question wording, the 
representativeness or randomness of samples, insights and accounts from focus 
groups, scalar rankings, agree/disagree, yes/no, aware/unaware, and other 
classificatory schemas used to simplify and demystify political attitudes.  
Theories of public opinion relating to issues such as the use of military force 
(Lian and Oneal 1993; Jenleson and Britton 1998; Eichenberg 2005; Williams and 
Slusser 2014; Dieck 2015; Everts and Isernia 2015), international governance 
(Herberichs 1966; Flynn and Rattinger 1985; Bell and Quek 2018), immigration 
(OECD International Migration Outlook; Ureta 2011), and human rights (Davis, 
Murdie, and Steinmetz 2012; Allendoerfer 2016) have been developed to better 
understand the relational link between public opinion, political elites, and 
domestic and foreign policy. More recent theoretical turns analyse the 
relationship between public opinion and the media (Soroka 2003; Entman 2004; 
Baum and Potter 2008; Shapiro and Jacobs 2011; Moy and Bosch 2013), the 
influence of political elites (Foyle 1997; Isaacs 1998; Hooghe and Marks 2005; 
Guisinger and Saunders 2017), and global ideological shifts in polls (Leiserowitz 
et al. 2013; Adamczyk 2017; Fowler 2017; Goren and Chapp 2017). Traditional 
political scholarship on public opinion has thus keenly sought, by and large, all 
possible explanans of these relational or causal links (Lippmann 1922; Campbell 
et al. 1960; Nincic 1992; Page and Shapiro 1992).  
A second, though less explored reason that polls and surveys are interesting has 
to do with what they actually are (i.e., political artefacts) and what they actually 
do (classify, control, and govern bodies). While traditional scholarship has 
tended to take public opinion as given—as something out there which is readily 
available to capture, measure, and record and as something that can be subjected 
to different analytical treatments in order to explain political behaviour and 
outcomes—this a posteriori approach precludes us from asking more fundamental 
questions, like what are the tangible differences between public opinion as a 
conceptual idea and public opinion as the end result of a research agenda? Are all 
individuals represented through public opinion inquiry, or are some 
systematically prioritised over others? And how do pollsters and researchers 
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intervene in or help to construct ideas about publics? In a nutshell, how do these 
political artefacts come about and what do they do? 
It is in this strain of thought, at the crossroads of politics and epistemology, that 
my research agenda is embedded. On the nature of public opinion, I take a cue 
from “non-traditional” constructivist and critical accounts which have sought to 
problematise public opinion by looking to the ways through which statistical 
data enacts politics and creates power struggles. These include insights from 
Pierre Bourdieu, for whom public opinion is a manufactured myth and does not 
exist per se (1979), Elizabeth Noelle-Neumann, whose theory on the spiral of 
silence has been used to explain fear of expression in the case of minority opinion 
(1993), Ian Hacking’s work on the empirical implications of counting individuals 
and creating social categories (1982), and research on the social construction of 
public opinion (Osborne and Rose 1999; Lee 2002; Krippendorff 2005). I also find 
inspiration in reflexivist critiques of positivism and empiricism (for instance, 
Keller 2001) and the decentring and decolonising of IR and its dominant 
methodologies (Acharya 2015; Smith 1999). This thesis is therefore an exercise in 
bringing public opinion into the fold of ideas relating to global knowledge 
production. 
This thesis comes on the heels of a rapidly-expanding market for public opinion 
data pertaining to people in the Arab region, ignited in part by a renewed 
preoccupation with Western foreign policy and intervention in the years since 
September 11, 2001 and the subsequent invasion of Iraq, and boosted as well in 
the post-Arab Spring environment. Shining a light on the Arab region is about far 
more than just selecting a novel case study. For one, the analytical potential for 
political public opinion knowledge from the region has largely been ignored in 
scholarship. Indeed, the vast majority of existing research on public opinion has 
engaged with democratic publics in the West (unsurprisingly, American public 
opinion forms the lion’s share of material). Although there has been case-based 
research conducted in non-Western countries and regions, including in the 
Middle East, it has emerged in a piecemeal fashion and it remains unclear how 
these studies fit into larger narratives and macro-theorising about public 
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opinion.1 It is precisely the primacy and centrality of Western scholarship that 
exposes immense gaps in our explanatory frameworks.  
But deeper than this is a sense of urgency around understanding and 
demystifying Arab public opinion. From Orientalist discourses that incite a 
fascination with and fetishization of the “Arab mind” and the “Arab street”, to 
the revolutionary uprisings that began 2010 and transformed public spheres, to 
the ways in which social media is altering communication and power dynamics, 
it feels as if the region is more closely watched, measured, and studied (from 
outside as from within) today than ever before. This thesis therefore seeks to 
understand the ways in which we come to know about publics and public 
opinion, and how this knowledge contributes to the dominant empirical 
constructions of the region.  
2 The Argument 
This thesis will show that public opinion data cannot be divorced from the 
complex contexts and legacies from which it has emerged. I identify a field of 
inquiry pertaining to the Arab region, one in which the object pursued is 
knowledge of public opinion. I explore the ways in which the development of 
this field comes as a result of externally-driven historical, imperial, and market 
forces. In the absence of context and legacies, public opinion data and theory can 
only ever be taken “as is”—as something static and analytically removed from 
social and political forces—when in fact it plays a role in the engendering of the 
political world. Paying attention to context allows for broader theorising and 
helps us to understand the rationale behind the pursuit of global public opinion, 
as well as the power dynamics and hierarchies of knowledge embedded in the 
pursuit. 
 
1
 For instance, on Russia, see Inkeles (1950), Wyman (1997), Gerber (2015); on China, see Lin (1936), 
Tang (2005), Shi and Lu (2010), Reilly (2012); on Latin America, see Lagos Cruz-Coke (2008), Stein 
(2013); on Sub-Saharan Africa, see Bratton, Mattes and Gyimah-Boadi (2005), Van Der Westhuizen and 
Smith (2015), Keuleers (2015); on Southeast Asia, see Pietsch (2014); finally on the Middle East, see 
Tessler and Jamal (2006), Furia and Lucas (2006), and Tessler (2011).  
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My central argument is that Arab public opinion inquiry has been pursued and 
created by different actors to different ends and can be characterised by stages of 
development. This development unfolds in three successive stages from the early 
twentieth century until today. For the purposes of my argument, it begins with a 
colonial mode of inquiry serving as a representation of modern power, then 
enters a transformative phase where foreign inquiry becomes deeply embedded 
in development and social science institutions in the region, and finds itself most 
recently in a stage of reclamation (of practices and knowledge) by local actors. 
The reclamation of local claims to local knowledge represents one of the central 
messages of this thesis. This is therefore a story of how externally-driven claims 
to knowledge evolve to become locally-driven ones, painting an agential “arc of 
return” in the pursuit of public opinion knowledge. In identifying this agential 
arc, I am not making the normative claim that the stages of development of 
inquiry signals progress. My goal is simply to examine the trajectories of 
knowledge production, rather than weigh the legitimacy or accuracy of that 
knowledge. 
3 The Contribution 
As I see it, this thesis reckons with dominant knowledge structures embedded in 
the international system. It contributes to the broader question about how 
knowledge production shapes the conduct of international relations—not so 
much the relations between states, but the relations between epistemic actors and 
the international societies that form the object of their inquiry. The aim of this 
thesis is to advance the idea that the trajectory of knowledge production 
responsible for the emergence of public opinion inquiry relating to the Arab 
world is part of a larger story about the production of global publics, and 
specifically about a transformation from colonial modalities of control to the local 
reclamation of knowledge. This thesis addresses three general gaps in the 
literature. The first is a lack of understanding about the field of Arab public 
opinion inquiry, while the second is the limited and generally outdated 
theoretical research on public opinion in non-Western and non-democratic 
settings. But the third and larger contribution of this project is a sociological 
intervention into the (re)production, fascination, and fetishisation of public 
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opinion data relating to the Arab region, which has been sustained for quite some 
time by different epistemic actors and generative practices of scientific research. 
Given that there is little in the way of existing research on Arab public opinion 
research (and certainly, the term “Arab public opinion inquiry” is not found in 
any literature) this project has often struggled to find a theoretical home. While I 
draw on many ideas and theories from different literatures, there are no seminal 
texts upon which we can build an agenda for the study of Arab public opinion 
inquiry. Nevertheless, as an emerging theoretical field, International Political 
Sociology (IPS) invites us to problematise the “geo-cultural epistemologies” from 
which particular disciplines emerge (Guillaume and Bilgin 2017, 1). In the spirit 
of IPS, I am interested in the ways that public opinion manifests itself through the 
act of inquiry (polling) and through “specific sites, temporalities and modes of 
deployment as forms of power” (Guillaume and Bilgin, 3). Importantly, then, I 
argue that we must consider how the empirical contours of public opinion have 
been shaped by the history of American social science, steeped in rationalist and 
liberal ideals that privilege a positivist epistemology (Ross 1991; Delli Carpini 
2011). In constructing a historical and sociological account of public opinion 
inquiry, I emphasise the role of situated knowledge (with its own set of 
epistemological assumptions) in shaping fields and disciplines. The thesis adopts 
the general framework and methods of IPS scholarship in order to contribute to 
discussions about forgotten or supressed legacies of knowledge about the 
international. 
J. Ann Tickner writes that to advance a truly global IR, we must become aware of 
the methodological constraints that keep disciplinary IR from being freed of its 
Eurocentric (and often neo-positivist) stronghold (2016). This requires focusing 
“on the link between knowledge and power—that is, whose knowledge, and 
what kind of knowledge, is counted as legitimate (and ‘scientific’) by the 
mainstream of the discipline” (Tickner 2016, 157). Advancing a global IR requires 
us to contend with issues of race, empire, and historical accounts that have been 
omitted from IR knowledge, as well as to question the epistemological footing of 
“legitimate” scientific inquiry.  
In building a research agenda around the rise of public opinion inquiry in the 
Arab world, I wish to contribute to the task of forging a more global IR in two 
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small but, I believe, meaningful ways. First, I wish to highlight the power 
relations implicit in the production of public opinion knowledge, allowing for a 
critique of the epistemology, methods, and technologies that foster dialogue 
between people and their political representatives. Second, I want to tell a story 
about the widespread diffusion and adoption of specific (American) neo-
positivist social scientific methods beyond the Western, democratic context. The 
relationship between knowledge and power is nothing new to IR—we know the 
ways in which knowledge legitimates power and, likewise, the ways in which 
knowledge is legitimated by power (Weiler 2011, 210). Hierarchies and power 
asymmetries are always embedded into the production of knowledge: different 
forms of knowledge, different institutions, and different knowledge-producing 
actors have varying degrees of importance and influence. Public opinion as a 
form of knowledge production is always for something or someone (which is why I 
choose to consider the power dynamics embedded in the processes and practices 
of producing public opinion knowledge). This is something we may have 
guessed at the outset, but with no critical theoretical literature on the 
globalisation of polling, it is an idea in need of careful appraisal. 
Challenging dominant (Western) ways of knowing, measuring, categorising and 
defining publics and public opinion is also related to efforts to decolonise 
methodologies, i.e., to advance a more critical understanding of the underlying 
assumptions, motivations, and values that inform dominant methodological 
practices. As Linda Tuhiwai Smith writes, “what counts as Western research 
draws from an ‘archive’ of knowledge and systems, rules and values which 
stretch beyond the boundaries of Western science to the system now referred to 
as the West” (1999, 42). Smith’s deep interrogation of that place of intersection 
between imperialism and research awakens a type of critique about the epistemic 
privilege of the West. And while I do not mean to reframe Smith’s emancipatory 
work only to suit this research project, this “hook” of power structures 
embedded in Western research is far more compelling to me than other 
approaches that I have wrestled with. In this background of this thesis, then, the 
relationship between power and knowledge is ever-present. 
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4 The Methodology 
Conceptual development lies at the heart of all social science work (Gerring 2012, 
112). In order to conceptualise, deconstruct, and then reconceptualise and 
reconstruct a subject, we must start with at least a neutral or descriptive meaning 
of a concept as a way of understanding or explaining phenomena, processes, 
outcomes, and the like (Guzzini 2002). There are some important lessons about 
concept development from Guzzini (2002) and Berenskoetter (2016) that inspire 
my approach to disentangling and attempting to uncover and develop the 
concept of public opinion, which is the most basic and fundamental idea around 
which my thesis is constructed. One lesson is that concepts should be seen as 
context-bound. They are constantly in motion, demonstrated by how uniquely 
they can be employed across history and geographies, motivated by different 
interests or treated with theoretical exclusivism (Splichal 1999, 4). 
Acknowledging the historical, geographical, cultural, epistemological, and socio-
political fields that shape a concept encourages “a more critical attitude towards 
the categories and terminologies we use and the mentalities behind them” 
(Berenskoetter 2016, 2).  
A second lesson is that “basic concepts fulfill a cognitive function and are central 
parts of knowledge production in modernity” (Berenskoetter 2016, 18), which 
means that concept development has a role in artificially ordering the world. 
What I take from this is the need to “explore how concepts form and become 
reified through their use across society” (Berenskoetter 2016, 18). The starting 
point for the analysis of public opinion in thesis was to ask the fundamental 
question: What are the ways in which existing conceptualisations of public 
opinion have shaped how and what kinds of knowledge are produced? 
Problematising the ways of knowing a concept thus naturally leads to issues of 
its production. Where knowledge production and public opinion intersect, we 
find the public opinion research industry. I believe that any interrogation of 
(contemporary) public opinion must consider, then, the ways in which it is 
brought into being by particular practices, tools, and methods.  
While there is a strand of literature that approaches public opinion from a more 
critical lens, problematising its construction and inclusivity as a concept (i.e., 
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whose opinions count), there is little at our disposal that interrogates the role of 
the pollster at the level of the international. Pollsters, practitioners, and pundits 
are often quoted and misquoted—their data, analyses, and forecasts are used to 
provide background knowledge and justify and legitimate claims. But they 
themselves have evaded critical interrogation as actors in the international arena 
who shape discourse and knowledge about the political world (particularly in IR 
scholarship). One reason for this might be that they are a nebulous and extremely 
heterogeneous they. Pollsters and related actors operate at different levels, are 
accountable to a diverse set of agents, and work in competition. On an individual 
basis, their training and professional trajectories are perhaps too disparate to 
warrant analysing them as a single, unified group. When taken as individual 
experts, their knowledge is authoritative. When they are mentioned collectively, 
it is often on the basis of a common (sometimes sinister) agenda, i.e., as spinners, 
political mouthpieces, and sensationalists. I do not approach this thesis assuming 
that pollsters are inherently spinners, or that the machinery of data production 
relies on the ability to spin data and give it a journalistic flair, though that may 
sometimes be part of it. Pollsters are my methodological “in” into the study of 
public opinion inquiry because they are key to the process, through which we 
come to know and understand publics and social groups that we are and are not 
made members of. Their daily bread involves the repeated collection, systematic 
processing, and thorough analysis of some number questions asked to masses of 
individuals, creating polaroid snapshots of the social and political world (and 
like a polaroid snapshot, each photographer takes a different angle, orientation, 
and viewpoint).  
The research question at the heart of the thesis—namely, how can we explain the 
rise and proliferation of public opinion knowledge on the Arab region?—dictated 
careful methods selection. I began by documenting published polls and opinion 
studies on the Arab region, and recorded the actors responsible for creating them. 
In this way, I identified as many pollsters as possible who are presently working 
on public opinion relating to the Arab region and found that they were 
geographically stretched between the United States and countries in the Arab 
world (with a small number located in Europe). Analytically, this inspired a 
mapping of the field and generated questions about why the American-Arab 
nexus was reproduced in the practitioner’s world. This list of practitioners that I 
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identified is small enough sample to analyse as a self-contained body of 
epistemic actors on the basis of their shared object of analysis (Arab public 
opinion).  
In Chapter 1, I provide clear terminological definitions relating to this field of 
inquiry. While the Arab case analysis in Part 3 of the thesis builds a narrative 
from historical to contemporary practices of inquiry (Chapters 5 through 7), the 
empirical work involved in this thesis required me to work backward from the 
current state of the field to its origins. The research process went as follows: 1) 
preliminary research to identify actors working in the field by collecting 
published polls and sourcing the authors of studies, 2) a geographic mapping of 
these actors, 3) a study of their individual characteristics and the nature of their 
polling/research operations, 4) in-person interviews with pollsters in the field, 
and 5) “piecing together” the findings and the broader narrative using historical 
and other secondary sources. 
The interview process deserves a mention. The mapping exercise helped to locate 
relevant actors based in North America, Europe, North Africa, the Middle East, 
and the Gulf. Due to time and budget constraints, I narrowed my interview 
selection down to the countries which were the most prolific producers of Arab-
region polls: the United States, Jordan, Palestine, Lebanon, and Qatar (Egypt 
would have been included but conducting fieldwork was considered risky and so 
it was eliminated, and Tunisia was a planned site for research if not for budget 
constraints). Within the countries visited, I contacted as many polling centres and 
senior pollsters and practitioners as I could identify. Respondent selection was 
limited to senior-level actors as they likely have the experience to reflect on the 
field more critically. In some cases, snowball sampling led to more interviews 
than planned. I triangulated the pollster interviews by also meeting with scholars 
considered experts in relevant fields in each country (public opinion, sociology, 
and methodology).  
My methodology comprises of semi-structured, in-depth interviews conducted 
with pollsters and public opinion experts, combined with secondary research. It 
is thus a qualitative approach to a generally quantitative subject matter. Semi-
structured interviews generate open and exploratory conversations and give 
interviewees the freedom to express themselves on their own terms. I chose to 
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use certain anchors or ideas to guide the interviews along common trajectories. 
These anchors included questions about the usefulness and value of public 
opinion, the definition of public opinion, the nature of the interviewee’s work as 
far as it pertained to public opinion (procedures, objectives, timelines, and 
personnel), their career backgrounds and histories of their institutions, the 
perceived impact of their own work on the field, their professional connections in 
the field, and where they saw themselves positioned within the market for Arab 
public opinion data. 
In all, fifty-seven interviews were conducted across six countries over the course 
of three separate field research trips. All were conducted in English. About two-
thirds of interviews were with pollsters or survey research practitioners, while 
the remainder were with scholars working in academic institutions or in the 
policy field. Most interviews were conducted in the respondent’s place of work, 
while five were conducted either through Skype, or over coffee. It was important 
to be able to spend time inside the workplaces in order to view the data 
production set-up (participant observation), meet other researchers, get a sense of 
how busy or large their operations were, and learn about workplace culture. The 
average interview length was one and a half hours and the interviews were 
conducted in an open-ended fashion. I determined provisional questions based 
on the anchors mentioned above, but left room to cultivate trust and allow for the 
free-flow of conversation. 
The first wave of field research took place over two weeks in May 2016 in Jordan 
and Qatar. I conducted thirteen interviews and spent time observing the daily 
practices of one main research centre in each country. This first trip was both 
introductory and exploratory. A second trip took place over three weeks in 
February and March 2017 in the United States, specifically in Washington D.C. 
(fifteen interviews), Maryland (one interview), New York (three interviews), and 
Ann Arbor (four interviews). In addition to these, I conducted one Skype 
interview with a Princeton-based pollster/scholar, one Skype interview with a 
senior American counterintelligence expert, and one in-person interview in 
Baltimore with an American government attorney. The third and final trip took 
place over four weeks in November and December 2017 in Lebanon (eight 
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interviews), Jordan (five interviews), Israel (one interview), and Palestine (four 
interviews). 
I must mention that the interviews were by no means exhaustive. I did not meet 
every pollster that I would have liked to in an ideal case, though this leaves room 
for future research. Additionally, as mentioned, the sphere of actors operating 
within this field is self-contained, and many pollsters and polling centres are 
readily identifiable. The actors operating within this sphere are linked 
relationally, through training, education and mentorship, conferences, 
commissioned projects, and word of mouth. Many of my respondents knew or 
were aware of each other, each other’s work, clients, and reputations. Some 
actors work in partnership, others in competition. This raises issues of 
confidentiality and explains my decision to withhold identities, company names, 
and other details, unless the information provided to me was already publicly 
available. I stress that in my aim to uncover a field of research and trace its roots 
and its effect on our perceptions about public opinion and publics in the Arab 
region, I wish to steer clear of compromising the work or reputations of these 
actors. I am more interested in the collective insights gained from the manifold 
discussions rather than interrogating actors on an individual basis. 
Issues of confidentiality are part and parcel of the trappings of qualitative 
interview-based research for this subject. While the interviews were extremely 
insightful, I met with each actor one occasion only. In almost all interviews, I had 
to first gain the respondent’s trust before they were willing to share information, 
and while each pollster opened up to candid conversation, it was clear that this is 
a competitive market full of closely guarded secrets (in two instances, I was met 
with extreme distrust and repeatedly asked who I was working for. And while 
eventually some level of rapport was achieved, only one of those two interviews 
was fruitful). This requires the researcher to tread carefully within a small 
window of time, as some questions are simply off limits. These include questions 
about clients, especially when those clients are foreign governments, certain 
questions about funding sources, questions about ties to the state, and questions 
about personal politics. It often seemed that the most politically interesting 
information was the least accessible to me.  
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Outside of the semi-structured interviews, I relied heavily on secondary research 
and digging through digital archives and old research compendiums for 
published polls and surveys on the Arab world prior to 2001 (after this point, 
published studies can usually be obtained on the websites of research companies 
or commissioning bodies). Beginning with insights from the interview process, I 
traced back the histories of actors to when they first emerged, following the trail 
as far back as records were available, and then building on the early history of 
Arab public opinion inquiry with supplementary research. 
One final (and perhaps glaring) methodological issue with the thesis is the 
bracketing of the authoritarian dimension. Interestingly, what I once thought 
would be of central importance to this thesis—namely, the ways in which 
authoritarianism shapes pollsters and the conduct of their work, as well as how it 
changes the dialogical relationship between publics and researchers—was rarely 
discussed in interviews (regardless of where those interviews took place). 
Authoritarianism may well be a key constitutive element of knowledge 
production in the field, however, the interviews showed that it has not precluded 
political opinion research altogether (instead the field is growing) and is therefore 
not a primary matter of concern in the mind of the pollster. While it is true that 
politically sensitive questionnaires and data on Arab publics has been censored 
in many cases, the general silence from the pollsters themselves on this issue is 
one key methodological reason that the authoritarian dimension does not play a 
central role in this thesis.  
5 Personal Considerations 
Every project has its limitations and I have tried to consciously and carefully 
consider those that I am bound by, as well as the boundaries that I have imposed 
on this project. There are a few micro- and macro-level restraints worth noting 
that I have, in some way or another, come to accept.  
At a Micro-Level:  
Language was at times a limitation. All of the interviews were conducted in 
English, my mother tongue, and due to low competency in Arabic, the people I 
met in Lebanon, Jordan, Palestine, and (some) in Qatar (while all at least 
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bilingual), only had the option of expressing themselves in English. The natural 
questions that emerge are: What is the influence of my own language on the 
interview process? Am I marginalising others’ ways of knowing or languages for 
knowing? Rapport-building, the flow of conversation, and sociocultural 
differences in verbal and non-verbal styles will change based on language choices 
made by the researcher. While I am aware of some of the limitations, an 
awareness is all I can have in this case. 
Related to language is the paucity of texts and studies about public opinion 
inquiry relating to the Middle East or North Africa. By this, I do not mean polls 
or survey results, but rather information about the conduct of polls and surveys, 
the history of trying to record or attain some sense of collective opinion, accounts 
of the contemporary industry of public opinion research, or theoretical 
discussions of public opinion specifically relating to the region and relevant to 
my research position. I have found few formative texts on which to build my 
project (the language barrier may be a culprit here). Without formative texts or 
existing scholarship to build on, it feels a bit like reaching in the dark for an 
anchor, searching for grounding. Acknowledging that this thesis is an attempt at 
mapping a particular phenomenon, finding ways to conceptualise it is important. 
I see this as a first sketch, and I am encouraged by the many routes that this 
project can branch into in the future. 
Finally, while I have actively sought to draw on diverse voices in compiling the 
research, the overwhelming presence of Western and male authors in the 
bibliography is a cause for concern. It speaks, in part, to the developments and 
limitations of the disciplines that I draw from, and must, in time, be remedied. 
At a Macro-Level: 
The macro-level considerations worth mentioning are personal ones. First, my 
interest in studying public opinion inquiry stems from my experience working 
over five years in polling and data analysis. I began a career as a research 
assistant at Ipsos in survey research, bright-eyed and eager to be immersed in the 
activity of professional research. The complexity of the method and the rigorous 
research process made it feel meaningful—data could be reproduced, hypotheses 
could be tested, claims could be supported with data, and conclusions seemed 
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sound. Public opinion seemed to matter because global operations like Ipsos 
expended vast amounts of resources extracting data and selling insights to 
clients. Sometimes, a figure was exaggerated here or there to make a story more 
consistent or compelling, poor results were omitted, or statistically insignificant 
numbers sometimes drove decision-making. Only after I moved on from this role 
did I realised that I had been socialised into a particular way of knowing and 
way of speaking about data. This thesis has helped me to reverse that process of 
socialisation, allowing me to critically re-learn or un-learn about data and uproot 
my own epistemological assumptions. While this is not a limitation per se, it 
might explain some of the research choices I have made over the course of the 
project.  
Second, coming to terms with my positionality has made me conscious of the 
limits of my own knowing, especially across cultures. Since I am not “of” the 
region, what is my claim to knowing or attempting to know it? When the 
researcher encounters a cultural or geographic framework beyond her own, a 
series of questions may arise: 
“What is my place in asking these questions?” 
“What are my own embedded assumptions about truth-seeking?” 
“What gives me the power to make knowledge claims?” 
I continue to work through these issues of agency, and measure myself by my 
openness to listen, observe, and to be changed as a researcher, realising that a 
critical epistemological engagement with public opinion researchers through the 
method of interviews risks reproducing some of the very same underlying 
assumptions that I attempt to critique with this thesis. I do not expect to have 
clear answers to these questions yet, but they are always in the background. 
6 Chapter Summaries 
This thesis unfolds in three parts. The first part introduces the concepts and 
theories used to develop an account of the rise of Arab public opinion inquiry. 
The second part explores the field of global public opinion inquiry, with a focus 
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on actors (pollsters and public opinion practitioners) and the dominant 
epistemological issues at the heart of their work. The third part offers a narrative 
of the development of public opinion inquiry pertaining to the Arab region, 
following a trajectory of colonial to contemporary forms of knowledge 
production.   
Chapter 1 (“Public Opinion: Disentangling a Contested Concept”) is an exercise 
in sorting through theoretical debates and overlapping assumptions about public 
opinion, as they are found in the literature. Problematically, I find that the ideal 
of public opinion is commonly conflated with its empirical reflection, i.e., the set 
of epistemological practices that produce the idea sense of public opinion. In 
seeking to bring clarity to the concept of public opinion and resolve this problem, 
I propose a reconceptualisation of public opinion that separates the ideal-type 
from the empirical pursuit. This reframing allows me to situate the thesis as 
fundamentally concerned with the latter. Further, it helps to reveal the extent to 
which legacies of Western scientific thought are embedded in the concept of 
public opinion. 
In Chapter 2 (“The Development of Arab Public Opinion Inquiry: Elements of a 
Conceptual Framework”), I tether together theoretical elements related to the 
idea of “Arab public opinion” and propose a conceptual framework that 
considers the complex legacies of knowledge at the heart of its construction. This 
requires contending with ideas about the empirical construction of the Arab 
world by different epistemic actors who engage in specific practices and modes 
of inquiry. Very little has been written to date on the field of Arab public opinion 
inquiry. Rather than simply filling gaps in our knowledge with descriptive 
information, the proposed conceptual framework provides a fresh historical and 
sociological account which considers the politics of knowledge production. I also 
consider the generalisability of this account beyond the case of the Arab region. 
While the contestation over public opinion in the literature is well-documented, 
we have only a faint understanding of how pollsters as practitioners come to 
define and operationalise public opinion. In Part 2 of the thesis, Chapter 3 
(“Searching for Public Opinion: Insights from Pollsters”) seeks to remedy this, 
drawing on interview research with international pollsters. Rather than a 
uniform view of the concept, I identify three competing narratives among 
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international pollsters: one that sees public opinion as scientifically objective and 
absolute, a second that sees public opinion as a malleable social construct, and a 
third that understands public opinion as a form of emancipatory power. 
Contestation over public opinion as a concept is therefore found to extend 
beyond the bounds of scholarly debate, into the practitioner’s realm. 
Chapter 4 (“On the Global Ascendancy of Polling”) follows a trail of practices 
dedicated to the systematic production of data on populations, culminating in a 
global public opinion industry. With a focus on actors and practices, I consider 
the ways in which polls are extensions of other acts of counting and control (i.e., 
enumerations and census productions). I evaluate what exactly it is about polls 
and pollsters that has granted polling “sovereign status” in the area of opinion 
research, and I trace the hegemonic ascendency of polling and survey research 
through the twentieth century from its origins in the American social science 
tradition to its global application. 
Part 3 (Chapters 5, 6, and 7) is dedicated to analysing the case of Arab public 
opinion inquiry. Applying the conceptual framework proposed in Chapter 2, I 
trace the rise of the field of inquiry as it unfolds in three successive stages. 
Chapter 5 (“Stage 1 | Arab Opinion in the Colonial Imaginary”) examines early 
colonial and post-colonial epistemic interventions into the Arab region. These 
epistemic interventions were definitive political acts using questionably sound 
methods, designs, and assumptions. I illustrate early attempts to capture and 
control ideas about Arab opinion with the cases of the King-Crane Commission 
of 1919, Daniel Lerner’s 1958 study of Middle Eastern modernisation in The 
Passing of Traditional Society, and the question of Palestine as it appeared in 
Western polls from the creation of the state of Israel to the Six-Day War.  
Chapter 6 (“Stage 2 | Great Transformations: The Rise of Embedded Institutions 
and Practices”) covers transformative ground and new ways of thinking and 
doing public opinion research. From the Bellagio Conference on survey research 
in Arab countries in 1983 to the invocation of Arab public opinion in American 
policy circles during the Bush years, I outline a period characterised by the rapid 
institutionalisation of Arab public opinion inquiry.  
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Finally, drawing on in-depth interviews with pollsters in Jordan, Lebanon, and 
Palestine, Chapter 7 (“Stage 3 | The Local Reclamation of Public Opinion 
Inquiry”) describes the reclamation of public opinion inquiry by indigenous 
actors, wherein we begin to see the workings of a self-sustaining and self-serving 
approach to producing public opinion knowledge through the emergence of a 
networked and inwardly-focused field of pollsters. The findings suggest an “arc 
of return”, where agency and knowledge production—i.e., who claims the right 
to produce knowledge, and by what means—see a return to the local context.  
Chapter 8 (“Conclusion”) briefly considers the implications of this thesis, both in 
terms of its findings and its aim to disrupt conventional approaches to the study 
of public opinion. I discuss some “missed opportunities” that present avenues for 
future research, which could serve to build on the state-of-the-art of Arab public 
opinion inquiry presented in this thesis.
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Part One 
 
 
Concepts and Theories 
  
  
Chapter 1  
Public Opinion: Disentangling a Contested Concept 
 
There are few terms used more frequently or with more assurance than Public Opinion. It 
is constantly upon our tongues to explain the most ordinary social and political 
occurrences. […] Were it to be lost from our daily vocabulary it would be quite impossible 
to make ourselves understood in any discussion or conversation about political matters. 
And yet, I venture to say, few terms are so incapable of exact definition or, indeed, carry 
with them so indefinite and misty a significance, even to those who employ it most 
frequently. 
Walter J. Shepherd (1909) 
 
What exactly is meant by the term “public opinion”? Fraught with ambiguity and 
with no singular, accepted definition, the term has proven notoriously hard to 
unpack. In the most general sense, there is an understanding that public opinion 
encompasses the views, values, and attitudes of “the majority”, or those that 
political actors perceive, are made aware of, and heed. Within “public opinion” is 
an emphasis on the individual’s role as central to the workings of political 
behaviour, and to speak of public opinion is to assume its “importance if not 
decisive power” in the world (Shapiro 2011). The term has been used 
interchangeably with the “common will, public spirit and public conscience to refer 
to the political aspects of mass opinion”—not simply an aggregate of individual 
opinions but a social force greater than the sum of its parts, with the effect of 
wielding power over government and influencing the process of politics (Erikson 
and Tedin 2016, 1 [emphasis in the original]). The shape of this effect has 
depended to some extent on changing ideas about public opinion in 
contemporary intellectual thought. Robert Peel, former Prime Minister of the 
United Kingdom, described “that great compound of folly, weakness, prejudice, 
wrong feeling, right feeling, obstinacy, and newspaper paragraphs, which is 
called public opinion” (in Durant 1955, 150). British pollster Henry William 
Durant famously wrote that public opinion was “awkward to describe, elusive to 
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define, difficult to measure, and impossible to see” (1955, 152). And political 
scientist Susan Herbst has called it one of the most elusive and complex concepts 
in democratic theory (1998). Its conceptual muddiness has generated theoretical 
refinement and backtracking time and again, and its different articulations 
through the years surely complicate its seeming simplicity. 
Ideologically, public opinion derives from archetypes and assumptions about 
democracy and civic participation, where everyday citizens are considered “a 
prime force in political life” (Shapiro 2011). This archetypal sense of public 
opinion presupposes that people are directly and/or indirectly affected by the 
consequences of political transactions and that they carry with them the potential 
to create and participate in forums for public discourse and deliberation through 
which politically informed collective judgements are expressed. Public opinion in 
this sense is an abstract construct rooted in the proverbial idea of vox populi, vox 
Dei—“the voice of the people is the voice of God”—or else, the voice of the 
people dictates the laws of the social world (Crespi 1997). And there have long 
been conflicting ideas about whose voices belong to “the people”, whose are 
silenced or neglected, what amount of political sway “the people” have, if any, 
and under which conditions.  
The ambiguity of public opinion is compounded by popular definitions. In the 
very first issue of the journal Public Opinion Quarterly, published in 1937, public 
opinion was defined as a “multi-individual situation” in which people express 
their support for or opposition to “some definite condition, person, or proposal of 
widespread importance, in such a proportion of number, intensity, and 
constancy, as to give rise to the probability of affecting action, directly or 
indirectly, toward the object concerned” (Allport, 23). A few short years later, 
Harwood Childs, one of the journal’s founding editors, argued that “there is no 
such thing as the public except in the sense that there may be a particular group 
of persons about which we are speaking” (1940, 41). To study public opinion 
therefore meant nothing more than to study “collections of individual opinions, 
wherever they may be found” (in Oskamp and Schultz 2005, 16), which hardly 
amounted to a vital political force. Scholars like Francis Graham Wilson have 
similarly stressed that “there is no organic entity which can be called public 
opinion. A person is inevitably a member of several or many publics”, which 
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leads to the conclusion that “the voice of the people is neither the voice of God 
nor the utterance of Belial—it is simply the cry of man” (in Morley 1963, 211). 
Today, Google as a tool for the dissemination of information to mass publics 
defines public opinion as “views prevalent among the general public” where “the 
public” means “ordinary people in general; the community” having particular 
interests or connections.2 Public opinion is categorised as a “mass noun”, i.e., a 
noun denoting something which cannot be counted, though counting is an 
almost indispensable part of contemporary public opinion inquiry. 
As we will see, there is no consensus on the meaning or explanatory role of 
public opinion, and a tension exists between its normative claims, namely what 
its political role should be, and how it actually manifests in the real world (in 
both democratic and non-democratic contexts). Further, public opinion in the 
archetypal sense undergoes a transformation once it becomes an empirical 
pursuit. Locating the “views, values, and attitudes of the majority” might at first 
seem an uncomplicated methodological task (simply ask people what they think 
about an issue and take note). But this exercise becomes far more complex once 
we begin to question what constitutes a majority, whose views to count and how, 
what happens to the views of non-majorities, what might the positionality be of 
those who do the asking, and why and how some issues become prioritised over 
others. Normative considerations and epistemological trends are both very much 
at the heart of why certain conceptualisations of public opinion have prevailed 
over others. The contestation over public opinion is therefore related to changing 
contextual fields (historical, scientific, cultural, sociopolitical, and geographical) 
that the concept has inhabited through time and space. In this chapter, I explore 
the ways in which the concept itself has been claimed by competing ideas 
through different empirical means.  
This chapter is dedicated to first unravelling the thoroughly contested concept of 
public opinion, and second to reframing it in order to bring clarity to the ways in 
which we speak about it. This is important because public opinion is sometimes 
treated as a tired concept in political theory; as something done and dusted with 
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 Google search, March 2019. 
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little room for radical reconceptualisation. Despite the global proliferation of new 
forms of media in the past decade, treatment of public opinion in the literature 
has evolved only minimally. With the exception of the Foreign Policy literature 
(see, for instance, Goldsmith and Horiuchi 2012; Tomz and Weeks 2013; Everts 
and Isernia 2015; and Kertzer and Zeitzoff 2017), the concept has not invited 
much in the way of new theory-building. And yet public opinion today provides 
us with a unique problem: it is at once an abstract idea and an empirical object. I 
contend that one casualty of taking public opinion as given is that we lose sight 
of the ways in which it manifests through “specific sites, temporalities and modes 
of deployment as forms of power” (Guillaume and Bilgin 2017, 3). Specifically, 
there is a missing understanding of the inherently political character of the rise of 
global public opinion inquiry. 
The themes and concepts drawn from this analysis are broad-spectrum and cover 
a gamut of literature, not only within International Relations (IR) and Political 
Science, but also in Sociology, History, Political Philosophy and Philosophy of 
Science, Science and Technology Studies (STS), and Media Studies. Disentangling 
the many overlapping ideas, theories, and assumptions circulating through my 
research agenda provides clarification and allows for a discussion of the more 
central conceptual and thematic components and the relevant scholarly debates.  
A note on terminology: in this thesis, I understand “public opinion inquiry” to 
represent the manifold activities concerning the creation, commissioning, 
funding, design, collection, production, analysis, and dissemination of 
information, data, and knowledge about public opinion. The consolidation of 
these activities under the banner of “polling” points to an epistemic industry at 
work. I am concerned with public opinion inquiry inasmuch as it relates to the 
political. I therefore do not include market research in my purview, which shares 
considerable overlap in terms of actors and methods. In this thesis, I use the term 
“industry” in a loose sense to say that public opinion inquiry can be undertaken 
as an economic activity where data and storytelling (ideational factors) and the 
instruments and methodologies used to procure data (material factors) are 
commercially acquired, sold, and shared by commercial actors, and subject to 
operational and quality standards. Usually, the instruments and methodologies 
mobilised in the pursuit of public opinion are large-N aggregative polls, surveys, 
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or interview-based studies conducted through face-to-face, online, telephone, or 
mail-out methods. A poll is simply a record of public opinion. I designate public 
opinion actors (sometimes referred to as polling actors in this thesis) as 
professional pollsters, practitioners and public opinion experts, private research 
firms, state-affiliated research bodies, scholars, academic entities and research 
groups, media spokespeople, think tanks, and business intermediaries (i.e., 
vendors), all of whom are, to some extent invested and/or implicated in the 
political potential of public opinion. “Actors” in this thesis can therefore refer to 
individuals or entities. While I do draw a distinction between commercial actors 
in the field of polling and non-commercial actors, both types are included in my 
analysis. Throughout the thesis, I understand “public opinion research” to be an 
investigative process that invokes a clear set of epistemological assumptions and 
methodological practices, while “public opinion inquiry” can be thought of as the 
institutionalised curiosity about public opinion more broadly. Public opinion in 
this sense refers to the views and attitudes of segments of the population, 
pertaining to specific issues and propositions. Finally, while in the past there was 
a clearer distinction between polls and surveys, the two are generally used 
interchangeably today. The original distinction was that polls referred to shorter 
political or public policy-related studies, while surveys were broader in scope 
and concerned with explanation. In any case, I use the two synonymously in this 
thesis, following on Moon (1999, 24): “opinion polls are surveys just like any 
other”. 
In what follows, I first tackle the challenge of disentangling the concept of public 
opinion by exploring its conceptual roots (Section 1.1) and the various schools of 
thought that have helped to shape the concept (Sections 1.2 to 1.4). In Section 2, I 
present a new way of thinking about public opinion that, I believe, frees it from a 
conceptual rut (at least in the field of IR). This requires disaggregating public 
opinion as an ideal from public opinion as an epistemic object and practice. 
Parsing this important distinction helps us to answer the research questions at 
the heart of this thesis, which fundamentally focus on the latter. 
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1 Public Opinion: Competing Definitions, 
Classifications, and Debates 
Let’s return to the question, What do the people think? This represents the 
fundamental guiding question that has accompanied any and every attempt to 
understand the social pulse and identify patterns in the collective streams of 
consciousness of political societies on practically any matter. With respect to the 
collective opinions of members of a state regarding issues of the state or 
international affairs, a natural extension of the question “what do the people 
think?”—namely, “how do the people think?”—has given rise to competing 
claims about the nature of public opinion and the extent to which it shapes and is 
shaped by the political world. This question of how peoples’ individual 
assessments of matters of the state and international affairs are formed has taken 
theorists down different avenues. Whether individuals in society are considered 
to be politically informed and rational or unpredictable and emotionally-driven 
has led to diverging approaches to defining the concept. 
The general understanding is that public opinion relates to how individuals in a 
society form political opinions or perceptions (thus a type of behaviour), and 
how they self-identify and merge into collectives, whether rationally or 
otherwise. Through collectives, individuals dialogically engage with their 
political world and seek representation en masse. Majorities, minorities, and 
hierarchies of opinion form, either organically or through the influence of 
external and indirect factors (i.e., elite discourses, media, or critical events), 
resulting in perpetually shifting assemblages of collective perceptions, attitudes, 
and opinions (Oskamp and Schultz 2005). But even this general understanding 
leads to analytical complexities.  
Considering the amount of scholarly, political, and popular attention directed 
toward the subject of public opinion and its role in the shaping of everyday 
political dynamics, it may surprise that there is no consensus in the literature as 
to how to define and operationalise it. Its conceptual complexity is well 
documented, and while this has not inhibited theorising, it has generated 
competing discourses. The concept of public opinion has undergone several 
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stages of transformation in contemporary scholarship from the eighteenth 
century through till today and is best treated as an interdisciplinary concept. The 
historical purview of public opinion as an empirical object and a practice—as 
something that we attempt to locate, observe, and measure—is a more recent 
development. Importantly, the empirical contours of public opinion research 
have been greatly shaped by the American social science tradition, steeped in 
liberal and rational ideas that have privileged the individual, the exact sciences, 
and statistics3 (Ross 1991; Delli Carpini 2011). But the cultural and 
epistemological backdrop against which the study of public opinion has emerged 
is generally taken for granted in mainstream literature and in popular discourse. 
This is especially evident in practices of public opinion inquiry in non-Western 
and non-democratic contexts, where we commonly see a universalist application 
of assumptions and methodologies of the American social science tradition, 
transplanted elsewhere without a deeper interrogation of whether this can or 
should be done, or of the reasons and implications for doing so.  
In the following sections (1.1 through 1.4), I explore the historical roots of the 
concept, paying particular attention to the qualities of public opinion which have 
made it so difficult to define, as well as the main schools of thought in the public 
opinion literature. Amid the conceptual confusion, I myself argue that “public 
opinion” cannot be divorced from the theoretical and epistemological traditions 
from which it has emerged. The inherent Western-centricism of these traditions 
raises a methodological challenge. Namely, the architecture of global public 
opinion inquiry is and has been dominated by actors who have been socialised 
into certain patterns of thinking (theoria) and doing (praxis) that shape how 
people (publics) are empirically identified, categorised, treated, and expected to 
behave. This is of critical importance, if only because sometimes the data these 
actors produce is all that we have (empirically-speaking) and fills the universe of 
what we come to know about people. Understanding the limits of empirical 
research is not enough; we must go beyond and consider the ways in which the 
thinking and doing are inherently political and situated. 
 
3
 Etymologically derived from the Italian statista (one who deals with the affairs of the state) and the 
German Statistik (science or knowledge of the state). 
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1.1 Conceptual Roots 
The conceptual development of “public opinion” until the late nineteenth 
century, as the literature will have it, is a European story, while in the twentieth 
century, it is an American one. There are limits to our understanding of non-
Western histories of public opinion, which present challenges when attempting 
to think beyond the dominant definitions and practices. We can negotiate these 
limitations in a pragmatic way. Edward Said warns against imposing boundaries 
demarcating “West” or “East” or “Third World” on conceptual development: “To 
prefer a local, detailed analysis of how one theory travels from one situation to 
another is also to betray some fundamental uncertainty about delimiting the field 
to which any one theory or idea might belong” (in Bayoumi and Rubin 2012, 
197). Yong-Soo Eun advocates for broadening our theoretical horizons beyond 
the binaries of West and non-West in order to encourage global theoretical and 
epistemological dialogues (2018). Amitav Acharya argues that it is not enough to 
say that IR suffers from Western-centricism or that bringing in concepts and 
theories from non-Western contexts is the solution; pluralising the discipline 
should rather “involve multiple but overlapping conversations” (2015). And 
while it is a tricky exercise not to reify the binaries of West/non-West in the 
process of critiquing the conceptual development of public opinion and the field 
of research that has followed from it, what should be stressed are how hierarchies 
and hegemonies of knowledge come about as a result of the historical 
development of the discipline of IR and its core concepts.  
As the socio-political term that we recognize and use in popular discourse today, 
“public opinion” is a relatively recent construct. There is a rough consensus that 
the contemporary rendition of the term gained currency in late seventeenth-
century Europe, around the time of the Enlightenment. At the time public 
opinion meant something like an “opinion disclosed to others” of a general 
concern or concerning the res publica, i.e., public affairs (Speier 1950, 376). Though 
“public opinion” is recent, its constituent elements have far earlier roots (Price 
2008). The “public” (as opposed to “private”) signifier is found in the ancient 
Roman sense of publicus (pertaining to the people; usually adult males) or populus 
(people; “things that concern the people as a body are public, and such concerns 
require public exhibition”) and in the ancient Greek political institution of the 
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polis, or city-state, where public life was lived out (Peters 1995, 7). From early on 
then, an idea persisted that whatever was public was open and visible to the eyes 
of all (including the state), as opposed to private lives, thoughts, opinions, and 
behaviours.  
Part of the difficulty in generalizing public opinion today is surely rooted in the 
problem of pinning down the elusive public. Rather than an identifiable 
homogeneous body or organised crowd, the “public” is and has long been 
thought of as a dynamic pastiche of societal members with variable interests, 
positions, voices, and worldviews, which at times overlap and at times diverge, 
not always in tandem with the unfolding political environment.4 At the turn of 
the twentieth century, Walter J. Shepherd contended that it was modernity that 
made publics, as only with the advent of printing, the telegraph, and processes of 
industrialisation did a sense of solidarity and unity propel the creation of what 
he called “intellectual publics”, i.e., those who could readily communicate, read, 
and access printed materials and were bound by a common knowledge of social 
and political issues (1909, 36). Public opinion here is an imaginary; it is the idea of 
a site where informed members of societies convene and enact political 
dialogues.  
Meanwhile, readings of “opinion” are found in the distinction between Plato’s 
doxa (opinion) and episteme (knowledge), where the former equated with 
unintellectual popular belief (belonging to the many) and the latter with 
unchanging, eternal knowledge (belonging to the few) (Peters 1995, 4). Doxa, in 
the sense of “consensus or views held in common” was considered to be a non-
scientific cognitive classification, as something in “the realm of prejudice, 
probability, and authority, as opposed to ‘science’” (Hacking in Peters 1995, 5). 
Whether the term “opinion” is truly the right fit for public opinion has been 
questioned, with alternative terms like “attitudes”, “perceptions”, “sentiments”, 
“beliefs”, and “impressions” sometimes used as substitutes. The distinctions here 
may seem trifling, but conflating these different terms has empirical implications. 
Attitudes relate to individual predispositions and orientations; perceptions to 
 
4
 An early account of the sociological position of multiple publics is found in Ruskin (1880): “There is a 
separate public for every picture, and for every book” (in Wilson 1962). 
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personal assessments; sentiments to feelings and judgements; beliefs to strong 
convictions; and impressions to imprinted feelings. Opinions, rather, are closer to 
judgements lacking certainty, not necessarily based on fact or knowledge; 
stronger than impressions but weaker than beliefs. Statistical measurements of 
public opinion have never really paid attention to these nuances, capturing more 
variations in individual positions, opinion formation, and intervening cognitive 
biases than the study of public opinion can account for. While there are many 
mental acts closely related to opinion (consider, for instance, the imagination), 
what has been of primary interest is a common bond of association among 
individuals formed once there is knowledge that their opinions are mutual 
(Shepherd 1909, 40). 
Peters (1995) situates the emergence of “public opinion” as a political turn of 
phrase in Enlightenment thinking, a time when the public (which implicitly 
meant a privileged, largely male, land-owning stratum of society) was 
developing into reasoning body, capable of such things as demanding justice in 
the face of feudal order and social upheaval. Several historical moments are 
buried in the term’s past: the spread of literacy in Europe and the circulation of 
literature and news in print form, the expansion of European merchant and 
affluent classes, the Protestant Reformation (see for instance Bagchi 2016), and 
the rise of social institutions like salons and coffee houses where people 
gravitated to join in everyday debates and deliberation (Price 2008, 12). In this 
way, public opinion can be seen as a social and technological invention, “not an 
eternal given of human life. It emerged at a specific historical moment within a 
delicate balance of social and institutional conditions” (Peters 1995, 11). In this 
early stage, it was an ideological construct with fluid interpretation rather than “a 
discrete sociological referent” (Baker in Peters 1995, 13), and it is important to 
keep this in mind as we consider the incorporation of later (technological) 
innovations to the field of public opinion inquiry. 
While the link between seventeenth and eighteenth-century European intellectual 
thought may seem very distant from the contemporary case of Arab public 
opinion, around which this thesis is assembled, we should consider the historic 
roots of the concept for at least two reasons. First, the persuasiveness of public 
opinion as a vital social force continues today. As Peters states, public opinion as 
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“a figure of speech cannot be easily separated from the real social and historical 
convulsions shaking Europe in the late eighteenth and throughout the nineteenth 
centuries: the rhetorical appeals were crucial in the century-long struggle to open 
the state to more and more popular control, from the French Revolution 
onwards” (1995, 13). Public opinion in the Arab region and other non-democratic 
contexts is often studied for signs of a similar struggle between people and their 
authorities. A second reason is that although scientific concepts are presented as 
timeless and universal, independent of historical and political developments, 
there are choices involved in the very act of defining scientific terms which are 
liable to contain the character of history, dispositions, and other contextual 
factors. There is little doubt that this applies to the globalised and highly 
scientised concept of public opinion. 
An entire sub-field of literature exists on the influence of Enlightenment-era 
thinking and liberal ideology on public opinion theory (see La Vopa 1991); this 
body of work forms a major paradigm or tradition of thought. Public opinion in 
democratic theory leads down many different avenues: toward rights and 
representation, political behaviour, forms of liberal governance (democracy, 
direct democracy, or participatory democracy), and questions of support for 
authoritarian regimes. Perhaps there is some truth to Shepherd’s contention that 
“the spread of democratic ideas is partially due to the increase in the number and 
complexity of public opinions” (1950, 46). In any case, this theoretical tradition 
reveals the extent to which the meaning and pursuit of public opinion and the 
development of liberal democracies are inextricably intertwined. 
The turn to science in the early twentieth century marks a paradigmatic shift in 
the conceptual development of public opinion. Multiple factors were at work 
here, such as empirical developments in other fields of research. The science of 
political arithmetic built on the work of William Petty (1623-1687) brought 
statistics and demography into the field of economics, which helped to build a 
greater understanding of the political power of numbers. Developments in the 
field of anthropology (i.e., the outsider’s observation of groups within societies) 
had an influence as well. But it was the institutionalisation of statistics that 
perhaps had the strongest effect. Social statistics as a field emerged in the late 
nineteenth century, “based on objective observation, measurement, and 
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enumerating the activities and characteristics of individuals in order to find out 
the basic principles in the conduct of mass phenomena” (Splichal 1999, 229). 
Once they had gained currency, the rules and ideas of social statistics greatly 
transformed the empirical contours of public opinion as an object of inquiry, 
inviting critical reflections that sought to counter the unrestrained influence of 
positivist thinking on public opinion. 
The great amount of literature on public opinion can be synthesised and divided 
among three categories: traditional perspectives, natural science perspectives, 
and critical theoretical perspectives. I examine each in turn. 
1.2 Traditional Perspectives: Liberalism, Irrationalism, 
Rationalism 
Traditional perspectives have sought to understand the basis of public opinion as 
a source of political legitimacy and form of civic engagement and deliberation. 
These perspectives are part of a long liberal democratic tradition, embedded in 
the works of Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Immanuel Kant, Voltaire, Denis Diderot, 
and other Enlightenment thinkers, as well as John Stuart Mill, Jeremy Bentham, 
and more recently in the literature on democratic peace and the work of Jürgen 
Habermas on the public sphere (Habermas 1962; Baum and Potter 2008; Moy and 
Bosch 2013). Situating the individual at the centre of the problem of politics, 
liberal democratic theory considers the legal limits and moral duties of 
governments “concerning the extent of human affairs over which its authority 
could be legitimately exercised” (Oldfield 2000, 6). The security and protection of 
individual rights in a democratic system invokes a unique contractual 
relationship between rulers and ruled that must be upheld at all costs, and the 
dialogue between the two creates a space in which public opinion becomes a 
crucial mode of communication. Public opinion, in the sense of a general will or 
sentiment that binds people together, represents the singular voice that people 
use to partake in this dialogue; a voice that helps preserve individual interests 
and rights, negotiate with political authorities, and keep in check the powers 
wielded by government. Conversely, in the authoritarian context, public opinion 
is seen in direct tension with political authority, either side able to censure or be 
censured by the other. 
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From the eighteenth century, Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s idea of the volonté générale 
had a notable influence on the modern construction of public opinion (Shepherd 
1909, 42). Rousseau believed that all citizens should be subjected to laws declared 
only by the general will, “divined through reasoned debate, and framed as a 
powerful new tribunal for checking and thus controlling, as right would have it, 
the actions of the state” (Price 2008, 12). Rousseau was among the first to use the 
term in the liberal sense, where public opinion transcended class barriers—as 
something that did not belong only to elites but signified the customs and 
manners of all members of society. By 1780, European writers were using the 
term to refer to “the preponderant force” of mass opinion—neither public 
fickleness nor mob loyalty, but rather “the authoritative judgement of a collective 
conscience, the ruling of a tribunal to which even the state was subject” (La Vopa 
1991, 46). There is a marked idealism present in this early conceptualisation of 
public opinion. It is an abstract hypothetical embedded in a politics of the people. 
It is not an objective fact, a statistical average, or something that can even be seen. 
Rather, it is a symbolic and collectively agreed upon “will of everyone” without 
recourse to a mediator (Hamzaj 2016). 
John Stuart Mill, writing a century after Rousseau, saw in democracy an active 
space for the symbolic representation of the people. Through Mill and others like 
Jeremy Bentham, utilitarian ideas made their way into public opinion theory. In 
this view, individuals attempt to maximise their own interests, which naturally 
conflict with one another, resulting in a rule by majority interest. Thus, public 
opinion “was wedded to the liberal idea of an unregulated ‘marketplace of ideas’, 
with the majority view, ascertained through a free popular vote, as its operational 
definition” (Price 2008, 12). Further, majorities, minorities, hierarchies, in-groups, 
and out-groups become ways in which public opinion was analytically divvied 
up. 
Attempts to elaborate on the contours and characteristics of public opinion 
produced different ideas about whether public opinion was something that could 
be overstated. Much of the early twentieth-century literature appears to be 
conflicted as to whether the public was stable and rational or incoherent and 
easily swayed—or perhaps both. The role of the public in twentieth-century 
democratic theorising thus saw a notable shift: questions about the 
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representational power of citizens grew increasingly sceptical, leading to ideas 
about the public as poorly informed and lacking a capacity for rational 
judgement, being overly emotional and volatile, or simply as pawns easily 
manipulated by modern political demagoguery (Price 2008, 13). World War and 
the collapse of international diplomacy no doubt played a part, and key public 
opinion thinkers like Walter Lippman and Joseph Schumpeter helped spur the 
idea that public opinion cannot and should not influence the foreign policies of 
states. With little empirical proof to say otherwise, the public existed “only as a 
fiction in the robust sense—something fashioned and formed” (Peters 1995, 17). 
In essence, public opinion began to lose the lustre that it once held. 
Lippmann, in his influential texts Public Opinion (1922) and The Phantom Public 
(1925), described publics as being unable to act rationally or understand the 
needs of the state. He encouraged a scepticism of the role of public opinion in 
democratic systems because he saw no adequate, real public ready to engage in 
that so-called sacred dialogue with government. The “phantom public”, as he 
saw it, was a mere illusion, naive and disassociated from the public affairs of 
democratic states. And so, public opinion itself was an illusion; a myth. Lippman 
argued that individuals assume no greater political role than to elect their 
leaders; they are politically ignorant, which leaves the task of domestic and 
foreign policymaking to governing experts. Distrust in the basis for and stability 
of public opinion has been echoed in many studies since (see, for instance, 
Lippmann and Merz 1920; Almond 1950; Converse 1964; Lipset 1966; Verba et al. 
1967; Zaller 1992; and Caplan 2007). As a theoretical principle, this distrust 
culminated in the Almond-Lippmann consensus of the 1950s and 1960s, which 
held that public opinion is too erratic and incoherent to be able to meaningfully 
contribute to foreign policymaking and should not be overstated due to the 
ignorance and “nonattitudes” of ordinary citizens.  
Aligning with realist thought in IR, Hans Morgenthau saw public opinion as a 
hindrance to coherent diplomacy, “thus to permit the public a strong voice in 
policy would be to place the democracies, if not the stability of the international 
system itself, at a distinct disadvantage” (Holsti 2006, 56). Even decades 
following the opinion polling revolution of the mid-twentieth century, John 
Zaller remarked that “no one quite knows what to make of the multiple vagaries 
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of mass opinion” (1992, 29). A good amount of the scholarly literature has 
therefore been devoted to a view of public opinion as fickle, volatile, and 
irrational, susceptible to manipulation and rumour, beholden to personal bias, 
and rarely authentic. With these characteristics, the normative potential of public 
opinion is diminished. In definitional terms, public opinion from this angle has to 
do “with the behaviour of other human beings, in so far as that behaviour crosses 
ours, is dependent upon us, or is interesting to us”, and further, when groups of 
people act upon “the pictures inside the heads of these human beings”, this 
becomes the so-called public opinion (Lippmann 1922, 29).  
On the opposing side, a significant body of literature has treated public opinion 
as something rational and stable, especially when studied over sustained periods 
of time. This has helped to create narratives about political beliefs and belief 
systems, especially around electoral systems. For a time, these two opposing 
literatures on public opinion (as rational and meaningful and as irrational and 
inconsequential) developed in conversation with each other. Research on 
American foreign policy from the Vietnam War-era onwards sought to challenge 
the Almond-Lippmann consensus. A study by William Caspary (1970), for 
instance, found American public opinion to be characterised “by a strong and 
stable permissive mood” (Holsti 1992, 446). Further studies by Mueller (1973), 
Jentleson (1992), and Page and Shapiro (1992) that relied in large part on modern 
polls discovered publics to be rationally-minded, displaying behaviour that 
could, to some extent, be predicted. Page and Shapiro’s pathbreaking work in The 
Rational Public used statistical aggregation of over six thousand different survey 
questions to reveal patterns of stability in collective opinion over a fifty-year 
period. The findings suggested that publics, though ill-informed about the 
political world beyond the domestic, still react to political markers in a rational 
manner. This school of thought understands that public opinion adheres to a 
“common-sense principle” and can act as an independent political force. 
Relatedly, but beyond the scope of my task here, the principle of common sense 
in political behaviour laid the foundations for the dense area of literature relating 
to rational choice theory and voting behaviour. Furthermore, this rationalist 
school of thought presupposes that public opinion “takes on an added rather 
than diminished significance” in policymaking and the conduct of politics (Holsti 
2006, 83). 
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1.3 Modelling the Natural Sciences 
Rationalist thought imbued the study of public opinion with a sense of great 
political potential: if public opinion was truly a rational, reason-based process or 
phenomenon, it might be possible to generalise about opinion formation and 
about how groups and collectives exert power on political processes. This 
question of how people collectively form opinions created new frontiers in the 
behavioural sciences. As a reaction against traditional approaches ,which were 
largely “institutional in focus and eclectic in approach” (Harris 1967, 30), 
behaviouralism sought to explain the psychology and mental actions of 
individuals and groups operating in the political world, providing a cognitive 
basis “for the representation of politics dominated by highly bureaucratised 
political party organisations and interest groups” (Wolin 1960, 574). The shift to 
behavioural-thinking was marked by an emphasis on empirical data drawn from 
scientific methods, on the attainment of facts, and on evidence. It allowed 
scholars to model the social sciences on the natural sciences, where observations 
are derived from experiments and analysed using mathematical methods 
including statistics (see, for instance Easton 1962). It advocated for the “utilisation 
and development of more precise techniques for observing, classifying, and 
measuring data” and defined “the construction of systematic empirical theory as 
the goal of political science” (Harris 1967, 30). It also allowed public opinion 
theory to enter the field of psychology. Philip Converse (1964), for instance, 
suggested that collective attitudes are shaped by belief systems: overarching 
configurations of ideologies and values that provide structure within political 
societies (Greene 2004, 13). From a social-psychological vantage point, then, 
public opinion came to refer to “people’s attitudes on an issue when they are 
members of the same social group” (Habermas 1962, 241).  
While different discursive patterns were thought to manifest as public opinion—
like conversations between elites and their constituents, newspaper editorials, 
protests, elections, and the views of community leaders—they were not readily 
observable until methodological advancements in sampling, questionnaire 
design, cognitive science, and a general “science of polling” were underway 
(Delli Carpini 2011). The popularisation of polls and surveys, which could 
produce empirical data points, was surely aided by the rise of behaviouralist 
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thinking. Polls and surveys (in addition to personal interviews and 
questionnaires) promised access to the aggregate the thoughts and behaviours of 
individuals through quantification. They transformed public opinion into mass 
opinion—a natural and observable phenomenon. They also assumed, as a 
starting point, that people have something meaningful to say, specifically that 
“people’s opinions form the bases for their actions” (Margolis 1984, 64). Actions 
usually meant voting in elections, but more complex political behaviour 
involving different interest groups could also be exposed to this method (for 
instance, opinions toward foreign policy). The effect of modelling public opinion 
(as a concept or variable) on the natural sciences was that it lost its organic, 
abstracted characteristics and came to be something that was invariably out 
there, awaiting scientific discovery. 
The inclusion of scientific techniques like random sampling made their way into 
the study of public opinion after 1915 (Splichal 1999, 230). Analysis based on 
small samples allowed a society to “know itself in a topical and immediate way” 
and measure its achievements and progress (Berelson in Basáñez and Parás 2012). 
During the first part of the twentieth century, “statistics was changing from a 
bare means for more accurate description of mass phenomena into an analytical 
tool for generalisation and explanation of social phenomena” (Splichal 1999, 230). 
Experimentation in cognitive behavioural methods, interview procedures, and 
mathematical formulas calculating and predicting human behaviour were in 
vogue by the 1930s and 1940s, as evidenced by the rapid proliferation of 
American and European scientific journals and associations, research hubs in 
universities, national statistics bureaus, granting agencies, and professional 
research companies dedicated to the cause (Splichal 1999). This period of 
institutionalisation and empirical overdrive was taking place even in the face of 
intense scepticism that regarded public opinion as nothing more than a 
manufactured fiction. Still, from the 1930s onwards, a time when behavioural 
approaches to American political science were becoming popular, polling and 
survey research were increasingly seen as innovative tools that stripped public 
opinion of its ambiguity and conceptual fuzziness. Delli Carpini (2011) notes that 
this fascination with measurement tools created a pressure to monitor people, 
and some saw public opinion becoming closer in kind to surveillance as a result.  
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Alternatives to scientifically-administered polls and surveys did develop in 
tandem. These included the social survey (as an example, see Charles Booth’s Life 
and Labour of the People in London, 1893), psychological attitude studies, and 
“focused interviews” or focus group studies, where deliberately selected 
participants engage in a planned discussions meant to elicit perceptions about an 
issue. These alternatives were nevertheless marginalised in favour of the mass-
observation approach, and “by 1960 public opinion and survey research were, for 
all intents and purposes, synonymous” (Delli Carpini 2011). Thus, within a few 
decades, the science of polling had more or less cemented a hegemonic status, 
and the second half of the twentieth century saw innovations in theory, 
methodology, and the application of the science of polling as a surrogate for 
“public opinion”. The ideological and empirical during this time became so 
closely intertwined that the latter began to stand in for the former. 
Finally, scholars have examined the extent to which the social sciences are 
capable of creating phenomena, as is the case in the natural sciences. Sociological 
perspectives have argued that public opinion research, as a social science, has at 
times produced a version of the world that has entered “into the true” (Osborne 
and Rose 1999). More specifically, the empirical pursuit of public opinion has led 
to the creation of people and societies with particular opinions, expressed in 
particular ways, that would be missing or different in the absence of empirical 
investigation. In this way, public opinion research appears to blur the line 
between the hard and soft sciences. 
1.4 Constructivist and Critical Perspectives 
Political scientist Francis Graham Wilson criticized the behaviouralist turn for 
encouraging uncritical statistical analyses that ignored historical, philosophical 
and institutional inquiry, arguing that “attitudes and opinions are quite 
obviously qualitative, intangible, evaluative, or normative; and in the ordinary 
sense they cannot be counted, weighed, or scaled” (1962, 165). The contestation 
over whether public opinion was something qualitative or quantitative promoted 
a diversification of theories. On the one hand, public opinion was something that 
could be located after aggregating measured sentiments “at a given time, in a 
given area, on a particular issue of public policy” (Wilson 1962, 271). On the other 
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hand, public opinion was a form of philosophical inquiry concerned with how 
the individual positioned herself in relation to her calculation of the collective 
judgment.  
Wilson was part of a broader backlash against behavioural approaches to public 
opinion, which has taken place on multiple intellectual fronts. Of these, 
constructivist thinking has paved the way for a re-philosophising of the concept 
in the post-behavioural era. The constructivist sees public opinion as a social 
construct; the term itself is a rhetorical device. In this spirit, Klaus Krippendorff 
writes that “surely, public opinion is not a fact of nature that could be found 
somewhere unattended, nor is it a tangible artifact that could be manufactured 
and photographed” (2005, 130). It does not exist independent of human action, 
but can be experienced through the everyday use of language and common 
associations (Krippendorff 2005, 130). 
Whereas many definitions of public opinion have suffered from being 
universalist or “thin” and fail to problematise its social, cultural, and historical 
development, a “thick” descriptive approach (see Geertz 1973) instead allows us 
to understand public opinion as a context-dependent phenomenon. To some 
extent, this is not novel. In the nineteenth century, German writer Christoph 
Martin Wieland proclaimed that public opinion, if it exists at all, “may be a 
rhetorical construct, used to retrospectively motivate and legitimate a particular 
historical transformation at the same time as it is used prospectively to justify 
specific behaviours and courses of action” (in Wetters 2008, 28). It is a force “by 
which historical events are rationalised” and is thus part of history itself (Wetters 
2008, 28). Another helpful direction comes from Krippendorff in the field of 
communications: 
[Public opinion] has a reality that is constituted in what people do. It does 
not exist independent of human actions [...]. It is the common use of 
language and its associated perception that makes public opinion an 
undisputed fact. Saying that the public is concerned about something, 
favours something, is against something, decides something, likes to hear 
about something, supports something, has attitudes about something, 
expresses its beliefs, and acts on them personifies the public. Personification 
is the most pervasive metaphorical root of the social construction of public 
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opinion. Personification makes actors out of objects, here out of an 
abstraction (2005, 130 [emphasis in the original]).  
Krippendorff and Wieland both invoke the idea that public opinion is 
performative as well as historically anchored. This notion of the performativity of 
public opinion can be extended to the empirical realm, especially when we 
consider the sensationalisation of opinion in the media, who participate in 
constructing public opinion by reporting and publicising it.  
Another helpful perspective considers the hegemonic rise of polling and its 
implications for our understanding of “public opinion”. Taeku Lee (2002) argues 
that the explicit emphasis on producing data is the reason why data is now 
routinely conflated with public opinion itself—indeed, that it helps to construct 
the idea of public opinion. Academic journals such as Public Opinion Quarterly 
have grown to favour quantitative research over other methods.5 Innovations and 
improvements in scientific sampling theory, polling technologies, psychological 
tools, and the accuracy of polls in determining elections have indeed led some to 
see surveys and polls as the desiderata of public opinion knowledge (Korzi 2000). 
The observation of the phenomenon changes the phenomenon itself. As Lee 
notes, “with the growing dominance of opinion polls, survey researchers 
increasingly command authority over the substantive parameters of public 
opinion as well—over what, when and how mass opinion is measured, analyzed 
and interpreted” (2002, 296). 
Other critical perspectives exist. Sociologist Pierre Bourdieu memorably declared 
that “public opinion does not exist” in a 1979 critique of opinion polls. Because 
data runs through the filter of an interpreter (i.e., journalists and social scientists), 
results are liable to be misinterpreted. This critique argued that polls wrongly 
assumed that each individual was capable of producing an opinion, that all 
opinions were of equivalent value, and that there is a real consensus around the 
issues probed in polls and surveys. “Following Bourdieu, post-structuralist critics 
have seen polls as the mythic constructions of a modernist age, the products of a 
 
5
 As an example, the share of articles in Public Opinion Quarterly on the topic of race that relied on survey 
and polling data grew from 14.3% in the early 1940s to 91.3% in the early 1990s (Lee 2002). 
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series of epistemological and methodological blunders whose factual appearance 
signifies a smug rationality” (Lewis 1999, 200). In this sense, polling is 
responsible for constructing (the idea of) public opinion rather than measuring or 
locating it (Lewis 2001, 10). Similarly, according to Ginsberg, polls have the effect 
of domesticating public opinion, in other words restructuring and abridging it in 
such a way that its intensity is diminished (in Herbst 1992).  
Critical theoretical approaches are also found in the works of Elizabeth Noelle-
Neumann on the silencing of public opinion (1974) and of Jürgen Habermas on 
the evolution of public opinion within the confines of the public sphere (1962). 
Learnings from cognitive science suggest that patterns of attitudinal stability 
found in polls and surveys might be a product of the method itself (see, for 
instance, Hall et al. 2013). And Limor Peer has argued that the practice of opinion 
polling is “a disciplinary mechanism which creates a ‘public that has opinions’, 
and that the consequences of this process include the exercise of power, 
surveillance and control” (1992, 230). Measurement error and non-opinions, i.e., 
“Don’t know” and “Refused” responses in questionnaires, remain greatly 
undertheorised and yet involve the systematic negation and writing off of 
collected non-opinions. While these critiques are extremely helpful, they are few 
and far between, not wholly unified, and their application to the non-Western, 
non-democratic context is limited. For this reason, there remains much uncharted 
terrain in this critical vein.  
2 Reframing Public Opinion 
Public opinion in its theoretical form has been operationalised and formulated as 
an empirically observable phenomenon, and there is an abundance of literature 
that seeks to “test” it. As we know by now, it is through some of this empirical 
work that public opinion has come to be known as rational (Nincic 1992; Page 
and Shapiro 1992; Caspary 1970; Mueller 1973; Jentleson 1992), as irrational 
(Lippmann 1922 and 1925; Campbell et al. 1960), as a hindrance to diplomacy 
(Morgenthau in Holsti 1992), and as inextricably linked to democracy (Lasswell 
1941; Crespi 1989; Shapiro 2011). It has been deeply distrusted as a politically 
viable force (Lippmann and Merz 1920; Almond 1950; Converse 1964; Lipset 
1966; Verba et al. 1967; Zaller 1992; and Caplan 2007). And it has opened up new 
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frontiers in the behavioural sciences (Harris 1967; Wolin 1960). The scientific 
approach for understanding public opinion has advocated for the “utilisation 
and development of more precise techniques for observing, classifying, and 
measuring data” aimed at “the construction of systematic empirical theory” 
(Harris 1967, 30). And importantly, this approach has come to eclipse most others 
(see Brulle et al. 2012). In the wider literature, constructivist and critical 
perspectives have problematised some of the epistemological and cultural 
assumptions associated with the practice of public opinion inquiry (Bourdieu 
1979; Beniger 1992; Noelle-Neumann 1993; Herbst 1992, 1993, and 2001; Verba 
1996; Osborne and Rose 1999; Krippendorff 2005; and Lee 2002). These 
perspectives, though numbered, are helpful and necessary interventions into the 
dominant scientific discourses on public opinion. However, what is missing is a 
critical historical analysis of the field of public opinion inquiry. 
Looking at the current state of the literature, the main authoritative claims that 
prevail today are (1) that public opinion exists and operates in some capacity in 
the political world, (2) that it can be measured, recorded, and used predictively, 
and (3) that particular tools (i.e., the poll; the survey) and practices (i.e., polling; 
statistics; social classifications) are among the best methods for doing so. Entire 
global industries have swelled since the science of polling was first popularised 
in the 1930s (Howell 2015; Lepore 2015; Wuthnow 2015). Today, opinion polling 
and electoral analysis are mutually co-dependent, and media landscapes have co-
opted the very same methods, practices, and assumptions in their own attempts 
to appeal to their designated publics. 
Operational definitions of public opinion are useful and necessary when the goal 
is just that—to operationalise and make use of it. But as the scientific approach 
that sees public opinion as something measurable has eclipsed other approaches, 
we must contest this further because it is rooted in epistemological trends in the 
social sciences, which are subject to change and which privilege certain types of 
knowledge. Take for instance Osborne and Rose’s sociological argument that 
“the term ‘public opinion’ conjures up, as its necessary technical aspect, the 
public opinion poll” (1999, 371). Public opinion as an idea is often conflated with 
its technical mirror image, i.e., “what the polls poll” (Moodie 1975, 314). What I 
see as fundamentally problematic in the development of public opinion as a 
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concept is this conflation between its ideal and observational forms. People tend 
to speak of the two as one. Thus, while the literature showcases many different 
definitions and uses for public opinion, there remains a common treatment of 
public opinion as a monolithic concept, where the underlying epistemological 
and philosophical assumptions are wholly taken for granted and where there is 
no differentiation between ideas and technology (for instance, see Furia and 
Lucas 2006; Lynch 2009; Telhami 2013; and Pollock 2014).  
For my purposes, a critical re-examination of public opinion entails 
problematising the value ascribed to public opinion data, which, instead of 
objective fact, is the result of dominant practices and epistemological 
assumptions in contemporary social science that have led to a disproportionate 
amount of attention, resources, and politicising around public opinion research. 
And importantly, these practices and assumptions are carried out by (groups of) 
actors (i.e., pollsters, experts, social scientists, and other researchers) whose role 
is generally left out of the literature. I expand on this in Section 2.1. 
2.1 A Missing Link in IR Scholarship 
Within IR scholarship, what does public opinion theory look like? Baum and 
Potter (2008) provide a visualisation of this (see Figure 1) in the form of a 
simplified causal map of actors and interactions present in the mainstream 
literature. 
 POLLING AND THE PURSUIT OF ARAB PUBLIC OPINION 56 
 
 
Figure 1: Causal interactions in the public opinion literature. 
Source: Baum and Potter 2008, 41.  
Disregarding for the moment that this depiction neglects scale and positionality, 
what it shows is directional arrows illustrating some of the main arguments 
supporting causal relationships between different variables. Public opinion has 
been shown to influence foreign actors and decision-makers and be influenced in 
turn. Public opinion has been shown to shape media messaging, while the media 
at times can shift public opinion. Critical events become politicised and weigh on 
public opinion. The link between opinion and foreign policy can been explained 
through the presence of intervening factors such as elites, decision makers, and 
the media. Through the use of this diagram, the authors assert that “scholars 
have investigated every conceivable causal link between the public, decision 
makers (foreign and domestic), and the media”, and stress that “this web of 
causal arrows has become so dense that further investigations into these narrow 
individual pathways is likely to produce diminishing returns” (Baum and Potter 
2008, 41). Instead of continuing to examine the directional relationships in Figure 
1, the authors encourage scholars to shift analytical gaze away from static causal 
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snapshots and towards new research questions that probe dynamic interactions 
between multiple overlapping variables (for instance, the media-opinion-foreign 
policy nexus).  
But more interesting than this is what Baum and Potter’s diagram tells us about 
the state of the literature on public opinion today. Indeed, scholarly attention 
tends to focus on the individual constitutive elements and causal pathways 
present in this depiction. This raises a number of issues. For instance, it is not 
exactly clear what “public opinion” is here (i.e., an abstract idea, a research 
output, a process, etc.). Similarly, it is unclear if the same conceptualisation of 
public opinion is used or is applicable for each causal relationship. Further, how 
can we capture the changing definitions, qualities, and uses for public opinion 
over time with an ahistorical and atemporal framework such as this one? Figure 1 
also tells us more plainly how public opinion inquiry has been sidelined by 
mainstream scholarship. Where are the pollsters, on whom we rely for raw and 
processed data, evidence, and analytical interpretations? Surely, they are an 
intermediary actor situated between the public and public opinion, or between 
public opinion and decision makers depicted in Figure 1. Likewise, the 
multimillion-dollar global industry for public opinion, that has developed over 
decades and shares an intimate history with American and European war-time 
foreign policy, is completely shielded from view. 
Given that actors in the field of public opinion inquiry today engage the very 
same methods, share technical resources, subject data to similar analytical 
treatments, and presuppose the same grounded assumptions about the basic 
operational qualities of collectives, opinion-formation, and human behaviour, it 
is somewhat surprising that the actual tools and practical activities that facilitate 
our understanding of public opinion are shielded from mainstream scholarly 
investigation. In bypassing these fundamental building blocks and taking public 
opinion as given, as something out there that can always be measured and is a 
stable concept, I believe that the strength of the causal linkages in Baum and 
Potter’s depiction begin to weaken. 
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2.2 Reconceptualising Public Opinion 
Taking stock of the issues at hand, I argue that IR is in need of a 
reconceptualisation of public opinion that speaks about the international while 
also considering the historical and geopolitical situatedness from which public 
opinion as a concept has emerged. While there are many different ways public 
opinion might be reconceived, I find it helpful to distinguish between theory, 
data, and practice (thinking public opinion and doing public opinion are two very 
different things). This requires us to think about “process, change and flows 
through a continuous reflection on the assumptions enabling claims to 
knowledge”, thereby allowing us to “enhance our understanding of the multiple 
facets and circulations of power and authority” embedded in public opinion 
inquiry (Basaran et al. 2017). 
There are many different ideas, claims, and definitions that fall under the banner 
of “public opinion”. I therefore encourage a distinction between public opinion 
as an ideal-type and as an epistemic pursuit (or object or practice):  
(1) As an ideal-type or referent, public opinion is an ideological vehicle that 
carries sets of views, actions, reactions, deliberations, expressions, and 
preferences of social collectives. It has symbolic power. Only by postulating the 
ideal concept can we begin to theorise how public opinion manifests politically. 
As an ideal, public opinion can be further problematised on the basis of its own 
historical situatedness, though that is not my primary task. 
(2) As an epistemic pursuit, public opinion is a form of knowledge production, 
i.e., the organised activities through which knowledge about peoples’ views, 
actions, reactions, etc., is created and pursued. The pursuit of public opinion 
engages certain practices and methodologies that are evolving and largely 
determined by the scientific, cultural, and dispositional milieus in which research 
takes place. These practices comprise a set of activities, assumptions, and 
relational links between epistemic actors working in cohort. Epistemic actors, i.e., 
pollsters, practitioners, and scholars, are directly and indirectly responsible for 
shaping ideas about public opinion in the first ideal-typical sense. Their data, 
which often comes to be called “the public opinion”, is a legitimating tool—it has 
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the ability to shape political outcomes and inform decision-making. In turn, data 
derives legitimacy from a generally-stable confidence in the science of public 
opinion research. Public opinion, as an epistemic pursuit, can be seen as 
“performative” in the sense that it is constructed and staged by actors with a 
desire or obligation to transform raw data into new knowledge.  
For simplicity’s sake, let’s call the ideal-type public opinion1 and the epistemic 
pursuit public opinion2. Both have evolved over time, alongside changing trends 
and “paradigm shifts” in the social sciences.6 I illustrate this evolution below:  
 
Figure 2: Distinguishing between public opinion1 and public opinion2. Changing definitions 
and approaches over time. 
 
The illustration above separates the two sense of public opinion, tracing key 
developments and approaches to uncovering public opinion over time. Public 
opinion1 in the ideal, abstract referent sense is a constant concept in the liberal 
theoretical tradition, following from Rousseau’s idea of the general will. But the 
 
6
 The idea of paradigm shifts in the sciences belongs to Thomas Kuhn, who used it to explain scientific 
revolutions in the natural sciences. By Kuhn’s definitions, paradigm shifts would not apply to the social 
sciences, though others have “borrowed” the term to describe disciplinary changes in the dominant modes 
of thinking. See Kuhn 1962. 
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dominant definition of public opinion has changed over time. In this illustration, 
I look back no earlier than the twentieth century, showing the transition from vox 
populi, to the views of the majority, to the sum of individual opinions, to the 
views and attitudes of segments of the population on particular issues. 
Importantly, the evolution of the concept does not read as neatly in the literature 
as on this simplified timeline. Instead, I acknowledge the progression of ideas 
about public opinion as an ideological construct. Even on this ideological level, 
we see an increasing “scientisation” of public opinion.  
On the knowledge production front, public opinion2 as an epistemic pursuit can be 
mapped more closely against theoretical and methodological developments in 
the social sciences. The developments displayed in the illustration reflect the 
Western/American social science tradition, within which the study of public 
opinion in the twentieth century is rooted. I display two levels of change. The 
upper level corresponds with theoretical paradigms that have influenced how the 
study of public opinion is carried out. These include the positivist tradition, 
behaviouralism, post-positivist/critical perspectives, and the media-
communications perspective. Where one new paradigm begins, the preceding 
one does not necessarily end (its relevance persists). I focus more on the advent 
of these modes of thinking. Meanwhile on the lower level, public opinion2 is 
described through the dominant methodological tools and technologies that 
emerge over time. Statistics, voting, and ethnographic methods pre-date the 
twentieth century, but were prevalent at the start. The use of polls and surveys 
spread through the 1930s, focus groups and interview techniques were refined 
through the 1960s with developments in the field of cognitive science, Internet 
polling boomed at the turn of the millennium, and more novel methods such as 
statistical modelling, forecasting, and big data analytics (including social media 
analysis) are now widespread and undergoing technical and theoretical 
refinement. As an epistemological pursuit with knowledge production as its 
main objective, public opinion2 is truly a sign of the (scientific) times. Again, the 
trend toward increased “scientisation” is clear. 
The implications for Figure 2 are that we cannot divorce the idea of public 
opinion from its theoretical and epistemological roots. A distinction between 
these two forms of public opinion brings clarity to the literature, where the only 
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consensus is that there is no consensus as to what public opinion is. When the 
two forms of public opinion are conflated, which they often are, “Public 
Opinion” (capitalised to denote the grand concept) appears to be this: 
 Public Opinion = public opinion1 + public opinion2 
We might say that Public Opinion is the sum of its theoria and praxis. I find it 
helpful to provide this equation because in this thesis, I am fundamentally 
concerned with public opinion2. While I stop short of militantly using these two 
terms (public opinion1 and public opinion2) through the remainder of the thesis, I 
can at least better stake my claims by clarifying this distinction from the outset 
and “choosing my battle”. 
There are broader theoretical implications for deconstructing public opinion as 
such. For one, it necessarily brings us closer to the relationship between 
knowledge production and power. As Weiler writes, the systematised 
production of (social) scientific knowledge creates epistemic hierarchies whereby 
“different forms and domains of knowledge are endowed with unequal status” 
(2009, 2). This is most evident in the distinction between the hard and soft 
sciences, where the quality of “hardness” has been equated with a more precise 
organisation of knowledge. Further, less exact or less scientific forms of 
knowledge are sometimes relegated to lower ranks of prestige (see Krause 2016; 
Anthony 2006). The influence of (Western) scientific principles and assumptions 
is very much embedded in how societies talk about and attempt to divine the 
public opinion. The issue of privileging some forms of knowledge over others is 
also a matter of whose knowledge it is (or who produces it). This recalls 
Burawoy’s reflexive query, knowledge for whom? and knowledge for what? (2005).  
In positioning the development of public opinion inquiry squarely within the 
Western social science tradition, we must address what it means to impose or 
transport ideas and assumptions about public opinion to other geographical and 
political contexts. As Mark Tessler hints with reference to Arab public opinion 
research, “the epistemological and methodological assumptions on which survey 
research is based may in some cases be inapplicable in the Arab world” (1998, 
79). With this thesis, I therefore want to contribute to literature that challenges 
the “paradigmatic hegemony” of Western knowledge norms (Weiler 2009, 4; 
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Krause 2016), and to problematise the ascendency of a globalised, but deeply 
Americanised, way of knowing, thinking, and doing public opinion.  
3 Conclusion 
In this chapter, I reviewed the different debates and perspectives in the literature 
relating to public opinion. For instance, traditional approaches to defining and 
explaining public opinion are bound by rationality. Constructivist perspectives 
have contributed to ideas about public opinion as a social construct, not a 
material fact but as something that is constituted through the act of searching for 
it. Sociological insights have helped to shape the idea that publics are borne of 
the use of specific epistemological tools and techniques. I argue that the 
prevailing conceptualisations of public opinion within IR are analytically 
inadequate because public opinion is not a monolith, but a conflation of different 
variables and epistemological positions. At times, it is an abstract, ideal construct, 
used to help make sense of the political world and our role in affecting it as 
individuals and as societies (public opinion1). At other times, we are referring to an 
epistemic practice that contains assumptions about how we can come to know 
public opinion (public opinion2). In breaking from conventional approaches to 
conceptualising public opinion, I encourage a unique focus on the role of 
knowledge production in defining, describing, measuring, classifying, creating, 
and controlling the vox populi, wherein the polls and surveys become political 
artefacts. Public opinion is not a given; rather, a more inductive approach to the 
issue allows us to engage the fundamental questions of knowledge for whom? and 
knowledge for what? in the context of the rise of global polling. 
 
  
Chapter 2  
The Development of Arab Public Opinion Inquiry: Elements 
of a Conceptual Framework 
 
Knowledge means rising above immediacy, beyond self, into the foreign and distant. The 
object of such knowledge is inherently vulnerable to scrutiny; the object is a ‘fact’ which, 
if it develops, changes, or otherwise transforms itself in the way that civilizations 
frequently do, nevertheless is fundamentally, even ontologically stable. To have such 
knowledge of a thing is to dominate it, to have authority over it.  
Edward Said (1978) 
 
With the problem of public opinion laid bare, this chapter moves ahead in 
tethering different elements together to sketch a conceptual framework, i.e., a 
system of concepts, arguments, and theories, which support the key arguments in 
the thesis. While the goal of this framework is to provide an adequate account of 
the development of Arab public opinion inquiry (and not the state of Arab public 
opinion), I acknowledge that there is still much to be done in the way of theory-
building and information-gathering, especially considering that the subject 
remains relatively untapped. Although many studies report the results of polls, 
surveys, and experiments so as to theorise how public opinion operates in 
democratic and authoritarian settings at different points in time, there is no 
existing, cohesive body of literature or seminal text that explains the rise of Arab 
public opinion inquiry or considers how pollsters have sought to claim the region 
as an object of study. All we really have are clues and methodology discussion 
pieces which recognise that the field of “Arab public opinion” is indeed growing 
and carries unique methodological traits and obstacles. For instance, Michael 
Suleiman has written on the “agonies and ecstasies” of conducting survey 
research in the Arab World (1985). Faires al-Braizat writes briefly on the 
development polling in Jordan (2004). Marc Tessler and Amaney Jamal discuss 
opportunities for political attitude research in closed research climates in Middle 
East and North African countries (2006). Mohamed Zayani has considered the 
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role of the media landscape in emancipating Arab public opinion (2008a). 
Lindsay Benstead describes the increasing openness of the Arab world to political 
survey research (2018). And finally, the case of polling Palestine has been 
explored in greater depth in studies by Christina Zacharia Hawatmeh (2001) and 
Erika Schwarze (2012; 2015).  
The conceptual framework that I build breaks from the status quo by considering 
the ways in which the development of inquiry pertaining to political opinion in 
the region is inextricably tied to the politics of knowledge production. It is a more 
sociological account that seeks to illustrate how the landscape for “Arab public 
opinion” has been dynamically constructed and reconstructed through practices 
and by actors (whether foreign actors, foreign actors embedded in the region, 
local Arab actors subordinate to foreign influence, or autonomous local actors). 
The framework developed in this chapter is later applied in Part 3 of the thesis, 
which analyses the Arab-region case in depth. 
My central argument follows that public opinion data cannot be divorced from 
the context from which it emerges. I identify a seemingly nascent field of public 
opinion inquiry pertaining to the region and explore the ways in which it is 
largely a product of externally-driven historical and market forces propagated by 
informational actors (i.e., pollsters, practitioners, experts, and scholars) who enact 
specific practices (i.e., polling). Through the history and development of these 
practices and the spread of the science of polling, we learn that these are not 
apolitical acts. When we fail to consider the contextual backdrop, public opinion 
data and theory can only be taken “as is”—as something static and analytically 
divorced from social and political realities. Paying attention to the contexts from 
which data is and has been produced and procured not only allows for deeper 
theorising, but helps us to understand the rationale behind the pursuit of global 
public opinion and the power dynamics inherent in that pursuit. Most 
importantly, it tells us something about the situatedness of knowledge 
production and the extent to which knowledge of something like “Arab public 
opinion” can reify and distort accounts of political life, can lend power to those 
with claims to that knowledge, and can sideline other/local/personal forms of 
knowledge.   
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The main premise of the conceptual framework is that public opinion inquiry 
pertaining to the Arab region and its people can be seen to unfold in three 
successive stages. Each stage encapsulates a dominant mode of inquiry for the 
study of Arab public opinion. In the first stage, political opinion served as a form 
of colonial knowledge. Epistemic interventions and investigations were forged in 
Stage 1 by foreign actors, whose practices of inquiry rendered local societies as 
“passive patients” (Wagoner 2003, 748). Following on Wagoner, the knowledge 
produced in the Arab region during this time was not of the region; rather, it 
emerged through the combining of pre-defined, imported forms of scientific 
knowledge and “the raw data provided by the indigenous social and cultural 
forms of the colonised society” (Wagoner 2003, 748). In the second stage, the 
rapid institutionalisation of social science research propelled the rise of a 
transnational network of actors engaged in studying patterns of local opinions 
and political behaviour. Developing alongside the commercialisation of polling 
in the West and the expansion of an Arab media sphere that fostered greater civic 
communication across borders, Arab opinion inquiry became a collaborative 
endeavour between foreign and indigenous epistemic actors. While relationships 
were collaborative, knowledge with a Western scientific stamp of approval 
continued to be prioritised and popularised. In the third stage, which we see 
most formally today, there has been a shift toward the reclamation of practices 
and knowledge production by indigenous actors. This localisation of knowledge 
production to suit local needs represents one of the key findings of this thesis. 
The expectation that local actors lacked agency in the field of knowledge 
production has increasingly turned out not to be the case. What emerges in the 
third stage is a clear distinction between the independent “ethics of research” of 
local actors, and foreign scientific procedures of research. I find that the foreign 
monopoly over knowledge of “Arab public opinion” is being displaced by the 
local.  
To summarise, taken together, these three stages describe a process that begins 
with the intervention of foreign experts, develops into a transnationally-
dispersed and networked marketplace of pollsters and related actors, and then 
evolves, adapts, and responds to local contexts such that the study of 
contemporary public opinion is, in a sense, reclaimed at the local level, by Arab 
polling actors who have a far greater stake in the political potential of civic 
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dialogue. While preliminary research would seem to suggest that the 
proliferation of public opinion data relating to the region is a recent 
phenomenon, the themes and theories drawn into this analysis are used to weave 
a historical account of the pursuit of Arab public opinion (the narrative laid out 
in Part 3 reaches as far back as the end of the First World War, though enriching 
this historical analysis with more archival research would likely reveal earlier 
roots). Knowing this, it becomes critically important to trace the evolution of the 
field, and much of this thesis is dedicated to a mapping exercise that relies on 
disparate sources and evidence, simply because this story of the rise of Arab 
public opinion inquiry is one that has yet to be told. 
This chapter is divided into different theoretical discussions that are pertinent to 
the conceptual framework: namely, the empirical construction of the Arab world 
(Section 1), the legitimacy of data (Section 2), actors and group dynamics (Section 
3), and processes of localisation (Section 4). Each of these elements is in some way 
modeled into the conceptual framework presented in Section 5, which builds and 
elaborates the three-stage model of inquiry described above.  
There are of course limits to the extent to which I can provide full and impartial 
evidence of the three-stage model of inquiry at work in the real world. Perfect 
knowledge is unattainable. Further, I take a bird’s eye view of the development 
of Arab public opinion inquiry, which means that many nuances, outliers, 
diverse and diverging elements, and unique voices in the field are not always 
captured and accounted for. Describing a general phenomenon while avoiding 
the trappings of being reductive is a fine line to walk, and I acknowledge the 
limitations of this approach. However, with little existing scholarship to build on, 
a first attempt should be sufficiently broad to identify patterns and carve a space 
for new theoretical discussions. In the sections that follow, I engage and 
intertwine issues beyond the concept of public opinion that are nonetheless 
centrally important to what I identify to be the field of Arab public opinion 
inquiry. 
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1 The Empirical Construction of the Arab World 
Of all the manifold ways in which the Arab world has been “constructed” by 
outside forces—for instance, by rhetoric built on essentializing words and 
images, or by sensationalised popular portrayals in Western media—I am most 
interested, for the purposes of this thesis, in the construction of the Arab region 
as an empirical object of study. As an empirical object, I am concerned with the 
ways in which the region as a whole has been reflected and recast by the 
“investigative modalities” (Cohn 1996) of social science and its observations of 
people’s political behaviour. By concentrating on empirical observations and 
measurement via public opinion inquiry, I may be charged with denying agency 
to the very people who come to be observed, counted, recorded, and classified. 
At this point then, I should make clear that people’s opinions do matter and are 
their own, not the property of data creators or scientific investigators. To focus on 
the industry of public opinion research is not to say that public opinion does not 
emerge elsewhere. In fact, it is everywhere—at kitchen tables and in street cafes, 
in schools and universities, in small communities, major cities, places of worship, 
in news media and in technology, in elections, protests, and revolutions. So much 
of public opinion in the ideal sense is wholly organic, and evades capture by any 
scientific method or mean. By drawing the reader away from the question of 
what the public opinion is and toward questions about its production, I do not 
seek to diminish the existence and importance of what people feel and think 
collectively, in the Arab world or elsewhere. Rather, I aim to concentrate on a 
phenomenon—a specific type of observation—that is in great need of analytical 
appraisal.  
The very idea of an “Arab world” is, in many ways, an extension of other 
essentialising constructs rooted in the notion that people across the region 
constitute a single regional community. Commonly used as a blanket social and 
geographical signifier, the idea of the Arab world invites us to problematize the 
ways in which external actors have gazed upon, attempted to define, studied, 
classified, framed, and reified its existence. Defining the region is, as Culcasi 
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warns, “a precarious endeavour” (2010, 583). It doesn’t exist as a monolith7, but 
comprises at the moment of nearly two-dozen countries with an estimated 
population of 423 million, stretching across two continents, containing disparate 
origins, unique historical and political developments, extraordinary experiences 
of nationhood and nation-building, many self-ascribed and/or legally recognised 
identities, diverse religions and sets of social values, wide distributions of wealth, 
overlapping institutional and social structures, uneven economic landscapes, 
multidirectional future trajectories, and the list goes on. The tendency in popular 
discourse to use the terms “Arab public opinion” or “public opinion in the Arab 
world” speaks to how public opinion is similarly treated as a monolith; as a 
regional phenomenon even in the absence of uniform experiences and 
characteristics among people inhabiting the same spaces. These terms also 
indicate a habit of simplifying information into manageable, generalisable units 
of analysis—a practice that is generally encouraged by audiences who use public 
opinion data, such as policymakers and the media. 
I seek to further problematise the shorthand label of “Arab public opinion” 
(though I do employ the term in this thesis when referring to it in the sense of a 
social/empirical construction). This term is found in both academic scholarship8 
and policy9, and is sometimes used in the abstract way (public opinion1), but more 
often connotes aggregate opinion polling and survey data taken from many 
(though not always the same sets of) countries in the Middle East and North 
Africa. The justificatory claim is that this term is more nuanced and scientific 
than previous attempts to understand and capture the pulse of the region. For 
example, a policy brief from the Washington Institute for Near East Policy 
(WINEP) is prefaced with this:  
 
7
 The identifier “Arab” is used in the sense that countries in the region’s core have Arabophone and Arab-
majority populations, but it is admittedly problematic for its exclusion of non-Arab identities. 
8
 See, for instance, “Arab Public Opinion and the Gulf War” by Telhami (1993); “Determinants of Arab 
Public Opinion on Foreign Relations” by Furia and Lucas (2006); Voices of the New Arab Public by Lynch 
(2006); “Courting and Containing the Arab Street: Arab Public Opinion, the Middle East, and US Public 
Diplomacy” by Zayani (2008b); The World through Arab Eyes by Telhami (2013). 
9
 For example, David Pollock’s 2007 testimony “Arab Public Opinion”, given before the US House of 
Representatives, as well as Daniel Brumberg’s 2002 testimony “Arab Public Opinion and US Foreign 
Policy: A Complex Encounter”, prepared for the Congress of the United States, House of Representatives. 
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In the Middle East, the Gulf War shattered many stereotypes and 
preconceived notions, not least among them, about the so-called ‘Arab 
street’. Commentators regularly depict a mythologised and often 
demonised ‘Arab street’—an ominous urban mass that is sometimes 
depicted as intimidating regimes, sometimes as being held captive by 
them; and sometimes, oddly enough, as both. But Arab opinion is not 
uniform, rather it is diverse, and operates in dynamic interaction with 
Arab government policies; moreover, its very nature must not be assumed 
but measured (Pollock 1993). 
This piece, authored by David Pollock, goes on to say that a more sophisticated 
reading of Arab publics which appreciates the internal diversity of opinion in the 
region, is possible in order to move beyond the exaggerated and monolithic 
views of the Arab street. The Arab street, based on anecdotal evidence of public 
and private life, “evokes exotic images of mystery, mobs, and mullahs; it sounds 
vaguely subterranean, if not sinister; and it is most often regarded in the West 
with a peculiar mixture of fascination, dismissal, and fear” (Pollock 1993, 1). By 
contrast, Pollock suggests that the term “Arab public opinion” is scientific, 
neither uniform nor static, and can be tailored “to fit individual Arab 
governments, societies, and circumstances” (Pollock 1993, xiv). It has room built 
in for refinements that can be supplemented by statistics, modelling, and other 
tools, which flag inconsistencies and provide “among the more objective, 
interesting, and also unfamiliar pieces of evidence in the field” (Pollock 1993, 27). 
For this reason, it has caught on as a new empirical anchor for the Arab world. 
Though practitioners like Pollock have warned against constructing regional 
public opinion as something uniform and have pushed for an understanding of 
nuanced and diverse identities, “Arab public opinion” as an empirical term 
maintains strong links to its antecedent, the “Arab street” (see Rosen 2016; Wolf 
2015; Lynch 2013; Jamal 2013; Regier and Khalidi 2009), boosted only, it seems, by 
the guise of scientific objectivity. This terminological thread can be traced further 
back to similar portrayals used to capture the Middle Eastern “other” from the 
vantage point of the outside looking in; we can see this same idea of the “street” 
in the notion of the “Arab mind” (Viorst 1998; Patai 1973; Sayegh 1953) or the 
“Arab psyche” (Palmer 2012; Victor 1973). These, in turn, link to constructions of 
“the Arab” (Allen 2006; Rodinson 1981) and the broader geopolitical architecting 
of the Middle East (Foliard 2017; Bonine, Amanat and Gasper 2012; Güney and 
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Gökcan 2010; Culcasi 2010). And this harkens further back to the notion of the 
Orient (Said 1978; Lockman 2010; Hentsch 1992). Terminologically, “Arab public 
opinion” is, in my view, little more than an extension of earlier constructions, 
discourses, and politicised narratives that position the dialectic “other” in 
relation to a Western “self”, used as means of counterbalancing “non-
knowledge” or ignorance of the “other”.10 
The empirical construction of the region is therefore partly embedded in 
essentializing orientalist discourses and imaginings that were pivotal in 
constructing the other as inherently different from the Western self; “once 
established as different and inferior, Western domination of these Other peoples 
and places was not merely justified but also warranted” (Culcasi 2010, 584). In 
the context of this thesis, domination over the other is interpreted as foreign 
control over the architecting of mass opinions.  
Edward Said’s 1978 critique Orientalism is “centrally concerned with the forms of 
knowledge that constitute what he defined as orientalism”, as they relate to 
cultural, racialized, and political discourse-making on the region (Said 1978; 
Appadurai 1993, 314). I find Said’s critique to be helpful inasmuch as it discusses 
issues in empirical measurement. For instance, the orientalist critique can be a 
useful sociological tool for considering the relationship between colonial forms of 
control and knowledge extraction, and the later development of localised 
enumeration (census-taking) and polling that engaged many of the same 
methods and practices of research. It is also particularly helpful for 
understanding the practices of classification. Said wrote that “rhetorically 
speaking, Orientalism is absolutely anatomical and enumerative; to use its 
vocabulary is to engage in the particularising and dividing of things Oriental into 
manageable parts” (Said 1978, 72). While Said’s articulation of orientalism and 
other subsequent critiques like Covering Islam (1981) are extremely enlightening, 
the relevance of Said to the core arguments in my thesis remains somewhat 
constrained. The work that would follow from a purely orientalist analysis might 
 
10
 I take a cue here from Michael Smithson’s “Toward a Social Theory of Ignorance” (1985): ignorance, 
like knowledge, is constructed and negotiated, and a complete sociology of knowledge requires a sociology 
of ignorance 
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help to explain how foreign inquiry frames or distorts issues relating to public 
opinion in Arab states, however, it would fail to explain recent developments 
that have seen local actors acquire greater agency and control over rights to 
determine and define public opinion in the region. For this reason, I choose not to 
fully engage with Said. I look beyond the orientalist critique and instead bring in 
questions about counting and control, as well as questions of local agency and 
the degree to which it can emerge and become prevalent. 
On counting and control, literature on the history of enumeration provides a 
gateway for analysing the politics of numbers, measurement, quantification, and 
by extension, public opinion inquiry (see Appadurai 1993; Ludden 1993; Cohn 
1996; Kalpagam 2000; Skerry 2000; Kertzer and Arel 2002; and Ruppert 2011). 
Enumeration as a colonial science, according to Appadurai, had more than just a 
utilitarian function: it helped to create “the illusion of bureaucratic control” and 
was “key to a colonial imaginaire in which countable abstractions, both of people 
and of resources, at every imaginable level and for every conceivable purpose, 
created the sense of a controllable indigenous reality” (Appadurai 1993, 317). In 
tracing the practices of public opinion inquiry relating to the Arab region back to 
colonial census-taking activities, we can assess how social classifications were 
developed and imposed along territorial, occupational, ethnic, and racial lines 
and then brought directly into the practice of contemporary polling (I consider 
this in Chapter 4). The politics and history of social classification, with its imprint 
very much present in contemporary (quantitative) research, was brought in via 
statistics, which Appadurai terms the “epistemological underbelly” of colonial 
politics (1993, 330). While India has been a fruitful case for the study of colonial 
forms of knowledge production (see Appadurai 1993; Cohn 1996; and Dirks 
2001), the Arab case is comparatively less explored (with exceptions of course; 
see Mitchell 2002). While it is beyond the bounds of this thesis to analyse the 
development of colonial forms of counting in the Arab region, I do engage with 
the aforementioned bodies of literature inasmuch as they help to situate 
contemporary public opinion inquiry as an extension of these colonial practices.  
Finally, the many lenses through which the region has been empirically framed 
have very much shaped the kinds of questions that researchers ask, the methods 
and sources employed, and the meaning and interpretation imbued in the 
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knowledge that emerges. This has created “contending visions” of the Arab 
world and the people who inhabit the space (Lockman 2004). If we look closely, 
we can often find the “taken-for-granted imaginings of the region” (Culcasi 2010, 
594) embedded in questionnaires and survey designs. The tools of opinion 
research are therefore best understood as political artefacts, and if we analyse 
them as such, they can provide valuable discursive evidence of the empirical 
(re)constitution of the region. 
2 The Pursuit of Public Opinion as a Tool for 
Legitimation 
In the literature concerning the relationship between public opinion and politics, 
it is generally assumed that public opinion lends legitimacy to governments and 
political decision-making. It is seen to broadly act as a check on the actions of 
those who hold power and authority. As was once remarked in The Observer, “the 
vigilance of the public operates powerfully on the subconscious of members of 
the government” (Durant 1955, 155) and this has been found to be the case both 
in democratic and non-democratic contexts (in authoritarian cases, see for 
instance, Zaller and Geddes 1989; and deLisle, Goldstein and Yang 2016). This 
vigilance is often perceived in the lead up to or aftermath of elections, during 
times of conflict, in heightened security climates, amid diplomatic crises, and in 
economic downturns, where the dialogue between politicians and publics 
intensifies and these two facets of political life are drawn closer together. Without 
some sort of claim to legitimacy, public opinion would likely go unnoticed, be 
dismissed, or have imperceptible effects on political outcomes. Political elites rely 
on and take cues from the ebb and flow of support and denunciation from the 
public. Public opinion in this sense is a rational construct, i.e., it acts as a voice of 
reason and places external constraints on the state, while demarcating the 
boundaries of public life.  
In the context of public opinion inquiry, I take legitimacy to mean something 
more than simply constraints from approval or disapproval on the part of the 
public. Following on Inis Claude, legitimacy can be understood as “ultimately a 
political phenomenon, a crystallisation of judgement that may be influenced but 
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is unlikely to be wholly determined by legal norms and moral principles” (in 
Mulligan 2005, 363). This “crystallising of judgement” or the act of providing 
legitimacy takes place in the empirical realm, i.e., concerning public opinion2. 
Public opinion2 (the empirical pursuit resulting in data from systematic research) 
legitimates and is legitimated through different means. For instance, it 
legitimates words and actions when we consider the ways in which political 
elites wield data, pander to, listen to, or seek to manipulate the public opinion 
(Weiler 2009). It supplies an informal channel between political elites and the 
public, constructed and maintained by the industry of research. Further, 
perspectives that critique the malleability of polls are relevant here, as they 
examine the ways in which states employ data to manufacture consent and 
legitimacy that might not otherwise exist (Lee 2002; Habermas 1962; Ginsberg 
1986). Legitimacy is therefore a (sought after) byproduct—the ultimate telos—of 
public opinion2; it brings this form of public opinion closer to the ideal state of 
public opinion1.  
One way that a field of research attempts to gain legitimacy is through scientific 
objectivity. Objectivity in social research, modeled on the methods and 
assumptions of the natural sciences, makes claims to describing the social world 
from a value-free perspective, without interference from human bias or personal 
interests. Some have suggested that “the invocation of ‘objectivity’ for a 
knowledge claim has more to do with attempts to boost the status of the claim 
than with any actual criteria the claim has satisfied” (Harding 2015, ix; Hacking 
2015). This means to say that the label of scientific objectivity can lend legitimacy 
to data, and indeed, the authority of science has propelled the transformation of 
public opinion inquiry into a predominately quantitative field, subject to rules, 
controls, and methodological rigour that mimic laboratory work. The legitimacy 
gained from the guise or label of scientific objectivity generally increases the 
value of the research from a professional standpoint. Prior to the 1970s, most 
opinion researchers were seen as little more than number crunchers with a 
skillset geared toward analysing raw data. Since then, they have grown to fulfill a 
more prominent and strategic role in political life, increasing their relative power 
within the field (Medvic 2003, 35). The responsibilities of data interpretation and 
crafting sophisticated political strategies are now part of their skillset, and these 
skills are subjected to intense scrutiny. We see this when polling actors are 
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regularly ranked in relation to one another, fight for survival in a capital 
marketplace, or compete for attention and reputation.11 The reputations of 
pollsters hinge largely on the accuracy and predictive capacity of their methods, 
which are tested against the real world, i.e., election results, referenda, and 
political outcomes. 
While Chapter 3 in particular discusses the implications for the pursuit of 
scientific objectivity in the practice of public opinion research, we might consider 
more generally the legitimation of public opinion2. Our assessment of the 
importance of public opinion2 is dependent on the extent to which we are 
persuaded of its scientific value, and whether states, elites, media, and publics in 
general carry confidence in the polls. When these are met, public opinion2 is 
secured. Similar to statistics and the census, public opinion data can serve as a 
referent for the inner workings of states and societies. When scientific 
measurements are used to justify political action, they take on a normative role. 
As Porter writes, “numbers create and can be compared with norms, which are 
among the gentlest and yet most pervasive forms of power in modern 
democracies” (1995, 45). This is more than simply a methodological issue. The 
perceived “scientificness” of public opinion can expose the extent to which 
political systems are dependent on statistical knowledge to explain the social 
world. Rose argues that “numbers have an unmistakeable power in modern 
political culture […]. Numbers here are an intrinsic part of the mechanisms for 
conferring legitimacy on political authority” (1991, 673). Numbers can be seen as 
a way to govern political life, can advance or slow progress, inform or distort 
civic discourse, or help or hinder political participation (Rose 1991, 690). These 
issues lead to broader questions, for instance, at what moment in the process of 
research does legitimation take place? It might arise when a poll is 
commissioned, which can be taken as signalling the desire or need for data. It 
might emerge when raw data is analytically transformed into meaning and 
symbolic interpretation. Or it might take place after a poll is said and done, once 
it finds its way into the hands of different actors who then use it to build 
 
11
 See, for instance, FiveThirtyEight’s pollster ratings based on accuracy and methodology. Available here: 
https://projects.fivethirtyeight.com/pollster-ratings/. 
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narratives about the social and political world. I believe that the need for 
legitimacy is present at each stage in the process of inquiry, in the very least to 
solidify confidence in the modes and methods of research. 
3 Actors and Group Dynamics 
In Chapter 1, I identified a missing link in the traditional literature on public 
opinion, i.e., those actors involved in the empirical pursuit of public opinion 
(along with the practices they enact). This focus on actors and practices—
pollsters, practitioners, scholars and experts, research entities and private 
companies, all invested and/or implicated in the political potential of public 
opinion—is sustained throughout this thesis. It seems pertinent then that I 
address the role of actors as I build toward a theoretical framework. 
There was both a pre- and post-hoc rationalisation for the focus on actors in my 
research. The case of missing actors from the literature (recall Baum and Potter’s 
causal map in Figure 1) provided the impetus to craft an empirical agenda 
around the pollster. In the small but growing body of literature that seeks to 
explain trends in “Arab public opinion”, pollsters are usually classified as part of 
a larger group of informational elites. Brumberg, for instance, argues that Arab 
public opinion is comprised of three circles of influence: ideologues and activists, 
professional and academic elites, and the broader public, and further, each of 
these three circles interacts differently with one another and with the 
international political environment (2002). Though not explicitly analysed as 
such, pollsters make their way into the second category of professional and 
academic elites. Meanwhile Lynch (2003a) and Zayani (2008a) have argued that 
the key to understanding “Arab public opinion” lies neither in the circle of 
ideologues not the broader public, but in that elite sphere that encompasses 
intellectuals, politicians, journalists, academics, student bodies, and other actors 
with some measure of power and influence in society. We can assume the 
pollster sits among these actors as informational elites, particularly given that 
pollsters in the Arab world often double as media-facing commentators. Still, 
meaningful studies such as these make only a passing mention about the role of 
informational elites who contribute to the production of public opinion data. 
Existing studies on Arab public opinion have not yet tackled the more critical 
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theoretical question of the extent to which the machinery of polling and public 
opinion research is responsible the crafting of ideas about people in the region 
and beyond.  
Identifying international polling actors implicated in the field of Arab public 
opinion research was thus one of the first exercises I undertook, and an agenda 
for fieldwork was designed around this. The post-hoc rationalisation (upon 
completion of the fieldwork) came from the discovery of the ways in which these 
actors were relationally linked and saw themselves as part of larger groups of 
networked polling actors. No single actor was operating in isolation, and there 
was good reason to assume that these actor dynamics were not uniquely limited 
to the case of Arab public opinion, but are rather characteristic of the field of 
global polling and public opinion inquiry in general.  
In considering how public opinion actors past and present are linked, how they 
understand their roles in relation to one another, how they interact, compete, and 
engage in knowledge sharing, and how they impart legacies and ensure the 
survival of their methods, I find it helpful to situate actors within larger 
transnational knowledge networks. Knowledge networks are usually seen to be 
made up of (in)formal entities involved in the creation and dissemination of 
knowledge by controlling the provisions and interpretation of specialized 
information (Stone 2003). As Stone describes, “if knowledge is ‘an organized 
body of information’ then a knowledge network is one mode of organising 
information” (2003, 8). Stone differentiates between formal and informal actors in 
knowledge networks; the former might be international organisations, while the 
latter are more difficult to identify but might include smaller entities like 
professional bodies, academic research consortiums, intellectuals, and scientific 
communities who are organized around a particular issue area. When actors are 
viewed as part of larger (transnational) knowledge networks, their modes of self-
organising come into view. We can begin to see how and why some groups form, 
and how the diffusion of ideas, norms, practices, and tools takes place.  
While transnational knowledge networks are a helpful and sufficiently broad 
organising tool, I do not engage network analysis in the strict sense (for instance, 
actor network theory). Fried (2012) provides one instance of an analysis in which 
network theory is applied to the case of American public opinion in order to 
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explain the institutionalisation of actors. Fried uses the concept of networks to 
show how the “quantification of public opinion became more common as it was 
inscribed into organizational routines and was incorporated into typical 
repertoires of activity” (2012, 14). The field of American public opinion research 
is therefore seen to have developed in a networked fashion, where networks 
helped to propel actors (like pollsters) and their activities. However, an emphasis 
on network theory meets two dead ends in the field of public opinion inquiry. 
The first is that it is near-impossible exercise to map out a coherent network of 
actors and institutions in the field. I would argue that the interactions, relations, 
inner movements, not to mention financial obligations, are far too dense and 
complex to generate any meaningful conclusions (other to say that there is a 
network and it broadly functions in some way). Second, the focus on networks 
sidelines the actors themselves, diminishing their agency and the centrality of 
their role. As will be seen in the case of the Arab sphere of opinion research, actor 
agency becomes increasingly important over time and must therefore be 
considered in its own right. 
While Chapter 4 maps out actors implicated in the rise of global polling and the 
distribution of control over the provisions and interpretation of public opinion 
data, Chapters 5 through 7 introduce the reader to actors specifically involved in 
the study of Arab public opinion at different points in time. I use this space here 
to provide a more skeletal overview of relevant actors. Others situated in 
proximity to public opinion but not involved directly in the conduct of inquiry 
include the broader public (as an audience and also as the subject of inquiry), the 
media, political parties, and ruling elites. Throughout this thesis, I bring these 
other agents in and out of view through the lens of my primary actors, i.e., the 
producers of Arab public opinion knowledge. The level of analysis I am thus 
concerned with is neither that of the public individual nor of the state, but rather 
the level of transnational entities and informational elites. 
The primary actors conducting large-scale public opinion inquiry relating to the 
Arab region are transnationally situated, with the main loci being the United 
States and major cities in the Arab countries (with a strong concentration in 
Egypt, Palestine, Jordan, and Lebanon). Few European actors are concerned with 
the production of Arab public opinion research by comparison. In Figure 3 
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below, the geographic distribution of actors is mapped, accounting for all of the 
Middle East and North Africa, the United States, the United Kingdom, France, 
Austria, Denmark, and Norway. A more detailed analytical discussion of the 
geographies of actors takes place in Chapter 6 and 7. 
  
Figure 3: Geographic distribution of actors in the field of Arab public opinion inquiry. 
The geopolitical significance of the United States-Arab region nexus unfolds over 
the course of the thesis. Over decades, the central concentration of actors 
involved in the study of Arab public opinion has shifted from outside to inside 
the Arab region, which means that the pursuit of Arab public opinion has been 
progressively transferred and at the same time reclaimed by local (indigenous) 
actors. If we consider the concentration of actors at any given time as a proxy for 
agency, the story suggests that the responsibility and power of local Arab actors 
is becoming more pronounced over time. As one of the central findings of the 
empirical research undertaken, agency is considered in greater depth in Chapter 
7. But generalising beyond the Arab case itself leads to the hypothesis that, at any 
given moment in time, wherever we see a strong concentration of actors 
reproducing institutions in a knowledge-producing field of activity (in this case 
the pursuit of global public opinion), from where there is a perceptible 
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proliferation of data, we should expect to see a high degree of human agency. 
This idea stands to be tested in other cases of global public opinion inquiry. 
Actors (informational elites) in the field of Arab public opinion inquiry include 
individuals and collectives. They are state departments and agencies, private or 
commercial polling firms, independent think tanks, partisan and non-partisan 
policy institutes, university departments and academic research bodies, social 
science institutes, public relations and market research companies, media 
affiliates, independent experts and scholars, as well as collaborative initiatives 
undertaken by more than one of these (i.e., research consortiums). Public opinion 
inquiry generally serves political, scholarly, and private commercial ends. The 
gradual commercialisation of global public opinion inquiry has led to 
fragmentations in the market. Commercial actors—private and/or media polling, 
public relations and public diplomacy firms, and market research companies—
compete more than ever before in a marketplace where the main commodity of 
value is data. They sometimes find ways to undercut the market and save costs at 
the expense of data quality and methodological soundness. While full-service 
public opinion research companies will produce studies from start (research 
design) to finish (research dissemination), a more common practice today is to 
outsource individual elements of the research process to other intermediaries, 
such that a single public opinion study finds itself in the hands of different actors 
(principle investigators, sampling firms, auxiliary data collection vendors, or data 
science divisions) at different steps along the way. In the end, a study often 
emerges from an assemblage of actors, resources, and practices. 
The development of the field of Arab opinion inquiry is evidenced by the 
proliferation of these actors since the advent of the science of polling in the 1930s. 
Emerging actors have grown from older, established ones and individual 
practitioners move seamlessly between organisations within the same field, 
creating linkages, ensuring commonalities of practice, sharing methodological 
insights and techniques, encouraging knowledge transference and market-
sharing, and delineating the field within which they operate. What I effectively 
mean by market-sharing here is the sharing of work, commissions, clients and 
employees, technical resources, and other aspects of labour. This might mean that 
one party calls on another for expertise, or that an institutional project is granted 
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to several different actors at once. Market-sharing in this sense creates working 
bonds, bringing actors closer together so their practices naturally come to be 
more integrated. In some cases, market-sharing also has implications for the 
legacy of work, i.e., in determining the allocation of future funding or planning 
projects. Further, actors are aware of other like actors who inhabit the same 
sphere and commonly interact with each other in professional capacities, such as 
by attending conferences, cross-training, and encouraging job mobility (employee 
movement) within the network. 
We can reframe these actor dynamics, interactions, and activities around market-
sharing in another way. They essentially relate to how knowledge is controlled in 
the field of public opinion research, as well as how knowledge becomes available 
to actors entering into and navigating the field. Bourdieu’s reflexive sociological 
concept of field provides a spark of inspiration here. For Bourdieu, actors in the 
field employ two types of knowledge: the first is a logic of practice (a feel for the 
game) and the second is a reflexive relationship to the field and one’s practices 
within it (Albright, Hartman, and Widin 2018, 2; Bourdieu 2000). The field has 
written rules and conventions governing it, but is also transformed by the actions 
of actors working within it. Field thus emphasises the dynamic relationships and 
actions within a social space. While I do not apply Bourdieu’s field analysis to the 
case of actors in the field of Arab public opinion inquiry, if only because of such 
limited access to the field and the actors themselves, I certainly find motivation in 
this reflexive stance. 
4 Processes of Localisation 
The world of opinion research is populated by giants. American household 
names like Gallup, Pew, and Roper, global megafirms like Ipsos and Nielsen, and 
famed statisticians like George Gallup, David Blackwell, Nate Silver, and Nassim 
Nicholas Taleb fill the space of popular knowledge, discussion, and debate, 
leaving little room for smaller actors to meaningfully shape the vast and highly 
diversified field of global opinion research. Today, there is an overabundance of 
actors operating in the field; many are small, and most are virtually unknown in 
markets outside their own. Further, the market activities of public opinion 
research overlap considerably with the market research industry, which is 
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characterised by increasing numbers of mergers and acquisitions by prominent 
umbrella corporations operating through high-value deals in competitive capital 
markets. In this fast-paced and often unforgiving environment, one might expect 
localisation to diminish in the face of globalising processes. 
Localisation suggests an emphasis or increased salience of locality and is 
stimulated by a normative orientation. It is a helpful tool when applied to a 
transnational field of such as public opinion inquiry, where actors operate across 
geographic borders and therefore come into constant contact with other instances 
of locality. Following on Acharya, localisation can be understood as “a complex 
process and outcome by which norm-takers [actors who absorb global norms and 
standards] build congruence between transnational norms (including norms 
previously institutionalised in a region) and local beliefs and practices” (Acharya 
2004, 241). The foreign and the local meet in such a way that “the active 
construction (through discourse, framing, grafting, and cultural selection) of 
foreign ideas by local actors” results in a developing congruence between these 
foreign ideas and local beliefs and practices (Acharya 2004, 245). Thus, local 
actors contribute to processes of localisation through the diffusion of ideas and 
practices.  
Translated into the case of Arab public opinion inquiry, localisation sees the 
modes and practices of inquiry adapting to the local climate, to local publics, and 
to changes “on the ground”. Further, actors increasingly acknowledge that the 
local is not a homogenous entity, but rather represented by distinct voices, 
diverse ideologies, and intricate histories. Localisation has the effect of making 
public opinion a less monolithic idea, and instead, something that carries a 
different flavour from place to place. The practices of mass opinion research, 
which have become more standardised over time, are renegotiated when 
localisation takes place. Practically, this might mean that the thinking and doing of 
public opinion change, i.e., by asking different questions, changing the nature of 
sampling frameworks, building closer relationships between interviewers and 
interviewed subjects, or redefining how mass interviews are conducted 
altogether. In this way, local actors increase their agency and command over the 
field, while something like the practices of research attune to different local 
settings.  
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As will be seen in Chapter 7, localisation is possible for polling actors operating 
in the context of transnational knowledge networks, despite the pressures to 
produce data in standardised ways. Localisation of practices in the Arab case is 
found to be shaped by various forces, including conflict and relations between 
state and society, as well as by the people whose opinions are counted and 
recorded. Localisation becomes most apparent when we consider the normative 
“ethics of research” that each pollster clings to, and the extent to which their 
ethics of research comes to be shaped by the settings that they inhabit. 
5 A Proposed Conceptual Framework for Arab 
Public Opinion Inquiry 
Given that the subject of public opinion inquiry involves the complex interplay of 
issues relating to knowledge production, epistemology, power asymmetries, 
actors, institutions, agency, and the reifying force of numbers, in this section I 
attempt to bring these defining components together. Here, I present a 
conceptual framework which will be used to guide an analysis of the empirical 
pursuit of global public opinion, with a specific application to the case of the 
Arab region. The problematization of public opinion as an empirical object is not 
just about pollsters operating in global markets. By looking at the political 
contexts that drive the pursuit of public opinion, together with hegemonic rise of 
polling in the American social science tradition, one can begin to problematise 
the logic that informs our way of speaking about monolithic constructs like 
“Arab public opinion”. The conceptual framework therefore represents public 
opinion2 in action. 
In the interest of trying to deconstruct the idea of “Arab public opinion”, I 
maintain an overarching argument that it (Arab public opinion) has been 
pursued and created by different actors to different ends, and that Arab public 
opinion inquiry has so far developed in three successive stages since the early 
twentieth century. This development begins with a mode of inquiry that is 
predominately foreign-led, then enters a transitional and transformational phase 
wherein foreign inquiry becomes deeply embedded and institutionalised in the 
region, and then finds itself in a stage of reclamation (of practices) by local actors, 
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which we are seeing in the field today. In a very skeletal and reductionist form, 
we can visualise these three modes of inquiry as follows: 
 
Figure 4: The branching of modes of Arab public opinion inquiry over time. 
 
In the figure above, t represents the continuum of time, while each directional 
arrow represents an actor-specific mode of inquiry. We can see how the process 
begins with foreign-led inquiry, then subsequently branches out into different 
modes at different points in time. Vestiges of the first and second forms of 
inquiry continue to be seen today, which is why each of these arrows continues 
its forward movement. This reductionist visualisation does not tell anything of 
the intensity of each mode of inquiry, or the ways in which each has changed or 
diminished over time. Instead, it purely shows the branching of three 
geographically and temporally-identifiable phases. It also shows, importantly, 
that practices of public opinion inquiry are generative; they are learned and 
adopted from previously existing practices, and thus share certain characteristics, 
empirical assumptions, and tools. On example of a generative tool, for instance, is 
the sample survey, which has been utilised within each mode of inquiry by 
different actors, though the scientific rules defining a sample survey have 
changed over this long duration.  
In order to describe this visualisation in more detail, I summarise below each of 
the three modes of inquiry, which I otherwise describe as “stages”. I also consider 
the moments of transformation that spark the emergence of a new stage. In some 
ways, these transformative junctures are unique to the Arab case, but there is a 
possibility of generalising this basic model of development such that if we were 
to look to other cases in global public opinion, we might observe a similar story. 
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Each of the three stages described below is located in a time and place, 
demonstrating how the process of knowledge production cannot be separated 
from its historical and political contexts. The progression from one stage to the 
next is not meant to create a periodisation of the narrative into discrete blocks of 
time. I also caution the reader against thinking of these stages of development as 
evidence of progress toward a more accurate or a better understanding of public 
opinion. Some would argue that this is the case, but I refrain from saying as 
much because I am fundamentally interested in problematising the production 
and construction of global public opinion on the whole. This means that I forego 
evaluating the data or results of public opinion research, and instead concern 
myself with the practices that bring them into being. 
Below, I present the three modes of inquiry that explain the development of 
“Arab public opinion” as both “a social institution and as a history and logic of 
thought” (Harding 1991, 222). 
Stage 1: Foreign Inquiry 
This stage represents some of the earliest attempts by foreign actors to study and 
maintain records of mass Arab opinion on issues relating to governance, 
statehood, identity, culture, religion, and community politics. I situate this mode 
of inquiry as part of broader historical practices that treated “othered” societies 
as scientific specimens under the lens of the outsider’s (the Western) gaze. These 
practices included the counting of people, the (oft arbitrary) classifying of social 
groups, the administration of censuses and surveys, and other ethnographic 
modes of inquiry on large populations. Stage 1 is characterised by “epistemic 
interventions” into the Arab region by foreign actors. I define epistemic 
interventions as points of knowledge interference, where one mode of thinking 
or set of ideas about what constitutes knowledge inserts itself into another 
existing epistemic tradition and then claims the right to represent the other. 
These epistemic interventions were definitive political acts using empirical 
means that were often suspect—of questionably sound methods, design, and 
assumptions. I illustrate with the cases of the King-Crane Commission of 1919, 
Daniel Lerner’s 1958 study of Middle Eastern modernisation in The Passing of 
Traditional Society, and the question of Palestine as it appeared in Western polls 
from the creation of the state of Israel to the Six-Day War. While there are many 
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more individual cases that can illustrate foreign inquiry and epistemic 
intervention, the selected cases are meant to address a broad enough spectrum of 
political and methodological issues, rather than being too close in kind. Chapter 5 
is dedicated to this analysis of Stage 1 (“Arab Opinion in the Colonial 
Imaginary”). While Stage 1 is not temporally fixed, I focus the fifty-year period 
from the end of the First World War in 1919 to just after the Six-Day War of 1967. 
During this time, public opinion (as a concept and as a practice) was undergoing 
important scientific transformation as polling was rising the ranks of popularity 
as the seminal way of doing public opinion. 
In delimiting the earliest stage of Arab opinion inquiry within colonial and 
postcolonial settings, I am tracing a particular mode of social-scientific inquiry 
carried out by Western experts and scholars whose goal it was to contribute to a 
unified science of opinion research for the world. While this mode of inquiry has 
diminished in intensity, we can still see vestiges of the same thinking in 
institutions that outlived the period covered in Stage 1 and continue to operate in 
the area of global opinion research today. 
Stage 2: Foreign Inquiry Embedded Locally 
This next stage covers substantial transformative ground from the late 1970s and 
early 1980s onwards, during which time we witness the proliferation of 
international institutions dedicated to social research in the Middle East and 
North African region, as well as a coalescing of a regional “Arab public sphere” 
(Eickelman and Anderson 2003; Lynch 2006; Ayish 2008) hastened by 
revolutionary advances in media landscapes. Stage 2 unfolds in the midst of 
developments that encouraged greater mobility and dialogue among Arab 
populations and sparked interest in the region both as a strategic asset and an 
ideological threat in Western foreign policy. Chapter 6 is dedicated to this 
analysis of Stage 2 (“Great Transformations: The Rise of Embedded Institutions 
and Practices”). Similar to how I approached Stage 1, I do not suggest concrete 
temporal bounds need apply to this phase of development, however, I focus on 
the three decades leading up to the final years of the George W. Bush presidency 
in 2009, by which time “Arab public opinion” had taken up a prominent role in 
America’s foreign policy interests in the Middle East. While the 9/11 moment can 
be thought of as the sort of pinnacle of Stage 2, the patterns of inquiry 
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characteristic of this stage continues until today. During this period of great 
change, I highlight a pattern of embeddedness whereby foreign actors/practices 
of public opinion inquiry rapidly “set up shop” in urban centres in Tunisia, 
Algeria, Egypt, Jordan, Israel, Palestine, Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, Iran, Kuwait, the 
United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Qatar, Yemen, and Libya 
(Morocco, Oman, and Sudan are found to be later entrants). This trend toward 
embeddedness came with the realisation that “a more original and authentic 
Arab contribution” (Tessler 1987b, 149) was needed in order to understand Arab 
society, and for this to happen, collaborative epistemic relationships would need 
to be forged with actors in the region. This marked a fundamental 
epistemological shift, and encouraged the development of a marketplace for Arab 
opinion data that was transnationally situated, with actors operating across 
multiple territories and with the lines between foreign and indigenous actors 
becoming increasingly blurred (Tessler 1987a, 20). 
In delimiting this second stage in Arab public opinion inquiry, I aim to highlight 
the evolution of actors and of practices, within the context of more formalised 
institutional settings. While these settings encouraged a collaborative pursuit of 
public opinion by foreign and local actors, the hegemonic rise of polling as an 
American social science during this time, combined the authority of Western 
science around the world, engendered power asymmetries between actors in the 
field and led to the prioritisation of a decidedly Western-styled approach to 
building knowledge around Arab public opinion.  
Stage 3: Localised Inquiry 
This latest stage describes the reclamation of public opinion inquiry by 
indigenous actors, wherein we begin to clearly see the workings of a self-
sustaining and self-serving approach to producing public opinion knowledge by 
way of a locally networked and inwardly-focused field of dynamic actors. Stage 3 
is fundamentally about the agency of local researchers that has arisen through 
processes of localisation. While local Arab actors have operated in the field of 
Arab public opinion inquiry since at least the mid-twentieth century, the 
cumulative effect of generative research practices, knowledge-sharing, and the 
steep intensification of polling in the Arab region since the 1990s has allowed for 
actors in the region to mold their own agendas and impart their own learnings to 
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the field. In more recent years and particularly in the post-Arab Spring 
environment, in which structural changes to the social science research 
environment have taken place, there has been a shift of agency and power from 
the foreign to the local. Chapter 7 is dedicated to this analysis of Stage 3 (“The 
Local Reclamation of Public Opinion Inquiry”). Drawing on conversations with 
actors situated across the Middle East, I identify a special network of actors that 
have come to define the field, with unique perspectives that can be explained by 
the localisation of knowledge production, as well as by personal politics. Actors 
in the field are more likely to carry a “participatory ethics of research”, 
something that is deeply political and rarely seen in the case of Western public 
opinion research today where pollsters assume an apolitical position. Stage 3 
analysis uses evidence of methodological and practice modifications to 
demonstrate processes of localisation. Importantly, localisation begins to emerge 
years before the Arab uprisings of 2010/2011 (some cases reaching back to the 
1990s). However, over time the personal networks and local authority of actors 
have strengthened considerably, and their capacity to shape the field is far more 
perceptible in recent years. 
In Stage 3, the expectation that Arab actors lacked agency in relation to 
monopolising Western pollsters and professional bodies has been upended. The 
space for foreign epistemic intervention has tightened as local actors adapt 
practices to suit local needs and political conditions. In this latest stage of 
development, local actors appear emboldened, and a more participatory 
approach to knowledge production has slowly begun to disrupt foreign claims to 
“Arab public opinion”.  
The three-stage process above traces the development of public opinion inquiry 
in the case of the Arab region up until the present (Chapter 8 considers some 
implications). This “stages of inquiry model” can be distilled into an analytical 
map, using geographic and temporal markers: 
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Figure 5: Analytically mapping the emergence of Arab public opinion inquiry. 
In this map, the x-axis of “Actor Location” plots actors according to their 
geographic position, while the y-axis “Time” plots the historical progression of 
their emergence. What we find is that older, more historical forms of Arab 
opinion inquiry (Stage 1) were forged mainly by foreign actors. The subsequent 
embedding of foreign inquiry into the local setting of the Arab region (Stage 2) 
involved foreign actors located externally, foreign actors located internally, and 
indigenous actors located internally (hence at the intersection of the axes). In the 
most contemporary setting (Stage 3) actors are predominately indigenous and 
internally located. Visualised across two axes, the development of inquiry travels 
from the lower left to the upper right quadrant. While this mapping exercise of 
time and place is a fairly elementary analytical tool, it nevertheless provides a 
clear differentiation between modes of inquiry geared toward the same 
fundamental and pervasive question of Arab public opinion. Because all actors in 
the universe of Arab opinion research cannot be plotted accurately here (the 
number of known actors is far too dense and there are many unknowns), I invoke 
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this map more as a general schema for a story of emergence. Its application is 
useful inasmuch as it supports the argument for the development of public 
opinion2 relating to the Arab region. 
Instead of defining the region for myself and locating practices of inquiry 
performed within, I follow the trail of literature in Arab public opinion research 
(as found in the methodology and specification documents of polls) that defines 
and re-defines the region for itself. Publics (and countries) are included and 
excluded, prioritised and ignored according to the interests of those doing the 
research. It is thus the field of Arab opinion research itself that must be held 
accountable for the construction of Arab publics; just as global opinion research 
contributes to the construction of global publics.  
While the empirical story that unfolds in three stages above is helpful for the case 
of the Arab region, we might want to consider the extent to which this account is 
generalisable to discussions about opinion inquiry and knowledge production 
beyond the Arab case. Certainly, the history and development of polling as the 
hallmark science of public opinion research is not a case-specific phenomenon; 
we could trace its effects in any setting (and the American case has received an 
inordinate amount of scholarly attention already). But rather than one linear 
history applied to different cultural cases, I find that a more meaningful 
contribution is the use of paradigm shifts in the study of global public opinion 
and in knowledge production in IR more generally (recall Figure 2 from Chapter 
1, where public opinion2 as an epistemic pursuit was mapped against small-scale 
paradigm shifts in the Western social science tradition). Identifying and mapping 
paradigm shifts in knowledge production allows for a clearer view of the 
overlapping assumptions, experiences, approaches, and methods that lie at the 
intersection of epistemology, history of science, and IR. A focus on paradigms 
and paradigm shifts is therefore a broadly useful approach. While this approach 
tells us something about dominant discourses, theories, and narratives, it does 
not necessarily help us to reconfigure knowledge or move beyond the status quo 
toward new and different perspectives. All that it can lend us is greater 
awareness. 
The “stages of inquiry” account above also leads us to question the nature of 
change; namely, what triggered the evolution from one stage to the next in the 
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development of Arab public opinion inquiry? From a methodological 
perspective, one explanatory mechanism is technology. In general, polling mass 
publics has become less laborious and less expensive over time, especially as a 
result of Internet polling, pre-recorded telephone polls, and the outsourcing of 
different parts of the polling process to competitive vendors. These 
advancements have allowed for greater “masses” to be studied at once, and 
pollsters need not (and rarely do) personally encounter the people they claim to 
speak for. Economies of scale and advancements in polling technology are only a 
partial explanation for the case of the Middle East and North Africa, where the 
majority of studies continue to employ face-to-face interview methods.12 This 
method is comparatively expensive, and polls and surveys must be “selective, 
and focused on producing the most useful kinds of information” (usefulness as 
determined by the agendas of pollsters and audiences) (Lynch 2006, 41). Other 
factors, like the strategic importance of the Middle East in policymaking must 
therefore be considered as well, as polling is generally deployed when particular 
policy issues pique the interest of the political community. Still, the fact that 
polling in the MENA region (regardless of the method) is far more feasible today 
than three decades ago is evidence of technological advancements in general.  
We can also look to more specific mechanisms to explain change between each 
stage. Stage 1 covers a period of rapid development in the American social 
sciences, which grew with the support of political patronage and was modelled 
on the natural sciences and ideas about modernisation. During this time, social 
scientists increasingly laid claims to knowledge about the international. Their 
research efforts—mobilised toward containing the threat of communism during 
the Cold War years—propelled theories of modernisation and development that 
“were extant well before the term earned its common currency in the years 
following World War II” (Ekbladh 2010, 14). But the modernisation narrative, 
 
12
 Computer-assisted face-to-face interviewing is one of the most common methods employed in survey 
research in the Arab region. Organisations hire and train interviewees, who are deployed to randomised 
households to ask standardised questionnaires in person. Like all methods, face-to-face interviewing has its 
pros and cons. While it grants the interviewer more time with the respondent, the ability to monitor the 
respondent’s surroundings, and the possibility of probing politically sensitive issues that respondents are 
less likely to answer by phone, it is a costly method with a high risk of measurement error due to 
inconsistencies between interviewers or the nature of interactions between the interviewer and respondent. 
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with its weaknesses and Western ethnocentrism “blindingly apparent”, was in 
decline by the 1970s (Latham 2011, 157).  
The shift away from the spirit of modernisation and toward alternative analytical 
paradigms for the social sciences during the 1980s and 1990s is found in the 
transition from Stage 1 to 2. Other important factors play a role in this shift, such 
as the shift toward an international development discourse, the “moment of 
uncertainty” in the social sciences following the decolonisation movements 
(Cooper 2004, 9), as well as the intellectual reckoning that came with Edward 
Said’s critique or orientalism (1978). As Burke and Prochaska write, Said’s 
Orientalism “marked a paradigm shift in thinking about the relationship between 
the West and the non-West” (2008, 1). Thus, we can presume that the branching 
off of Stage 2 inquiry takes place at a time of a major ideological and political 
disruption in the social sciences as a result of far-reaching structural and political 
changes in the world, as well as a post-colonial awakening. Meanwhile, Stage 2 
plays out in the aftermath of the Cold War, during which time the rapid 
acceleration of the effects of globalisation transformed public opinion inquiry 
into a consumerist endeavour (especially through its sister discipline of market 
research), as much as a scholarly one. The events of September 11, 2001 and the 
threat of international terrorism marked a new kind of political turbulence, and a 
totalising view of the Arab world became part of the discourse of public opinion 
(one that magnified an “us” vs. “them” ideological framework).  
The events of 9/11 itself were not a transition point for public opinion inquiry 
(though it did greatly intensify research on “what Arabs think”; see, for instance, 
Zogby 2002a). Rather, the transition from Stage 2 (foreign-embedded inquiry) to 
Stage 3 (localised inquiry) seems to have emerged as a result of a “local event”; 
namely, the Arab uprisings and the renegotiation of civic politics on a regional 
scale. The sheer magnitude and profound importance of the uprisings motivated 
local research efforts and opened a window of opportunity during which time 
politically sensitive research in the Arab region experienced a moment of 
freedom for many, only minimally obstructed. Research practices were 
revitalised, and new actors emerged, who had watched this political storm 
unfold. We can therefore presume that the branching off of Stage 3 inquiry was 
spurred by a critical local (regional) event.  
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In sum, while each of the three stages is motivated by different epistemological 
questions, their emergence comes as a result of ideological shifts and local 
political events. Arab public opinion inquiry has become formalised and 
institutionalised along the way, and in each stage, a different set of primary 
actors come to establish authority over the problems of public opinion. These 
actors are animated by their own assumptions, interests, and politics, which 
recalls Bruno Latour’s affirmation that “science is politics pursued by other 
means”, i.e., as a technology and an artefact of power (in Bueger 2012, 101). In 
seeking to reposition my substantive argument about the Arab-region case as a 
formal, more generalisable argument about global public opinion and knowledge 
production, I acknowledge that there is much more analytical work that needs to 
be done. Nevertheless, the conceptual toolkit assembled in Parts 1 and 2 of the 
thesis are relevant beyond the Arab case. At the same time, the guiding star of the 
project—which orients the research questions, argument, design, and empirical 
work—is the narrowly understood phenomenon of “Arab public opinion”. 
6 Conclusion 
I have so far explored some key concepts, thematic issues, and theoretical debates 
that animate this thesis and together shine a light on the relatively uncharted 
terrain of public opinion inquiry in and on the Arab region. In this chapter 
specifically, I have further problematised and tethered together ideas about 
knowledge production, actors, and practices in order to build a conceptual 
framework that will be applied to the main research question: how can we 
explain the rise of public opinion knowledge on the Arab region? In constructing 
a three-stage narrative for the development of Arab public opinion inquiry, I 
contend with historical legacies of colonial knowledge production, as well as the 
global spread and institutionalisation of Western social science. These histories 
do not normally make an appearance in existing conversations about Arab public 
opinion research. Thus, more than just filling the gaps in our knowledge of the 
subject of Arab public opinion with descriptive information and interview data, I 
wish to build a more cohesive historical and sociological account, which views 
epistemic actors and practices as inherently political rather than taking for 
granted their role in the production of knowledge. That claims to knowledge 
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about Arab opinion have passed through foreign hands and are today being 
recovered at the local level paints an “arc of return” of local knowledge. In this 
way, attention should be paid not only to the emergence and continuing strength 
of local epistemic actors, but also to the burdens of knowledge and history that 
they might carry with them. 
 
  
Part Two 
 
 
The Field of Global Public Opinion Inquiry 
  
Chapter 3  
Searching for Public Opinion: Insights from Pollsters 
 
Once public opinion is defined as the raw material for opinion polls, the various 
techniques used for turning words into numbers disappear, so that the columns and 
percentages emerge as if they are unmediated expressions of public attitudes and desires. 
Justin Lewis (2001) 
 
Public opinion must obviously be recognised as having its setting in a society and as 
being a function of that society in operation. This means, patently, that public opinion 
gets its form from the social framework in which it moves. 
Herbert Blumer (1969) 
 
The Public is a political state. 
Sina Odugbemi (2011) 
 
In Chapter 1, I explored the conceptual roots and competing definitions of public 
opinion—an interdisciplinary concept that has at once been shaped by political 
theorists, sociologists, cognitive and behavioural scientists, and media specialists 
through the course of its (relatively recent and ongoing) genesis. I discussed the 
evolution of public opinion from a democratic ideal to a “scientised” and 
abstracted representation of subgroups of populations defined by precise 
categorical parameters. The fluctuations in the development of this concept are at 
least partially explained by the fact that ways of speaking about public opinion 
are found to be confused and conflated in the literature, where public opinion is 
treated as a muddy amalgam of different elements. In Chapter 1, I argued for the 
need to separate the broad ideal of public opinion as something that represents 
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the general will (public opinion1) from the epistemological practice of locating and 
transcribing it (public opinion2). Specifically, doing public opinion research by way 
of practicing particular methodologies that capture and (re)present snapshot 
sentiments through numeric data leads us to something that approaches (but 
should not be) confused with the will of the people. That is because the 
epistemological sense of public opinion contains its own set of assumptions 
which favour scientific and systematic approaches to observing and recording 
pre-defined publics.  
The ongoing debate over how to define “public opinion” has mainly taken place 
among scholars and academics. Outside of the scholarly literature, we have little 
sense of how pollsters and practitioners working in the field of research create, 
contribute to, or even dissassociate from the dominant discourses about public 
opinion. In this chapter, I consider the position of pollsters, as practitioners, 
toward the idea of public opinion and present some of the ways in which they 
speak about the concept. Drawing on original interviews conducted with 
international pollsters, I synthesise their musings and insights about the qualities 
and characteristics of public opinion as their object of study.  
To this end, we might expect pollsters to describe public opinion similar to how 
they have been trained to measure it: for example, if a good amount of your 
professional job involves tabulating or managing a database of individual 
opinions, it may lead to a working definition of public opinion as an indicator 
used to convey the aggregate of individual opinions pertaining to certain issue 
areas. If instead your job is to mediate focus groups and distill thematic linkages 
from participants’ dialogues, public opinion might be defined as communally-
directed words and feelings toward certain problems.  
In navigating conversations with pollsters and expert practitioners located in 
Ann Arbor, Amman, Beirut, Doha, Princeton, Tel Aviv, Ramallah, and 
Washington D.C., my main aim is to examine the dominant discourses 
(co)constitutive of public opinion research as they are represented in the views of 
practitioners themselves. Through the process of interviewing I found that the 
interviewees were surprisingly reflective about public opinion, and they 
expressed many nuanced and differentiated views about it. They do not find 
useful recourse to a common definition. Instead, I identify three different senses 
 POLLSTERS ON PUBLIC OPINION 97 
 
of public opinion that exist in the global polling and survey research industry: the 
first sees public opinion as an objective and scientific reality, the second sees 
public opinion as a malleable construct, and the third sees public opinion as a 
form of emancipatory power. In some way, each of these perspectives is 
anchored by existing theoretical debates. I also sensed an interesting analytical 
confusion when pollsters would habitually equate public opinion results with the 
“public will at large” in the abstract sense. In essence, I found that even 
practitioners stand divided as to how to define public opinion (mirroring the 
long-running scholarly debates) and it appears to me that public opinion is not 
and has never been one thing. In other words, there is no one thing that public 
opinion can possibly be; rather we find divergent understandings wherever we 
look.  
As a secondary narrative in the chapter, I also consider why pollsters might hold 
these different views on public opinion. To explain divergence, I suggest that the 
geographical and market conditions in which these pollsters and practitioners 
operate within shape, to some extent, their conceptual views. Although most 
pollsters’ methodological tools and techniques are shared and standardised, it 
appears that their personal views are shaped more by the political and market 
environments that they are most familiar with. In addition, I note that pollsters 
with positivist inclinations tend to view public opinion as a valuable tool for 
policymakers or as a productive force for political decision-making. Meanwhile, 
those who expressed constructivist ideas about public opinion generally had 
mixed views on the matter: some would say that public opinion makes a 
difference to policymaking, while others were less convinced. Finally, those who 
viewed public opinion as a form of emancipatory power, or as something that 
confers and is closely connected to ideas about power, believed it to be absolutely 
necessary for the elevation of the masses in political life. This last group sees 
public opinion as something inherently political, and the effort of producing 
public opinion research is itself a political act. These patterns speak to pollsters’ 
varied senses of the perceived usefulness of public opinion. 
In sum, given that a complete conceptualisation of “public opinion” cannot be 
divorced from context and the legacies of knowledge production inherent within 
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(as is my contention), this chapter pays close attention to the practitioner’s role in 
shaping ideational and empirical views on theoretical concepts. 
1 Pollsters Share their Views: A Discussion on 
Methodology 
Who gets to define public opinion, and which definitions become the dominant 
ones? In Chapter 1 we saw that there is no singular accepted definition in the 
literature, and it is clear that different intellectual traditions have laid claim to 
different conceptualisations of public opinion. We have seen shifting 
interpretations going back to the idea of a symbolic manifestation of the vox 
populi, vox Dei, and since then, the dominant definitions have been greatly shaped 
by theoretical and methodological trends in the social sciences. Stepping outside 
the scholarly realm and into today’s extensive and growing industry of pollsters, 
analysts, enumerators, and data scientists, the question of how public opinion is 
defined is a seemingly crucial one—defining the object of inquiry is a key step 
when undertaking a scientific study. So how do pollsters and practitioners 
working in the field of public opinion research define and operationalise the 
concept public opinion? Do they tend to associate with a common theoretical 
tradition? In fact, our understanding of this is surprisingly limited, as no studies 
exist (to my knowledge) examining how pollsters in general approach either this 
concept, or more specific versions of the concept of mass opinion.  
We might consider as a first step looking to institutions and professional 
associations for public opinion researchers. WAPOR, the World Association for 
Public Opinion Research (founded in 1947), is a membership-based international 
organisation comprised of entities who are commercially engaged in the 
production of public opinion data. In conjunction with ESOMAR13 (founded in 
 
13
 ESOMAR is the World Association of Opinion and Marketing Research Professionals (formerly the 
European Society for Opinion and Marketing Research) and is a membership-based organisation that 
accounts for over six hundred corporate research entities. ESOMAR has a norm-creation role in that it 
provides guidelines for the conduct of opinion and market research and seeks to regulate and promote the 
industry. The official guidelines are enshrined in the ICC/ESOMAR International Code on Market, Opinion 
and Social Research and Data Analytics, developed with the International Chamber of Commerce, and 
outlining global standards for things like duty of care of interviewees, protection of children and vulnerable 
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1948), guidelines on the conduct of polls and surveys are published regularly, 
and include definitions, ethical considerations, and methodological guidelines. 
But curiously, we find no definition for public opinion in WAPOR or ESOMAR 
documentation. The closest equivalent is a rationalisation for the conduct of 
public opinion research, i.e., that “public opinion is a critical force in shaping and 
transforming society” (ESOMAR/WAPOR 2014) and that this justifies the 
methods of polls and surveys.14 A sister organisation, AAPOR (the American 
Association for Public Opinion Research, founded in 1947), also omits any 
working definition for public opinion from their documentation. AAPOR’s report 
of standardised definitions, which has been publicly available and regularly 
updated since 1998, focuses instead on technical terms relating to polling, 
descriptions of diagnostic tools, and calculated metrics.15 These institutions 
fundamentally embrace the principle that public opinion research is an essential 
element of a healthy democracy and an important piece of the policymaking 
puzzle, and yet there is no attempt to describe public opinion beyond this. 
Moreover, no definitions can be found in the published materials of market 
research and polling firms like Gallup, Pew, and other established companies. 
Even the online glossary of the Roper Center for Public Opinion Research 
eschews defining public opinion. Beyond references to public opinion as “views” 
there are no standard working definitions for public opinion available for 
practitioners in the field of research to draw upon. This curious omission perhaps 
gives practitioners more leeway in devising methodologies that are not tied 
down by precise analytical definitions or measurements. At the same time, we 
have no real indication of how pollsters and practitioners think of public opinion 
beyond the technical definition of a poll or a particular metric.16 As a starting 
 
 
peoples, data collection, privacy, transparency, and compliance. The code, first published in 1948, now 
covers 130 countries where ESOMAR members are contractually obligated to abide by the code. 
14
 ESOMAR/WAPOR Guideline on Opinion Polls and Published Surveys (August 2014).  
15
 AAPOR Standard Definitions Report (2016).  
16
 Poll and survey-based metrics might include ratings for approval, enthusiasm, positive intensity scores, 
confidence, satisfaction, and most pressing problem, for instance. 
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point then, it is important to begin to unpack how producers of public opinion 
knowledge understand their craft. 
The in-depth interviews, conducted in the Middle East in 2016 and 2017 and in 
the United States in 2017, involved pollsters and practitioners with experience 
working on large-scale polling studies focused on the MENA region. For the 
purposes of this chapter, I limit interview-selection to senior-level researchers or 
analysts, directors of research firms, and other practitioners with established 
careers (such as consultants and scholars) who have dedicated a considerable 
number of years of their career to the study of public opinion. Of the twenty 
interviews drawn upon for this chapter, half were conducted in the United States, 
three in Jordan, two in Lebanon, one in Israel, and four in Palestine. The in-depth 
interview process allowed for exploratory conversations relating to the 
practitioner’s role in the process of producing new knowledge, as well as their 
interactions with audiences of research, such as media outlets, policymakers, and 
academic stakeholders. In each interview, the question “How do you define 
public opinion?” was posed. However, not every interviewee was able to provide 
a clear answer. Many simply could not define public opinion, and there were 
clear differences in how answers were formulated based on the thematic routes 
and turns our conversations had taken until that point. Even in the absence of a 
clear definition, I did take note of the discourses or ways of thinking about public 
opinion that emerged from the interview, which in many cases were arrived at 
independently of the dominant debates in the scholarly literature. Surely, there 
are many more competing discourses at play in global polling industries than the 
three that I detail below. While I note the ones I found to be most apparent, I stop 
short of uncovering how these views are institutionally reinforced, though we 
can speculate in some instances. As an example, pollsters at Gallup had a 
tendency to repeat core company axioms or mottos in conversation, which first 
emerged in the original writings and speeches of George Gallup and are now 
found on the company’s website and in press materials. This might suggest a 
process of socialisation through which certain norms and ideas become 
internalised within organisations, though further research is needed in order to 
better understand the mechanisms at work here. The remainder of the chapter is 
divided among the three competing discourses, which see public opinion as 
something that is scientifically objective, as malleable and socially constructed, 
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and as an emancipatory tool belonging to the public at large. Within each section, 
I employ theoretical resources to help summarise and ground the views of 
pollsters. 
2 Public Opinion is Scientifically Objective 
From the positivist perspective that public opinion can be discovered through 
scientific inquiry, two main ideals emerged that were reinforced by pollsters and 
practitioners. These were objectivity and accuracy, both of which are tackled in 
turn below.  
Philosophers of science understand objectivity in a number of different senses; 
for instance, with respect to “the claims of a theory in relation to the world, to the 
process of gathering data, to individual reasoning about scientific theories, and to 
the social dimension of producing scientific knowledge” (Sprenger 2017, 3). 
Sprenger outlines three senses of scientific objectivity (in the context of statistical 
inference) that, for my purposes, are also very helpful for understanding 
scientific objectivity relating to public opinion inquiry. In the first sense, labelled 
“concordant objectivity”, different members of a community (let’s say, pollsters) 
agree to the factual reality of an observation. When the community (of pollsters) 
comes to believe and agree that tools like polls and surveys can observe and 
provide us with uncontested facts about the social world, those tools become 
objective truth-tellers.  
A second sense of scientific objectivity is that of “value-free objectivity”, wherein 
objectivity is ensured only through the absence of personal bias and subjective 
judgements. Indeed, the need to eliminate researcher biases, emotions, and 
judgements was often explicitly mentioned during the interviews as one of the 
ultimate goals of the pollster. In their view, polls and surveys could provide an 
impartial, direct, and unmediated pathway to the public by using neutral 
language, neutral forms of questioning, neutral recording techniques, and neutral 
aggregative and statistical treatments.  
The third sense of scientific objectivity, “procedural objectivity”, standardises the 
process of reasoning in order to obtain the same results every time, regardless of 
who conducts the research. Polls and surveys, in this view, produce systematic 
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forms of evidence about the social world. They involve assigning codes, symbols, 
and percentages to words, sentences, and sentiments in ways that can be 
standardised and replicated. They become part of the scientific process; tools that 
“bring science into the social” (Lewis 2001, x) or alternately, the social into the 
scientific.  
Each of these three forms of scientific objectivity is valued by empiricists and 
positivists. As Lewis writes, pollsters are “people who believe in an objective 
world” that “will simply reveal itself in columns and percentage” (Lewis 2001, 6). 
By default then, pollsters seek to ground all results in observations, and in the 
case of polls and surveys, observations and measurements are in fact 
interchangeable. To illustrate scientific objectivity in practice and drawing on all 
three of Sprenger’s senses, we can look to the Pew Research Center, one of the 
leading information hubs in the American research sphere. Pew presents itself as 
a non-partisan actor involved in the production of global public opinion and 
demographic information, as well as other major American projects and research 
initiatives. In official documents and on websites, Pew calls itself a “fact tank” as 
opposed to a think tank. Researchers at Pew based in the Washington 
headquarters speak in a tone that mirrors what is found in press documents and 
official memoranda. As one Pew Associate Director stressed, “We are a fact tank. 
Facts are objective science”. Unlike think thanks, which often perform research in 
order to advocate for policy positions, might carry a partisan affiliation, or are 
often funded by governments, advocacy groups, corporations, or other entities 
with particular interests at stake, the designation of Pew as a “fact tank” attaches 
the allure of scientific objectivity to its work. The Associate Director understands 
their research to be objective because it relies on pure facts and observations 
extracted from the social world. This sends the message that Pew sees itself as a 
rational, value-neutral actor serving as a gateway between policymakers and 
people on the ground. This ties into the idea of concordant objectivity; the view 
that facts are objective and we know this to be true when they are confirmed by 
multiple independent sources. 
A second ideal that emerged from this set of interviews was accuracy. Accuracy 
as a scientific ideal refers to the closeness of a measurement to its known value, 
or otherwise, how close it comes to the true value. The notion that greater 
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accuracy in results from polls and surveys influences the prestige of the pollster 
may not be surprising. But while accuracy in pre-election polling (measured) can 
always be checked against the results of elections (known), polling on complex 
social and political issues as a way to gauge public opinion cannot usually be 
checked against any clear known values. We simply do not have transparent 
knowledge about future political outcomes or the state of general opinion in time 
to be able to compare a poll with the real world; it is beyond our empirical 
capabilities to do so. This poses a validity problem, because accuracy ceases to be 
a helpful way to describe non-election polls and surveys. Instead, pollsters will 
focus on the soundness of their methodology or the reproducibility of their 
research design in trying to convey the message of scientific accuracy. An 
example is the Center for Strategic Studies (CSS) based at the University of 
Jordan, Amman. “The department conducts scientific studies and surveys on 
various local, regional and international issues on a very high level of accuracy, 
objectivity and impartiality” (Center for Strategic Studies 2015). Striving for 
accuracy is possible, but ensuring it is difficult. A note in a joint-analytical report 
by the CSS and the International Labour Organization (ILO) spelled out that 
neither organisation would “accept any responsibility in case of inaccuracy, error, 
or omission of, for any consequences related to the use of this data” (CSS/ILO 
2017).  
Emphasising the accuracy of the method and justifying the choices that go into 
the research process were easy techniques to spot in conversations with pollsters. 
The popular perception that polling has become more inaccurate in modern 
times tends to force pollsters to go on the defensive; they see themselves as the 
gatekeepers of their field. They argue that the problems with the polls lie not in 
the methods, but in the interpretation of results, which is often out of their hands. 
Interpretation can take place in the media, in the policy sphere, and in the public 
arena, whereas the role of the pollster is limited only to producing the 
information and providing a forthright account. Sometimes, pollsters would 
explain their methodologies in depth, describing the stages of costing, sample 
design, questionnaire building, field scheduling and re-fielding, technological 
deployment, error compensation, data tabulation, weighting, statistical 
treatment, and presentation. Other times, the process was kept from view, like a 
closely guarded recipe that contains in it some secret elements which ensure that 
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the best (most accurate) data will be produced. For example, one interview took 
place with an independent Washington-based pollster who formerly worked for 
a major American polling firm, where they were involved in launching large-
scale private surveys across the Arab region shortly after the events of 9/11. I 
asked whether one can justify the application of the same methods in different 
countries of the region despite divergent local conditions. The pollster simply 
said, “Look, the methodology that we imposed in those countries was accurate”, 
without further explanation of what exactly was done. We are meant to trust the 
pollster based on their expert understanding of the method and their intimate 
relationship with the research process. They have a level of access that the public 
(the object of their inquiry) are missing.  
This confidence in the methodology is part of a larger story about the rise of 
statistical thinking through the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, and which is 
now relied upon in almost all empirical scientific research (Romeign 2014; see 
Porter 1995). The great enthusiasm for statistics that developed during this time 
generated a need for quantitative expertise, new measurement systems, and 
institutions for quantification. As one polling expert and Director of the Institute 
for Social Research (ISR) based at the University of Ann Arbor, Michigan put it, 
public opinion research has grown from a “a missionary zeal to do statistics”. 
The ISR (originally the Survey Research Center) was founded in 1949, emerging 
at a time when Bayesian statistics were in the early stages of development and 
would soon become popularised and implemented in public opinion 
methodology.17 The words of the ISR Director ring with religious overtones. “The 
tremendous hopes that have been invested in polling since its origins” (Davies 
2017) reflect our burning desire—as a society—to see what and how people 
together think and act in plain, unaltered view. 
Pollsters who practice a positivist discourse also care about appearing scientific. 
Often, they will refer to what they do as “scientific polling” in order to distance 
themselves from media polls and other self-selective opinion-based tools and 
methods of research. Scientific polling, as they describe it, makes use of statistical 
 
17
 Bayesian theory is based on an interpretation of probability that expresses a degree of belief in an event, 
which made it particularly attractive for forecasting elections and results. 
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information during the process of selecting who to count as participants, relying 
on census and other official data to represent diverse demographics. Random 
selection of the group being surveyed is thus one main factor that dictates 
whether or not a poll is considered scientific, though this alone does not 
guarantee the accuracy of a poll. Even without making explicit recourse to 
statistical tools, public opinion research can manage to carry an air of 
“scientificness”. I conversed with a Jordanian Director of Polling at a major social 
science institute, for whom scientific polling could be defined as “something that 
is statistical, representative, and uses scientific terms”. The Director proudly 
noted, “We were responsible for the first instance of a scientific poll in the 
region”. This represents the rhetoric of science at work. This rhetoric of science 
incorporates the language of math, statistics, and specialised vocabulary in order 
to convey specific messaging. Scientific rhetoric is about “persuasive forms of 
reasoning or argumentation that aim at changing the belief system of an audience 
in scientific debates” (Pera 1994, 58). Pollsters stand to gain legitimacy when they 
make strategic use of scientific language to appeal to audiences with non-
scientific backgrounds. 
This rhetoric of science might be used to make appeals to an audience, but it can 
also indicate a stalwart belief in the method, above all other methods. I met with 
one Palestinian statistician and pollster in Ramallah who was described to me by 
a handful of pollsters across the Middle East as “the best statistician in the 
region”. The statistician, who has primarily worked on regional public opinion 
inquiry, remarked that “Survey research methodology is a fixed science. It does 
not change”. Very few people hold the absolute belief that science does not 
change, and I do not believe we need to read these words so literally. Rather, the 
statistician is exhibiting a level of trust in survey research that has come to 
dominate the field. For the statistician, the method itself is a fact, it has been 
tested time and time again, and it has proven itself over and above other 
methodologies. In a later conversation on samples (i.e., subsets of the 
population), the statistician stated plainly that “Representative samples of one-
thousand people, with a +/-3% error margin, are justified at the theoretical level”. 
The sentiment here is that findings from a survey amongst a group that closely 
parallels the population as a whole can be generalized with confidence to the 
entire population, precisely because of the representativeness of the sample. This 
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is a standardized and agreed upon research protocol, which counts as the third of 
Sprenger's senses of objectivity; procedural objectivity. 
The discourse of positivism gives clues as to how pollsters and practitioners see 
themselves and their role more generally. I noted that those who expressed 
positivist interpretations tended to see public opinion as a necessary and effective 
part of the political process. In conversation with one Research Analyst at a 
Washington-based think tank, we discussed to what extent public opinion data is 
actually used in the policy realm. The Research Analyst remarked that “Data 
brings [policymakers] closer to reality” and is commonly used and valued in 
Washington. The role of the think tank, when called upon, is therefore to “bring 
rational sense to policymakers who are not grounded in reality”. For this 
researcher, data from polls and surveys is the translation of the general will into 
something that political elites can understand. These elites stand outside of 
reality and do not naturally come to know or understand it without cues and aids 
from intermediaries. The pollster’s role is that of a saviour and interlocuter, 
providing the policymaker with the grounding that they need in order to be able 
to adequately understand a situation, make decisions, and propose ideas. The 
policy world in Washington was described as being infatuated by the objectivity, 
accuracy, and scientific rhetoric of data. As the Research Analyst remarked in the 
same conversation, “Fresh data from credible sources is the lingua franca of 
Washington D.C. Numbers are a truism for these people”. The Associate Director 
at Pew echoed this sentiment, pointing out that policymakers in Washington are 
not data savvy; they are not people who work with numbers, yet they are 
transfixed by them. It is the job of the pollster, in this case, to employ scientific 
rhetoric to transform numbers into something meaningful (something that can be 
imbued with political meaning) for audiences like policymakers and other 
political elites.  
The importance of data to elites is not only an American phenomenon. In Jordan, 
pollsters see their role as central to political decision-making because of a 
relationship forged between the former King Hussein bin Talal, who reigned 
until his death in 1999, and the growing community of social and political 
scientists. Multiple Jordanian pollsters noted his unique attention to statistical 
data (on the state of Jordan). One pollster, whose involvement in polling stretches 
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back to the 1960s and who has worked extensively with the Royal Hashemite 
Court throughout his career, recounted that “King Hussein used data to the last 
comma”. Indeed, the monarch also helped to establish the CSS, which continues 
to work extremely closely with the state in their polling initiatives.    
The insights presented above display the presence of a commitment to (or at least 
the influence of) the positivist tradition. Some commonalities are noted among 
the interviewees who expressed this particular discourse. For one, each of them 
worked for (at the time of the interview) or had made a career working for major 
firms and research institutes considered to be among the leading organisations in 
their field and respective country (companies with at least fifty employees or 
among the largest in their geographic markets). Each of these organisations are 
corporations, with the exception of the CSS, which is a major research entity 
accountable to the Jordanian government. Accountability to multiple 
shareholders and high-stakes media attention is likely a key reason why 
organisations such as these would value and promote objectivity and accuracy in 
their work, given that they must always appear to be authoritative leaders in 
their field. These discursive views emerged primarily in the United States and in 
Jordan, with the exception of one of the Palestinian researchers interviewed, a 
statistician.  
In our conversations, the reflections of these pollsters were straightforward, 
almost unflinching; there is a confidence in the expert self, bolstered by a belief in 
the validity of scientifically-obtained social data. The combination of musings on 
the nature of public opinion here did not exactly get at what public opinion is 
(definitionally) but did demonstrate an understanding of public opinion as 
something that can be captured by standardised statistical methodologies with 
confidence: the methods of polls and surveys are accurate, accurate methods 
produce facts, facts are objective, and objective facts are true. There is no desire 
from the positivist-minded pollster to probe deeper into theoretical terrain or 
question whether objective facts are empirically ascertainable. Instead, they view 
themselves as the gatekeepers of this science of social knowledge and expertise. 
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3 Public Opinion is Malleable 
While, as we saw above, the discourse of positivism is recognisable in 
commentary emphasising scientific objectivity and accuracy, a second discourse 
emerged among a set of pollsters that emphasised, by contrast, the socially 
constructed and changing nature of public opinion. According to this line of 
reasoning, public opinion is a fluid as opposed to a fixed science. These pollsters 
are aware that there is no strict agreement among scholars and experts on 
whether polls are perfect measures of public opinion. For instance, one Israel-
based practitioner, who described their role as an independent polling 
consultant, said succinctly, “Polling is not exact. No science is exact”. The science 
of polling cannot be exact because public opinion is a complex cross-section of 
independent thoughts, influences, ideas about choices, preferences and hopes, 
social judgements, unpredictable cognitive processes, and unknowns, and on top 
of this, the methodology is imperfect. And yet pollsters who understand the 
malleability of public opinion as a concept are still very much empirical 
researchers who “confine themselves to find out what people say they think, 
believe, know, or judge” (Krippendorff 2005, 133). They thus recognise the 
problem of conceptual malleability in public opinion while remaining committed 
to practicing the dominant measurement techniques. 
To say that public opinion is socially constructed is to say that it “is not a fact of 
nature that could be found somewhere unattended, nor is it a tangible artifact 
that could be manufactured and photographed” (Krippendorff 2005, 130). It does 
not exist out there, waiting to be discovered, but is an artificial construct 
emerging from the interactions of humans and social groups. The pollsters 
interviewed were seemingly clear on this. Polls and surveys represent merely one 
piece in a larger machine fashioned to tap into the public imaginary. The Israeli 
Consultant admitted that polls and surveys are important and useful, but prone 
to manipulation, saying that they are “the best and most systematic measure we 
have. There is no better measure”. And further, they are just one of a few 
different signals that we can pay attention to. Pollsters in this camp are therefore 
willing to adapt and potentially see beyond the opinion poll, recognising that 
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there are methodological limitations to large-N opinion research. Yet, they 
continue on their course, despite the recognized limitations in their methods. 
As Klaus Krippendorff writes,  
All social constructions are constituted in the understanding that their 
constituents have of it and enact. Public opinion is no exception. It is 
constituted in concepts of public opinion for which numerous institutions 
compete—advertising, public relations, the mass media, politics, 
journalism, and last but not least the science of polling—each pursuing its 
own interests in shaping the concept of public opinion in its favour, and 
each relying on pollsters, social researchers, and relevant media to record 
and publicise it […]. As such, public opinion appears as a self-organising 
system that preserves the uneasy network of conceptions of itself (2005, 
146). 
Indeed, the co-opting of the idea of public opinion to suit different actors and 
interests is something that arose in multiple conversations with pollsters. One 
Director of Polling at a Washington-based think tank described how they derive 
utility and satisfaction from doing public opinion research, but “what happens 
with it is out of my hands”. Public opinion information is an “uncontrollable” 
force. Once it leaves the hands of the researcher, it is prone to being shaped or 
reconstructed by others who come into contact with it at later stages. The 
Director recognised that data by its very nature is easily manipulable, and this is 
a reality of their daily work. Pollsters are not policymakers and do not see 
themselves as activists or advocates for non-neutral positions. By clearing up 
questions about their own neutrality, pollsters effectively set themselves free 
from blame. They are inculpable; determined to remain innocent while deflecting 
when necessary to those actors whose job it is to interpret or (mis)read data. This 
protective mechanism preserves the neutrality of the pollster, renders them 
apolitical, and keeps the process of transferring public opinion knowledge from 
publics to elites in balance because the pollsters remain invisible in the process. 
The main message is “Don’t shoot the messenger”. But at the same time, there is 
an admission that polling data is not one reality; rather, its ability to be 
misconstrued allows it to wear multiple faces at once. 
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Scientific accuracy is not a reasonable ideal or an absolute goal of the pollster 
who understands public opinion to be an ever-shifting thing. Instead, the focus is 
on keeping numbers in the ballpark or within a generally accepted (and 
expected) margin of error. As the Israel Consultant explained, “You don’t need 
accuracy within a single percentage point. The figures we have are good 
enough”. They give us a sense of what we’re looking for, or at the very least give 
clues that lead us toward the correct analytical directions. To expect total 
accuracy is both futile and unnecessary. One Director and Co-Founder of a 
Lebanon-based market research firm (which also operates in the Gulf region) 
admitted that “Most [public opinion] data is problematic” and that this is 
generally known and understood across the practitioners’ world. Some of the 
pollster’s doubts here are about methods—are the right questions being asked? 
Does the wording of questions have the effect of manipulating the public 
respondents or leading them into ambiguity? Do other pollsters cut corners, and 
how can we know? But the same issues also extend to the way that public 
opinion is talked about as an idea. It is, at its core, a “problematic” concept. 
Going back to Krippendorff, “Public opinion is the artifact of how public opinion 
researchers conduct themselves in public, which includes the questions they ask 
of their interviewees, what they do with them, and how they publish their 
findings” (2005, 134). The concept itself becomes an instantiation of the methods 
and approaches embodied by public opinion researchers. Problems and 
uncertainties in the methods thus naturally give way to problems and 
uncertainties in how public opinion is talked about more generally. 
Pollsters and practitioners who conveyed this constructivist discourse also 
highlighted the evolution of technologies in public opinion research. At Gallup, 
Inc., the Washington-based private firm founded by George Gallup in 1935, one 
Data Consultant explained that even though the methodology of polling is 
standardised, “There are innovations over time. Changing the survey constantly 
makes it a malleable science”. The Consultant described their philosophy toward 
polls and surveys as an acceptance of the inevitable imperfections and problems 
that arise in their daily craft. Their objective is to try and fix these problems, for 
instance by “making any changes that better the survey”, rather than to maintain 
absolute consistency in line with past motives and methods. Consistent, 
unchanged (or minimally changed) survey questionnaires are usually used to 
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trend public opinion data over time. Alterations can break these trends, and 
given that trends and forecasts are often considered two key objectives of polls, a 
philosophy of innovation as opposed to uniformity is an uncommon position to 
find. 
While an openness to the changing nature of technologies of research is seen in 
some pollsters, others suggest that we need to look beyond the dominant tools 
and techniques to understand public opinion. Though they are pollsters by 
practice, they too rely on other methods to supplement the sometimes shaky or 
incomplete stories derived from the polls. A prominent Jordan-based pollster 
with a background in psychology has come to realise this over the course of a six-
decade long research career, during which time they have worked on public 
opinion as it relates to Middle East market research, electoral and non-electoral 
political polling in Jordan, Lebanon, Egypt, and national and regional research in 
collaboration with the Jordanian government, United Nations Development 
Programme (UNDP), United States Agency for International Development 
(USAID), and the International Republican Institute (IRI). In a conversation about 
the pollster’s “ethics of public opinion research”, the importance of blending 
methods came through. “Qualitative research puts you in the frame of everyday 
people”, something that quantitative research cannot do as successfully. Focus 
groups, in-depth interviews, and direct observation are qualitative tools that help 
to tell elements of the story which standardised interview and online 
questionnaires often miss. They allow room for exploring why individuals might 
hold the views that they do, helping to understand opinion as opposed to just 
measuring it. It is this understanding—as opposed to just measuring—that makes 
a pollster more adept and a better expert. The pollster, in this sense, values the 
closeness to individual members of the public. The Director of the Lebanon-based 
market research firm mentioned earlier also conveyed a strong openness to other 
ways of understanding public opinion. “We need a more participatory approach 
[to public opinion research]. For instance, comparing different methodologies as 
opposed to total global standardisation”. Further, “We must change the 
methodology to suit the times”. Thus, public opinion research cannot effectively 
see itself as a fixed science and still thrive; instead, the methods shift and change 
not only because researchers aim to get closer to the truth, but also because the 
object of inquiry (public opinion) and its market are moving targets. 
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The social construction of public opinion also emerges when we consider the 
ways in which public opinion is put to use. Its perceived usefulness determines its 
purpose and shapes its conceptual meaning. This can be otherwise framed as the 
fundamental question, “What is the social reality that polling operationalises?” 
(Krippendorff 2005, 134). One Research Analyst at a Washington-based think 
tank put it this way: “Public opinion is about symbolic politics”. Symbolic politics 
in this sense requires us to pay attention to meaning in political acts rather than 
other substantive elements. Conveying meaning becomes the political end in 
itself. The Analyst continued by explaining that “The scientific gaze on public 
opinion is really more about salience, and about what sells. It matters what you 
use it for”. Public opinion for this Analyst is useful inasmuch as it is perceived to 
be impressive, important, or marketable. Given that the Analyst’s role is to 
produce information for policymakers, data is useful inasmuch as it relates to 
policies people will find relevant and in line with their interests. Contrast this 
with other ideas about the social reality that polling operationalises: one Senior 
Analyst at Gallup, for instance, said that public opinion is about “perceptions of 
things”. These perceptions drive behaviour, and “political leaders need to know 
these behaviours”. So, public opinion fulfills a need for political leaders. Given 
that a large part of Gallup’s role involves sharing data with political leaders and 
other elites, it seems fair that the Senior Analyst’s impression of public opinion 
reflects the usefulness of data from this perspective. Another example comes 
from a Research Analyst working in the Bureau of Intelligence and Research 
(INR) at the US Department of State in Washington. The Analyst described public 
opinion as being about intelligence. Intelligence, in this sense, refers to the 
collection, processing, measurement, and interpretation of information 
concerning foreign states and peoples. Its perceived usefulness as a tool to 
support foreign policy directions and national security is embedded in the 
Analyst’s understanding of public opinion. These examples reveal the different 
social realities (for policymakers, elites, and intelligence communities) that public 
opinion polling operationalises.  
The insights presented here reflect a sense of public opinion as something that is 
socially constructed: it is naturally malleable at both the theoretical and practical 
levels. The dominant measurement tools and techniques are prone to change and 
innovate, in some cases because of their inherent imperfections. These tools and 
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techniques are also considered alongside other means of producing public 
opinion knowledge, such as qualitative approaches. The reflections from each 
pollster are shaped, to a large degree, by what their data is ultimately being used 
for— policymaking, advising political leaders, and/or providing security 
intelligence. Utility is therefore one determinant of how pollsters perceive public 
opinion; it is not value-free. Those who expressed constructivist interpretations of 
public opinion generally had mixed views on its usefulness. The Lebanese 
Director raised the issue that polling is irrelevant during times of war; its 
usefulness ebbs and flows based on political conditions. But at the same time 
public opinion polling “helps policymakers to understand what the people 
want”. According to the Israeli Consultant, “polling is just one piece of a political 
machine”, which is to say that public opinion research is not enough to manage 
all points of disconnect between people and leaders. The Jordan-based pollster, 
meanwhile, cited their close working relationship with the state as one of the 
conditions for public opinion data translating into policy. Not all pollsters have 
this relationship of mutual support with government. Finally, the Washington-
based Analyst, when asked “Does public opinion [data] matter to policy?”, 
answered that “It is about flavour rather than kind; it’s about nuances”. The 
Analyst suggests that the question be rephrased to ask what forms of public 
opinion matter to what kinds of policy, as opposed to whether public opinion 
matters per se. 
The first set of interviewees who perceived public opinion as scientifically 
objective and exhibited a commitment to the spirit of positivism, were mostly 
working in the setting of large companies. By contrast, interviewees who 
expressed the malleability of public opinion, with the exception of Gallup, were 
either independent pollsters or worked in smaller operations with less than thirty 
employees. The INR office of the US Department of State has a small team 
dedicated to global public opinion research. The remaining operations comprised 
either of think tanks or small-to-mid-sized operations in Washington, Jordan, and 
Lebanon. The smaller size of operations may contribute to ideas about public 
opinion as something that changes or is volatile, simply because these pollsters 
are more likely to engage in methodological experimentation and exploration 
and test different approaches with fewer clients. In short, the methods of polls 
and surveys are considered adaptive, evolutionary, and imperfect. There is a 
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willingness from the constructivist-minded pollster to consider the limits of their 
craft. Still, their understanding of public opinion is bound by the perceived 
functional utility of the information they produce, leading them to view public 
opinion research as a means to different ends. 
4 Public Opinion is Emancipatory 
To say that the public is a political state is to see the potential for publics to 
embody a type of structural governance (Odugbemi 2011). Being able to hold 
states accountable for their actions is part of the power of the public, which 
means that public opinion is about much more than “a mere aggregation of 
attitudes that have not been reflected upon”; it is about larger processes of debate 
and discussion in the public arena (Odugbemi and Lee 2011, 7). As became 
apparent from a subset of pollsters interviewed, public opinion is also about 
fostering a sense of identity and inclusion in these same processes of debate and 
discussion. The third discursive tone that emerged from interviews with pollsters 
and practitioners understood public opinion as a form of civic emancipation or 
civic power. Neither does it prioritise the scientific soundness or objectivity of 
data, nor the perceived utility of data for private interests, nor developments in 
methodology and technology. Rather, it focuses on public opinion as a tool that 
can be used by people for the betterment of their societies. It is emancipatory in 
the sense that it procures the right of representation for different subgroups in a 
society. The pollster still has an important intermediary role to play here, 
especially in designing tools for “representativeness” and facilitating processes of 
communication between people and media and governments. Public opinion 
research is therefore seen as having an increasingly central role in political life, 
while conceptualisations of public opinion take on a normative dimension. 
The Arab Barometer describes itself as a “research network”, comprised of 
academic and research institutions who collectively have produced large-scale 
national opinion surveys in five waves since commencing data collection across 
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multiple countries in the Arab region in 2006.18 In a conversation about the 
formation and purpose of the Arab Barometer initiative, one American Project 
Director said that polling is about “using science to empower the region”. For 
this reason, the Arab Barometer is transparent with its data, publishing survey 
materials and results online for public consumption.19 This transparency is what 
the Project Director believes is “key to the sustainability of polling”, namely, for 
polling to make progress as a science, it must lay bare its mistakes and 
imperfections so that when polls and surveys “get it wrong, it doesn’t come as 
such a shock”, but rather as an opportunity to learn and improve the 
methodology. When the normative dimensions of public opinion are prioritised, 
a different ethics of public opinion research emerges. Instead of serving a 
particular utilitarian function or being sold as a commodity, data is multi-
purpose: it becomes available for anyone to make use of analytically. 
In response to the question, “What is public opinion?”, the same Project Director 
carefully reflected and then said that public opinion means “giving each 
individual in society a voice. Empowering them. It creates a level playing field”. 
A level playing field connotes equal opportunity and equal representation. The 
idea here is that each individual understands that their views are not excluded or 
marginalised by the complex processes of sifting, aggregating, and statistically 
manipulating a small sample of expressions and opinions. This is a distinctly 
different interpretation of the representative sample. While the discourse of 
scientific objectivity would understand the representative sample in public 
opinion methodology—a subset of a statistical population that accurately reflects 
the (demographic) makeup of the members of the entire population—as an 
approach that has strong external validity and generalisability, an emancipatory 
discourse highlights a principle of inclusion whereby majority and minority 
views and subgroups are visible within the bigger picture of a society painted by 
the polls.   
 
18
 The first Arab Barometer survey (Wave I) was conducted between 2006 and 2009, and subsequently, 
Wave II (2010-2011), Wave III (2012-2015), and Wave IV (2016-2017) were released. The fifth and latest 
wave, conducted between 2018 and 2019, was initially publicised in June 2019. 
19
 Pew Research Center also publishes its data online for public consumption. 
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Public opinion research can also have the effect of fostering a sense of identity in 
and among communities and subgroups. “Especially in countries where 
leadership is not close to the public … polling keeps people in contact with 
democracy. And we need polling for citizens to see who they are part of more 
broadly”. This was remarked by a Lebanon-based Director of Polling whose own 
data is not made public, though the pollster acknowledged that public opinion 
data can only be transformed into a public good if it is transparent and available. 
When data is publicised, individuals are able to take stock of where they stand 
and whether their own views are supported by others around them. The polls, in 
this pollster’s view, can help foster a sense of identity and belonging, especially 
in social climates that are not yet oversaturated or disillusioned by the polls. The 
democratic potential of public opinion research is re-embedded in the principle 
of inclusion, in which a spectrum of views is represented.  
The discourse of civic emancipation also allows for a renegotiation of the 
relationship between pollsters and civil society, which becomes stronger as the 
pollster begins to see themselves as an advocate of the people that they seek to 
give a voice to. While it is more common for researchers to see themselves as 
neutral intermediaries who are responsible for producing public opinion data but 
are absolved of misuse or misinterpretation of the data post-factum, neutrality 
takes a backseat when the pollster sees their work as part of a larger cause. One 
Palestinian pollster and President/Founder of a major research institute, who has 
also worked as part of the World Bank-led Palestinian National Development 
Plan, explained that in their view, “Public opinion leaders are influencers”. They 
can choose to operate from particular perspectives and advocate for particular 
causes. The pollster further discussed the notion of “polling for all”—the idea 
that polling methods need not follow existing models if they exclude relevant 
members of society. Rather, a more inclusive form of polling where “questions 
are designed around the needs of all” is advocated. In this way, people 
themselves become agenda-setters for research. Public opinion research is thus 
again about representation. If pollsters are seen to represent the diversity of sub-
groups and minority views in a society, then trust in pollsters and in the science 
of public opinion increases and the relationship between pollsters and civil 
society becomes stronger. Speaking more on this idea of inclusivity, the same 
pollster remarked, “I am not doing polling for the sake of polling”, but as a way 
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to give some sort of power to the people. Through representation, public opinion 
is thus a form of power that members of a society can hold, and pollsters help 
manifest this power by producing data and information. 
The discourse of public opinion as something with emancipatory potential stands 
in stark contrast to the positivist line of reasoning (where scientific objectivity 
and accuracy reign). An interesting way of conceptualising the tension between 
the two views is to consider the gendering of scientific research. As Lewis writes, 
The symbolic power of numbers to connote science and scientific rigour is 
inverted on this critical terrain: numbers are seen to symbolise a narrow, 
controlling view of the world, an arrogant, anal-retentive, and 
characteristically male approach to social science. Thus the term ‘number 
cruncher’, with its connotations of empty-headed manual labour, becomes 
a pejorative term (2001, 7).  
If the idea of data being crunched to create/control narratives and “truths” about 
the world is a decidedly masculine investigation of knowledge, then a gendered 
lens allows us to consider what a feminist critique of the science of polling might 
look like. Perhaps a feminist epistemological approach to public opinion 
knowledge, instead of outright rejecting empirical evidence as invalid, would 
“argue that most beliefs are more the result of their social context than they are 
objectively true” (Pressley 2008, 47). A feminist approach to public opinion 
research would not necessarily reject tools like polls and surveys, but would 
reconsider the politics of their origins, their application, their potential, and the 
manifold meanings that they reveal to us. This emancipatory discourse of public 
opinion aligns with critical perspectives in the literature, and while there is no 
sign of a gendered approach to polling in the literature (and it is outside the 
parameters of my research), I re-address the possibilities of a feminist critique in 
future trajectories of research in Chapter 8. But for the purposes of this analysis, 
we can say that this view stands in opposition to the positivist ideal of value-free 
objectivity because public opinion research must instead be understood as a 
normative pursuit that has inevitable social, political, and ethical consequences 
(see Douglas 2009). 
The discourse of civic emancipation may not be the dominant way of talking 
about public opinion, but it emerges where the pollster values transparency and 
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the accessibility of data. Those who expressed the view of public opinion as a 
form of emancipatory power saw public opinion as absolutely necessary for the 
elevation of the masses in political life. These pollsters are not alone in thinking 
that participation in the public sphere is necessary for a just society (see Rawls 
1971; Habermas 1962). The aforementioned Palestinian Director was one of few 
pollsters I encountered who discussed the need to “push for the diversity of 
questions, from political violence, to social issues, to sex and AIDS, corruption in 
leadership”, topics otherwise considered taboo or too sensitive to discuss in 
public forums. The Director’s desire to push the boundaries of collective 
discussion using questionnaires is geared toward progressing civic discourse on 
the whole. A second Director of another major Palestinian research organisation 
discussed how, from their experience, Palestinians display a willingness to speak 
openly about political issues and that it would serve leaders well to listen. 
Pollsters thus fill the space between people and political elites without sending 
the signal of favouritism toward the latter. As an example, politicians or 
journalists often request to see the results of polls before they are made public in 
order to “be in the know”, but pollsters refrain from doing so in order to uphold 
the principles of transparency and fairness in the public.  
In sum, public opinion in this sense is treated as a public good, i.e., as something 
that belongs to the people and simultaneously enhances their collective well-
being. As we will see in Chapter 7, this normative approach to research, which 
seeks to empower people by helping them to understand and through the 
artefacts of polls and surveys, has the potential to politically transform 
communities. Contemporary developments in Arab public opinion research have 
provided fertile ground for this human-centric approach. 
5 Conclusion 
After reviewing scholarly definitions of public opinion that have gained currency 
over time, I wanted to get a sense of whether practitioners actually reflected these 
definitions in their daily work. Through the interview process, I noted three 
general pollster perspectives relating to public opinion. 1) Public opinion is 
scientific. The epistemic and political authority of science is deeply rooted in 
highly-valued ideas about objectivity and accuracy (Porter 1995). 2) Public 
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opinion is a malleable and socially constructed concept. It is not a fixed science, 
but rather an approximation for representation. It is symbolic and has the 
potential to shift and change. Finally, 3) public opinion is a tool for emancipation 
and empowerment—both the empowerment of communities of individuals and 
of the study of opinion itself. We can see the linkages between the first 
perspective (scientific) and the rationalist/behaviouralist theoretical tradition. The 
second perspective (malleability) resonates with constructivist approaches to 
understanding public opinion. Finally, the third perspective (emancipation) feels 
novel and at the same time harkens back to the early, pre-scientific ideal-sense of 
public opinion as an invisible force that binds together all members of a society, 
to be wielded as a dialogical device in the struggle for political freedoms.  
Additionally, I found that the market conditions in which the pollster finds 
themselves align, to a great extent, with their individual perspectives. The 
principle of scientific objectivity was pursued by some of the largest companies 
out of the subset whose existence depended on their reputations, while the idea 
of malleability emerged from smaller polling organisations that likely experience 
greater methodological freedom and work volatility. Meanwhile, the 
emancipatory view was found in the Palestinian case and in academic initiatives 
who make their data transparent. I return to the significance of the emancipatory 
case of Palestine in Chapter 7. 
This exercise presented here had its limitations. Some pollsters, for instance, 
simply could not provide a conceptualisation of public opinion, while at the same 
time, the small sample and assorted selection of interviews means that it is 
difficult to assert that global polling practitioners will likely fall into one of these 
three camps. However, I take this to be a starting point in an area where we have 
surprisingly limited information; specifically, on the question of how global 
pollsters view public opinion and where these views come from. Nevertheless, 
the small number of examples derived from the epistemological and 
methodological convictions of the pollsters and practitioners I interviewed reveal 
nuanced ideas about public opinion, and demonstrate that conceptualisations of 
public opinion in practice are just as diverse and conflicting as in the scholarly 
literature: even in practice, there is no consensus on the concept of public 
opinion. 
  
Chapter 4  
On the Global Ascendancy of Polling 
 
Statistics are to bodies and social types what maps are to territories: they flatten and 
enclose. 
Arjun Appadurai (1993) 
 
Our academic and practical understanding of the term “public opinion” has come to rest 
on one point: the opinion poll. 
Taeku Lee (2002) 
 
We have so far seen that diverging conceptualisations of public opinion are 
prevalent in the everyday practice of research, and that this is, to some extent, a 
mirror of the debates and contestations in a body of scholarly literature that 
traces back to Enlightenment-era thought. The stage has thus been set to welcome 
public opinion as an essentially contested concept. With this chapter, I turn to the 
application of the concept in order to explore a phenomenon explicitly tied to the 
study of public opinion—that is, polling. This chapter engages with the relentless 
desire to capture and manage populations and “the public opinion”, and further 
traces its institutionalisation through the systematic use of polls and surveys on a 
mass scale.  
This chapter tackles the rise of international polling in five steps. I begin in 
Section 1 by considering the ways in which administrative practices of counting 
bodies provided a blueprint for the study of public opinion. Section 2 follows 
with a brief discussion of the method of scientific polling. Sections 3 and 4 
problematise the hegemonic status of polls in political life. I question where the 
authority of polls comes from and dissect the label of “pollster”. Finally, Section 5 
traces the global ascendency of polling and survey research through the 
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twentieth century as it followed from and contributed to developments in the 
American social sciences. Far from an exhaustive historical account, this chapter 
is concerned with the spread and institutionalisation of specific modes of 
scientific inquiry and behaviour which have “succeeded” in the sense that they 
have been replicated, reproduced, commodified, and globalised. The mapping of 
actors and institutions in Section 5 will subsequently prove helpful in the case of 
foreign-led opinion inquiry in the Arab region. Analytically, this chapter takes 
place from a more metatheoretical perspective, paying attention to the 
characteristics of inquiry rather than public opinion (data) itself. The groundwork 
laid down in Part 1 and Part 2 of this thesis provides a point of departure for the 
case analysis (Part 3). This point of departure is situated externally to the Arab 
region, the reason being that the study of Arab public opinion has not developed 
in a bubble and cannot be seen in isolation. Rather it bridges multiple 
overlapping histories and unfolds as part of a broader story of the globalisation 
of American-styled scientific opinion research in the twentieth and twenty-first 
centuries, which first conquered domestic public opinion and later set its sights 
on “empirically neglected” territories of the world. 
1 Counts, Categories, and Enumeration: A Basis for 
the Study of Public Opinion 
To count people is to determine the finitude of the social spaces we inhabit. As it 
happens, people are governed as members of populations, and populations are 
represented through observations, calculations, schema, probabilities, censuses, 
registrations, polls, and other administrative devices “invented to classify and 
inscribe identities as legal and bureaucratic categories” (Ruppert 2011, 219). As L. 
John Martin writes, “the idea of collecting, summing, and averaging the opinions 
of a population, as opposed to culling the wisdom of a community by listening to 
the sages who cared to comment or by achieving a consensus, developed 
gradually. On the other hand, gathering passive—for example, demographic—
data about a population goes back as far as written history” (1984, 15).  
The practice of counting individuals in a society has been performed by states to 
varied ends; for instance, in determining the wealth of a nation when people are 
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regarded as assets to the state, in drawing resources in the form of taxation, in 
producing inventories of materials that form the basis of economies, in executing 
military conscription, in keeping people under surveillance or control, or for the 
purposes of seeking political representation and participation, as in the case of 
electoral systems. In each instance, the act of counting is self-serving. It allows the 
state to account for itself and to come to know itself in relation to other states. In 
James C. Scott’s words, it renders society “legible” to the state (1998, 2). The 
practice of counting might also enable individuals—as the subjects of the 
counting—to access extracorporeal knowledge about themselves through the lens 
of the state. Anecdotally, a 1940s slogan of the American Bureau of the Census 
encouraging people to identify themselves in their census, read “You can know 
your country only if your country knows you” (Igo 2011, 285). This suggests that 
a dialectical relationship between the individual and the state is born of the act of 
counting, though the asymmetry is tipped in favour of the state, for whom the 
counting translates to a mode of governance. It also suggests an obligation for 
people to make themselves visible to the state. Still, the administrative exercise of 
counting “all” peoples, which has grown to become “a near-universal institution 
for the development of state power and the imagining of shared national 
communities” (Lieberman and Singh 2017, 1), has the effect of bringing into being 
both the state and its peoples (Clarysse and Thompson 2006, 11). 
Counting may appear a value-neutral and benign administrative activity, one 
that is arguably necessary for the management and functioning of large state 
systems and one that is also positively illuminating—in the sense that new 
knowledge is created to progress ideas about the state. Acts of counting “are, 
after all, generally viewed as matters of bureaucratic routine, somewhat 
unpleasant necessities of the modern age, a kind of national accounting” (Kertzer 
and Arel 2002, 2). In one view, counting has ordering and additive qualities that 
encourage consistency and a shared language. They can create “bonds of 
uniformity” amongst the counted, convey risk and change, and replace the 
unknown with a sense of monitored stability (Rose 1991). But by now we also 
know that counting populations is, of course, deeply political. People are rarely 
counted without being ordered—symbolically segregated—along hand-drawn 
lines denoting social difference; the act of counting thus somewhat superficially 
and arbitrarily produces populations. To count without classifying would mean 
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to assign each subject an equal value, with no perceptible distinguishing 
characteristics among them. Yet even a total population count involves 
classificatory schema, as it is usually the case that a population is defined on the 
basis of nationality, citizenship, living status, or whereabouts, delineating who is 
included and excluded. Counting and categorising are thus part of the everyday 
lives of states, and these activities help to produce identities (i.e., categories of 
race, ethnicity, language, social function, belief system, or other co-constituting 
markers) that order the social world. As Theodore Porter argues, categories 
become black boxes; “having become official, then, they become increasingly 
real”, and further, these categories “occupy contested terrain. The numbers they 
contain are threatened by misunderstanding as well as self-interest” (1995, 42). 
Many studies have focused on how contested constructs like race, legal status, 
and the ideal citizen, produced through the discriminatory acts of counting, 
classifying, or the enforced self-identification of individuals, serve to strengthen 
and legitimate the rule of the state (as a small selection, see for instance Skerry 
2000; Kertzer and Arel’s 2002 edited volume; and Ruppert 2011). These acts have 
sometimes been subversive, of the type that Ian Hacking calls an “unintended 
effect” of classifying peoples, as in how people might be organised according to 
their occupations or the “inevitable” divisions of social class (Hacking 1982, 280). 
“Enumeration demands kinds of things or people to count. Counting is hungry 
for categories” (Hacking 1982, 280). Seemingly innocuous descriptors we assign 
to groups of people in our everyday language might be part of the unintended 
effects counting.  
These acts may also be overt, as when classifying intensifies opposition and 
violence between groups, brings populations into existence, or conceals them 
from view. Jan Busse, in his study on the origins of Palestinian statistics, 
demonstrates the ways in which the count via census and official figures has 
played a role in the quest for self-representation (2015). “From the very 
beginning, the development of Palestinian official statistics was characterized by 
a profound exposure to global dynamics. Within the Palestinian national 
movement, there clearly existed an awareness that modern statistics are crucial 
for the project of Palestinian self-determination and nation-building” (Busse 2015, 
76). In this case, the tools for enumeration developed in the setting of conflict and 
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were harnessed in ways that shaped notions of identity and belonging. In the 
case of Burundi and Rwanda, Peter Uvin describes how population statistics 
managed to hide mass violence by continuing to indicate annual population 
increments in the early 1960s which “give no indication whatsoever of the death 
and flight of hundreds of thousands of people” (2002, 153). And Evelyn Ruppert 
questions the role of counting in making up new people in the case of the 
Canadian census, where “Canadian” was added to list of racial and ethnic 
categories only in 1996 after an indication that people were identifying as such 
even though the category was not considered an official one (2012). Following on 
Hacking’s ideas of “making up people” (1982), Ruppert asserts that censuses 
“may inaugurate a new kind of person that had not been self-conscious before” 
(2012, 37). 
Though they developed and were adopted unevenly around the world, practices 
of enumeration (census-taking) are broadly similar; canvassing territories, 
extrapolating from samples to larger populations, and incorporating vital 
statistics along with inventories of peoples and objects. As Tessler writes, 
censuses and population studies “constitute one of the relatively few substantive 
areas in which similar surveys have been carried out at many different points in 
space and time” (1987a, 200). These practices are part of institutional settings 
“within which the experts and their subjects interact, and through which 
authorities control” (Hacking in Ruppert 2012, 38). They are therefore embodied 
by institutions (census bureaus and statistics or population departments in 
governments), actors (census authorities and enumerators), and tools and 
techniques (paper forms, questionnaires, and categories).  
As a methodology, enumeration translates chains of local observations into the 
language of statistics. By virtue of being quantifiable, enumeration allies itself to 
the spirit of rigour, rendering the social objective (Porter 1995). As a process, it is 
generally slow and belaboured, carefully planned and executed. Such large 
undertakings as a state census are carried out infrequently and have likely never 
been attained in a perfect form: not everyone who is sought by enumerators is 
reached, not everyone who is sought out chooses to or is capable of responding, 
not everyone responds truthfully, some people are purposefully omitted, some 
data are lost, some are erroneously transcribed, and changing estimation 
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techniques are just that—estimations. The census naturally, and often by design, 
fails at being fully inclusive. “The final reports and administrative techniques 
work on the premise of acquiring complete and totalising knowledge” even 
though their creators know well that numbers are unruly, and completeness is 
unattainable (Widmer 2017, 100).  
The centrality of institutions, actors, and tools in acts of enumeration, as well as 
the methodology around recording, sampling, and extrapolating populations 
have provided a sort of template for the empirical pursuit of public opinion. 
Enumeration practices “are something of a model for the conduct of coordinated 
studies and/or replications in the pursuit of cumulativeness in other areas” 
(Tessler 1987c, 200). That approaches to counting were easily replicable aided in 
their reproduction and eventual standardisation. It is the scientific quality of 
replicability that allows for the same methods and practices to spill over into 
other areas of study concerning populations at large. As Tessler notes, 
“replication is thus an indispensable component of the scientific method and an 
absolute requirement for the cumulative production of knowledge”.  
Public opinion knowledge about populations is, in many ways, the same type of 
knowledge as is derived from counting bodies. As a start, opinion polls and 
surveys are modeled on census categories: if the census is taken to be an abstract 
depiction of the entire population, a sample will be drawn from the census to 
create a miniature population, who are then targeted for opinion polls. The 
classifications and omissions created through the census are reproduced in polls. 
We may think of opinion polling as a more specialised form of counting. What 
the census does to bodies, the poll does to opinions; both accumulate, aggregate, 
evaluate, and interpret data about populations. Polls add the element of voice to 
the census on a smaller (but categorically identical) scale. Both carry a 
constitutive force—they are not just descriptive exercises to represent 
populations, territories, and the bounds between groups, but also “performative 
technologies that literally produced them” (Isin and Ruppert 2018, 2). They can 
shape discourse and alter the way we speak of and come to know about 
populations.  
The Greek term, techne (τέχνη), becomes relevant here for describing knowledge 
in the act of counting and classifying. “It is in Aristotle that we find the basis for 
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something like the modern opposition between epistêmê as pure theory and technê 
as practice” (Parry 2014). In Seeing Like a State, James C. Scott introduces the idea 
of techne as technical knowledge—akin to formalised or “settled knowledge” 
(1998, 320). Elsewhere, techne is described as art or a craft where the objective is 
the “application of technical knowledge and skills according to a pragmatic 
instrumental rationality” (Flyvbjerg 2001, 56). In essence, techne represents 
technical know-how in accordance with what Foucault calls “a practical 
rationality governed by a conscious goal” (1997, 378). In the case of the systematic 
counting and classifying of populations, the practical rationality that guides the 
science of enumeration sees knowledge of populations as an abstracted system 
useful for calculating projections, outcomes, and decisions. Despite the 
unruliness of the social world or the complexities of human identities, 
enumerators adhere to rules and principles that formalise and distill knowledge 
of populations down to universal rules and metrics. Just as in the case of 
statistics, where the relationship between a mean and standard deviation is 
formalised and universally applicable, principles embedded in the practices of 
systematic population data collection are similarly guided by techne. An ideal 
sample of a population, for instance, is defined as a random selection of people, 
who, by virtue of being subjected to randomisation, are assigned equal values 
and carry the same chance of being selected in the sample. This rule is 
generalised to all populations everywhere; it is a universal construct. Because of 
its universality, randomisation in samples generates high levels of confidence, 
i.e., a secure faith in the universal application of randomisation. This principle 
does not claim to produce perfect knowledge about the social world, but it is 
practiced as techne and thus enacted as if it does. We can extend this idea to any 
instrumental part of the methodology of counting.  
The techne of counting and classifying is just as apparent in census-taking 
practices as in mass opinion research. The usefulness of techne for describing 
systems of counting populations—and by extension, opinions of populations—
comes from its ability to tell us something about standardised ways of knowing. 
Standardised knowledge in the form of rules and metrics can be shared and 
taught, applied and tested, validated and reformulated. Standardised knowledge 
also enforces strict discipline on methods and techniques in order to minimise 
variation. It is at once useful and destructive: while the universalisation of 
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population knowledge allows us to describe phenomena scientifically, it also 
comes at the expense of other ways of knowing (it fills the universe of knowing, 
such that there appears to be no possibility of this knowledge being untrue). 
While this discussion and application of techne to the practices of counting 
stands to be developed further, I find it to be a useful anchor in the field of the 
history of science, helping to problematise the technically-driven systems of 
knowledge that counting (bodies and opinions) produces.  
2 The Method of Scientific Polling 
To study the development of polls in political life is akin to studying at least two 
histories: one is a history of methodological experimentation, innovation, and 
failure, while the other is a history of its institutionalisation. Methodological 
experimentation in public opinion research has produced longitudinal surveys, 
sampling trials and sample bias, election prediction models, exit polling, 
questionnaire science, and more. It has led to developments in the study of 
representativeness, population weighting, total survey error, social 
measurements and calculations, probability and confidence intervals, odds ratios, 
house effects20, and the list goes on. And it has attempted to reach members of the 
public through different means: in person, over the telephone, through 
newspapers, in magazines and news broadcasts, via post, online21, and through 
real-time digital tracking. Especially when we consider how ubiquitous public 
opinion data is, experimentation and innovation are found to be the main sources 
of discovery, refinement, and often even mistakes about public opinion. The 
propagation of very specific tools, applications, and the jargon of polling 
naturally produces ways of seeing and talking about public opinion, and both the 
ability and inability to adequately measure a phenomenon will shape the ways in 
which that phenomenon is understood.  
 
20
 House effects account for all of the methodological decisions made by the researcher. 
21
 Online polls and surveys are inexpensive to conduct but comparatively ineffective due to the tendency to 
generate low and self-selecting levels of engagement. 
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The history of the institutionalisation of these processes of experimentation, 
innovation, and failure provides another means for studying the development of 
polls in political life. As a starting point, for instance, we know that the statistical 
revolution “spurred the initial growth in survey research in Europe and the 
United States” (Norris 2009, 522), and that together with electoral studies, 
conventions and norms around public opinion research were established. 
Electoral systems have provided a strong support system for the rise of polls. A 
persistent, undying intrigue with solving the riddle of future uncertainties is 
deeply human, so it is unsurprising that polling developed as a way to predict 
political outcomes. As Smith writes, “as long as elections have existed, people 
have tried to anticipate their outcomes”, and “horse race” pre-election polls have 
long been used to fill the void of uncertainty (1990, 32). Elections and polls are 
also naturally synchronised: the numerical format allotting one vote per citizen is 
replicated in the poll, where the assumption is that each person has an opinion 
on an issue and each opinion is valued equally.  
The poll itself has evolved through different stages. The straw poll22, for instance, 
is one of the earliest renditions of the pre-election poll. Contentious elections 
where the outcome was unclear provided opportunities for journalists and 
campaigners to take stock of what people were feeling by holding a straw polls at 
public meetings or from poll books left in public spaces where people wrote 
down their preferences.23 Despite sometimes getting it right, the use of straw 
polls for mass public opinion was written off as flawed and unscientific, 
intentionally or unintentionally biased, and as capable of producing only a 
premature statement of public opinion at best. On the other side of an election, 
exit polls were developed as better checks against reality.24 Not reserved for 
elections alone, the sample survey (based on the observation of a representative, 
 
22
 A straw poll (origin: American) is an unofficial or ad-hoc vote used to determine “non-binding” popular 
opinion on an issue, often an election, with a self-selected group of participants. Straw polls were often 
reported in early twentieth-century newspapers (mass-oriented “penny press”), evidence that public opinion 
and media have long been relationally linked (Delli Carpini 2011). 
23
 The inconclusive 1824 American presidential election, which was ultimately won by Andrew Jackson, 
has been considered the first successful example of the use of straw polls as predictive tools (Smith 1990). 
24
 Exit polls, still in use today, are taken immediately after voters exit a polling station. 
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random, or probability sample) was a revolutionary methodological 
development and serves as the gold standard of polling today.  
Constructing a sample survey from the ground up is a very human endeavour, in 
that it involves human input or manipulation: it entails sample design, 
questionnaire wording, setting quotas for interviewers, coding of open-ended 
(verbatim) responses, data entry, and human error—none of which are 
automated and all of which require conscious decisions made at each step. And 
yet the fundamental principles of randomness and representativeness have 
entangled polling with probability theory, as a branch of mathematics. 
Representative samples which reproduce the demographic makeup of a total 
population on a small scale are more or less a baseline expectation. Today, the 
ideal sample for a state stands at 1,000 people, i.e., a thousand people are 
considered sufficient to represent the views of a state in toto. When an insufficient 
number of members of a population or subgroup required for representation 
cannot be reached, support mechanisms like weighting and prediction are used. 
And the time it takes to conduct a poll (from days to months) will depend on the 
method used to reach people in the sample.  
The method of polling today, from the earliest stage of sample design to the 
interpretation of data, unfolds like an old, well-worn recipe: it is a consensus-
driven step-by-step process that is both human and mechanical. Through the 
process, the substantive opinions of people are of little consequence—they must 
first be sorted, assembled, and manufactured. Only once they emerge from this 
process does a comprehensive and decipherable picture come into view. The 
tension between the scientific elements of polling and human bias embedded in 
the design, conduct, and interpretation of polls is practically inescapable for a 
method that blurs the line between the hard and soft sciences (we tend to see this 
tension flare when the polls miss the mark). 
3 The Hegemony of Scientific Polling 
The notion of hegemony might traditionally refer to the overwhelming capacity 
of political actors or subjects to shape the international system and reproduce 
forms of dominance in relation to weaker subjects within a shared space. In the 
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same vein, the idea of cultural hegemony extends this dominance to the 
worldviews, beliefs, value systems, and norms embedded in status quo ideologies. 
Hegemony offers a template for understanding the authority of scientific polling 
on account of its radical novelty and prestige. On the strength of science in 
society, Michael Polanyi once wrote that most “accept the validity of science as 
unquestionable and neither in need of philosophical justification nor capable of 
justification. You will rarely find this spelled out, but it is revealed by current 
practice” (1967, 533). Polanyi was referring to the authority of the hard sciences in 
society, but his message extends to the (social) science of polling, which has 
traditionally held greater influence and power than alternative means of social 
inquiry—not only in the social scientific community, but also in popular culture. 
The normalisation of scientific polling in society is a case of scientific and non-
scientific communities growing closer together; “laymen normally accept the 
teachings of science not because they share its conception of reality, but because 
they submit to the authority of science” (Polanyi 1967, 540).  
There is no doubt that public opinion polls and surveys have come to play an 
increasingly authoritative role in political life, becoming one of the most 
ubiquitous and socially trusted determinants of public opinion. Perrin and 
McFarland write that “few techniques are more central to contemporary social 
science than the sample survey as a tool for measuring the opinion of a public. 
The technique has become so entrenched that its historical, ontological and 
epistemological contours are hidden” (2011, 101). Similarly, Fried writes that 
“whether or not people like the polls and similar mechanisms, they are now a 
part of the landscape of our lives, having largely displaced other means of 
discerning public opinion” (2012, 6). Brady contends that “no other method for 
understanding politics is used more, and no other method has so consistently 
illuminated political science theories with political facts” (Brady 2000 in 
Fernandez et al. 2016, 859). And Korzi suggests that innovations and 
improvements to scientific sampling theory, polling technologies, and 
psychological study tools, combined with the predictive accuracy of many major 
election polls have fed the idea that opinion polls are the sine qua non of opinion 
research (2000, 56). 
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While there are myriad ways to convey the rapid growth of opinion polling, 
Figure 6 below shows the frequencies of relevant terms using Google’s Ngram 
functionality, which displays growing mentions of public opinion polling and 
related terms in a contained corpus of literature over time.25 
 
Figure 6: Google Ngram results for occurrences of phrases in corpus of English-language 
books, 1910-2008. 
Similarly, Figure 7 below uses the Web of Science Citation Index (SCI) to chart 
the growth in citations for the same six search terms as above in the scientific 
literature. 
 
Figure 7: Web of Science Citation Index (SCI) results for opinion poll-related terms, 1937-
2018. 
Source: Web of Science Core Collection. 
 
25
 The terms “poll”, “polls”, and “polling” were omitted to minimise skew from unrelated results. 
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The oft-cited American setting (imagined as a “sea of polls”) captures this growth 
in another sense (Lepore 2015). Lepore notes that “from the late nineteen-nineties 
to 2012, twelve hundred polling organizations conducted nearly thirty-seven 
thousand polls by making more than three billion phone calls” to Americans 
(2015). The sheer level of penetration of polling in contemporary political systems 
is difficult to capture, but it is certainly towering.  
How did polling become so ubiquitous? Lee, for instance, wonders whether “the 
sovereign status of survey data may simply be a fortuitous historical contingency 
or, more forcefully, an outcome warranted by the simple fact that polls are the 
optimal way to measure public opinion” (2002, 79). Both these explanations limit 
the agency of actors and seem to suggest that the phenomenal rise of polling 
might be an inevitable development in the social and political sciences, one that 
could not have otherwise been resisted or influenced by outside intervention. 
Perhaps it has to do with the ease with which polling data-bytes can be digested 
and quoted, or the ability of polling data to provide quick validation of 
individuals’ perspectives. Perhaps the problem that polling data soon becomes 
redundant and obsolete works to ensure its survivability, thanks to the need for 
replaceable data at a constant pace. Herbst reminds us that the opinion poll is not 
the only form of quantification in political life, yet it is one of the most attractive 
because of its seemingly objective and decisive nature, its ability to account for 
many individual opinions, and because of the authoritative power of numbers in 
general (1993, 2).  
What does the predominance of polling as a research tool mean? For one, it 
fundamentally shapes the how and what of the field of research, given that much 
of our understanding about public opinion has come to be equated with, or at the 
very least rely on, “what opinion polls poll” (Korzi 2000, 56). Polling data by 
nature is static, disjointed, rife with cognitive biases, and sometimes derives from 
impulse (and while we may actually want to measure impulse instead of reason 
in political behaviour, the point is that impulse is volatile and difficult to 
generalise to large populations). There are therefore analytical ramifications to 
the increasing reliance on polls over time. The observation of the phenomenon 
changes the phenomenon itself. As Lee notes,  
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The ascendancy of survey research is accompanied by a shift in focus from 
public opinion as the subject of theoretical speculation to public opinion as 
the object of empirical inquiry. A casualty of this shift is that the normative 
and conceptual parameters of public opinion largely become presumed, 
rather than interrogated, and much to the neglect of alternate parameters 
of public opinion (2002, 296). 
Regardless of what public opinion really is or what polls really measure, public 
opinion polls play a yet undetermined but surely prominent and symbolic role in 
the construction of ideas about nations, publics, identities, hierarchies, and 
boundaries. Though they may not always be correct, they are believable. 
4 The Pollster 
Who is the pollster? It may seem a fairly straightforward question, but as I argue 
for refocusing the empirical gaze on the pollster within the study of IR, it’s a 
necessary question to address. Clearly, pollsters are individuals who conduct and 
analyse polls. They are the creators, producers, disseminators, and 
representatives of public opinion data. They uphold a form of method and 
research that is among the most customary modes of public opinion knowledge 
production. I consider pollsters as a category of non-state actor for the reason that 
they are individual experts with the capacity to hold influence in (domestic and 
foreign policy) decision-making and act as agents wholly or partly independent 
from government. The pollster bears a legacy of being summoned by political 
elites to enlighten them on changing attitudes, fear, impressions, and other 
fragments of valuable social information. Their role includes providing relevant 
information to key actors in political settings. This information might sometimes 
be thought of as a public good, in the sense that it may directly and/or indirectly 
impact the well-being of the public depending on the venue through which 
information flows, i.e., through strategic political channels, media, or politicians 
and campaign managers. As Byron Price claimed, “whoever keeps public opinion 
under the microscope, analyzes its tempo and questions every sign of malady, 
performs a paramount public service” (1945, 40).  
Pollsters as a non-state actor-type are epistemologically and methodologically 
united, engaging in the same methods learned from common forebearers and 
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often coordinating their efforts and technical expertise within a community of 
like actors. The practices that pollsters enact are so consistent that those working 
today in Washington D.C., São Paulo, Allensbach, Abuja, Beirut, Kiev, and 
Quezon City converse in the same scientific language, engage the same methods, 
and produce results and reports that structurally resemble and speak to each 
other. 
The idea of the pollster as a modern-day soothsayer has often propelled them to 
celebrity status. We are meant to trust the pollster’s innate understanding of their 
methodology and intimate relationship with the research process. They have a 
level of access to the public imaginary that regular people themselves (the object 
of the pollster’s inquiry) are missing. They may also play the role of pundit and 
political strategist. Indeed, pollsters who accurately predict political outcomes 
such as major election results often garner media attention and fanfare. Their 
data (the end-product) grants them the authority to represent publics 
discursively, and the results of their polling can greatly influence the course of 
political decision-making. One peril of this lies in failing to accurately predict 
future political outcomes. British pollster Henry Durant (1902-1982) once 
quipped, “it is the most stupid job you can ever take up, no matter how hard you 
try to find a worse one. If you get the election results right, everybody takes it for 
granted. If you get it wrong, you stand naked and utterly ashamed, and there is 
nothing you can do about it” (Durant in Gallup 1976, 19). Inaccurate results can 
make waves in media circles, after which a coming crisis of the polls is inevitably 
declared and then usually averted, if only because the deep entrenchment and 
institutionalisation of polling seems to ensure its survival (see, for instance, Silver 
2014; Blumenthal 2016; Friedman 2016; Skibba 2016). In election or referenda 
polling at least, there is an overwhelming pressure on the pollster to prove that 
the method of scientific polling is accurate, verifiable, and replicable in the face of 
unforeseen events and unpredictable human emotions, reactions, and decisions. 
Part of the pollster’s role is therefore to ensure the public has faith in the polls, as 
well as ensure the survivability of the method. 
Another way that we can understand the pollster is by considering them in the 
context of what Lipari calls “the ritual of polling” (1999). Lipari describes the 
dialogical exercise of polls as being “ritualistic”, arguing that “the practice of 
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consulting the latest opinion poll has become a ritual not unlike consulting the 
oracle was to the ancient Greeks. Then, as now, the power of the ritual lies not 
merely in the interview itself, but in its symbolic resonance with the larger 
community”, and further, “rituals attain a privileged status in a culture by virtue 
of being distinguished from other practices” (Lipari 1999, 90). It is through the 
symbolic power of polls that the authority of pollsters comes to be legitimated, 
and through which pollsters, experts, and social scientists harness their 
specialised knowledge and conduct a social custom that affirms the existence of a 
reasoning public. Again, this equates the pollster with a soothsayer or seer—an 
intermediary between reality and the unknown with the special ability to 
demystify how we feel, act, or will feel and will act in the near-future. “Thus, 
whereas in religious ritual the specialist could be a priest or shaman, in polling 
the ritual specialist is the social-scientist-pollster who is appropriately qualified 
and trained to design, conduct, and interpret poll results” (Lipari 1999, 91). The 
lens of mysticism through which Lipari interprets the phenomenon of polling is 
very much tied to polling’s active role in the daily procession of (democratic) 
political life. The risk here is when too much trust is placed in the pollster, who is 
neither immune to mistakes nor bad judgements. As Lepore writes, “pollsters, 
rose to prominence by claiming that measuring public opinion is good for 
democracy. But what if it’s bad?” (2015). This question engages a distinct set of 
problems, which in today’s political reality is almost a counterfactual exercise. 
There exist very few surveys of pollsters themselves, but a more recent study 
titled “Polling the Pollsters” (Fernandez et al. 2016) attempts to better understand 
practitioners based in academic survey institutions (not commercial ones) across 
the United States, many of whom are accountable to or provide data for federal 
agencies. The authors found the demographic makeup of academic pollsters to be 
largely homogenous: about sixty percent were male, and ninety percent were 
white, while more than half had doctoral training in political science. There is no 
clarity as to what extent this homogeneity is reproduced in the full universe of 
pollsters (commercial or academic) across global polling markets. However, since 
the development of the American polling industry has taken shape in 
institutional settings characterised by the predominance of white men, we can 
expect, to some extent, that this will be reproduced in sub-settings of the 
academy. While the enterprise of polling is designed to account for the opinions 
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of all (via representative sampling), Western polling methods, as a type of expert 
knowledge, have been produced (and continue to be reproduced) in the confines 
of culturally, racially, and epistemologically homogenous power structures.26 In 
the following section, which traces the ascendency of global public opinion 
research from its American roots, the parameters of these power structures are 
drawn out. The ways in which these structures have sought to capture and 
control global knowledge beyond the American case is explored in Chapter 5. 
5 The Spread of Polling from Gallup to World 
Opinion 
By almost all accounts, public opinion polling has thrived since the 1930s, 
adapting quite painlessly to changes in markets and societies “and exploiting 
new technologies when they proved valuable to the field” (Groves 2011, 861). Its 
early institutionalisation in international organisations (e.g. the World 
Association of Public Opinion Research (WAPOR) and ESOMAR), journals (e.g. 
Public Opinion Quarterly and the International Journal of Public Opinion Research), 
and research programmes (e.g. the National Opinion Research Center (NORC) at 
the University of Chicago; the Global Barometers) have served as a stimulus to 
the development of a multibillion-dollar global market research industry, and 
have furthermore been instrumental in advancing the fields of domestic and 
international policymaking. By the 1950s, the question arose as to whether a 
single world-wide polling agency could be created for the purpose of preventing 
international war, in parallel to the idea of developing a world government 
(Dodd 1959; Dodd 1945). This idea of a “demoscope”—a single barometer to 
“measure, in representative samples of citizens and, eventually, leaders in all 
nations, the many kinds, degrees, and patterns of attitude, information, and 
current behaviour together with their changes in time as far as all these may be 
related to the elimination of war”—was an ambitious research proposal that 
sought to uphold a liberal international order (Dodd 1959, 430). Steps have been 
 
26
 To understand the implications of this, consider the invisibility of race in American survey research: see 
Lee, T. (2002), who exposes the subordinate treatment of African-American opinions in national surveying.  
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taken toward a system of “Barometer of World Opinions”, and today we have 
enterprises like the Global Barometers Surveys (GBS), which include the 
Eurobarometer, Latinobarometró, Asian Barometer, Afro Barometer, Eurasia 
Barometer, and Arab Barometer.  
The measurable expansion of public opinion research—from a decidedly 
American preoccupation with domestic affairs, to a transatlantic community of 
social scientists and market researchers, to a post-World War II concern by 
governments regarding foreign policy matters, and to the mass implementation 
of quantitative methods for understanding behaviour in diverse markets around 
the world—has been documented in several historical accounts (see for instance 
Groves 2011; Brückweh 2011; Norris 2009; Heath, Fisher, and Smith 2005; Geer 
2004; Converse 1987; and Speier 1950). Further, the tenacious link between 
American social science institutions (in which public opinion research was 
refined), philanthropic money, and power in the Cold War era has been explored 
in detail (see Berman 1983, Gilman 2003; Shah 2011; Parmar 2012; Solovey and 
Cravens 2012; and Solovey 2013). Instead of paraphrasing these chronicles and 
accounts, which more than adequately do the job of recounting the historical 
development of opinion research, I wish instead to concentrate on the 
proliferation of actors who have been centrally involved in this field. From my 
perspective, focusing on the emergence of particular actors over time is more 
helpful for showing how the field of public opinion research has unfolded in a 
geographically expansive way, based at least partly on coordination between 
actors and groups. This focus on actors also allows for a consideration of the 
human agency of researchers, institutions, and organisations in the field. They 
have their own objectives and incentives, and many will stand on reputations 
and impart legacies, which in the case of institutions can be incredibly influential 
and enduring. While not an exhaustive list of actors by any means, this analysis 
aims to highlight how the rising influence and power of actors (often based on 
the merits of their work or the perceived need for public opinion data) lends 
credibility to their methods and findings. This in turn further solidifies their 
status as well as the status of the science of polling. This cyclical pattern of 
reinforcement has helped to crystallise the hegemonic status of polls and surveys 
in the quest for understanding the public opinion. As such, I provide a brief 
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overview of the global ascendency of public opinion research through the lens of 
key Western actors. 
5.1 The Gallup Empire 
The contribution of Iowan-born George Horace Gallup (1901-1984) to the field of 
public opinion research is difficult to overstate. His name appears in nearly every 
text about the development of opinion research, and the operation that bears his 
name, Gallup Inc. (founded in 1935, formerly Gallup Organization, and the 
American Institute of Public Opinion), is today among the most visible and 
prominent brands in the field of international polling. At its inception, this brand 
was built on the novel use of representative samples of the population: “If a 
sample is accurately selected, it represents a near replica of the entire population. 
It is a miniature electorate with the same proportion of farmers, doctors, lawyers, 
Catholics, Protestants, old people, young people, businessmen, labourers and so 
on, as is found in the entire population” (Gallup 1944 in Emmel 2013, 128). The 
predictive promise of this approach in American electoral studies made the jump 
to market research when Gallup himself took up a career in the advertising and 
film industries in the 1930s (see Ohmer 2006), applying the same methods as well 
as the general dictum that understanding attitudes should inform decision-
making.  
As of 2012, nearly three decades after George Gallup’s death, Gallup Inc.’s net 
worth was estimated to be about $275 million (Anders 2013)—though the 
company does not release financial information—and counts about two thousand 
employees in thirty to forty offices worldwide. Most of the company’s revenues 
come from private consulting work and independent market research, selling 
data to third parties, and conducting confidential government research. But the 
legacy of the Gallup empire is not built on its private research, rather, it rests 
firmly on the ability to predict the winners of presidential elections and on the 
Gallup Poll, “the longest continuous measure of public opinion in the United 
States” (Moore 2008, 298). The Gallup poll has been syndicated to hundreds of 
newspapers, and Gallup has often been first in line to conduct research for media 
outlets in the United States and globally (Hogan 2009). Though “Gallup has been 
the country’s gold standard for horse-race election polling ever since its 
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legendary founder, George Gallup, predicted Franklin Roosevelt’s landslide 
reelection in 1936”, Gallup Inc. ceased conducting electoral polls in 2012 after 
misidentifying Barack Obama’s win (Shepard 2015). This “retirement” is 
symptomatic of a recent crisis of polling in Western democracies, faced with an 
oversaturated market for data.  
In 1937, shortly after Gallup’s method of “scientific” opinion polling took hold in 
the United States, the Gallup Poll came to Britain and the British Institute of 
Public Opinion (BIPO) was established with London-based pollster Henry 
Durant (LSE) at its head (Roodhouse 2012). BIPO was the first international 
affiliate for Gallup, and a sister organisation was founded in France the following 
year. BIPO’s primary activities were electoral forecasts. “Gallup thus began in 
Britain as it had in the USA, by producing an unexpected finding and being 
proved right. As had also happened in the USA, this led to an immediate increase 
in status” (Moon 1999, 14). Moon (1999) describes how the British polling 
industry grew rapidly from this point, yet always faced mistrust and scepticism 
by news media who managed their own subscription-based polls (this growth 
took place despite a wartime statistical blackout during which the British 
government ceased publications of census and statistical data until World War II 
ended) (Roodhouse 2012, 235). The range of methods grew as well, with 
experimentation in random sampling and refining questioning techniques. By the 
1960s, opinion polls of the Gallup type were a major part of the electoral process, 
and many new organisations joined in competition, including firms like Market 
and Opinion Research International (MORI), who specialised in the type of 
commercial opinion research that took off in the 1970s. And in 1969, Gallup 
himself helped create the National Council of Public Polls (NCPP), an association 
that has been heavily involved in monitoring the conduct of American political 
polls.  
 
 
This image has been removed as the copyright is owned by another organisation.  
Image can be viewed at http://content.time.com/time/covers/0,16641,19480503,00.html. 
Figure 8: George Gallup featured against the backdrop of his hallmark method. TIME 
Magazine, May 1948. Cover Artist: Boris Artzybasheff. 
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Likely in an effort to consolidate opportunities outside this transatlantic sphere, 
the 1970s saw George Gallup develop a network of foreign associates under the 
umbrella organisation of Gallup International Research Institutes (GIRI) 
(Traugott 2008, 298). Traugott writes that this network of researchers “were at 
one time responsible for conducting polls in more than 70 countries overseas” 
(2008, 298). A separate source lists the number of countries at fifty (Hodges 2009). 
Very little information exists on the nature of this organisation, with one study 
describing an inexpert approach to an early (GIRI) cross-national poll: “The 
world was divided up into 8 regions and some sort of proportionate probability 
sample of around 9,000 people aged 15 years and older was drawn from 57 
nations. No particular scientific theory was tested using this data-set, which was 
subsequently lost” (Michalos 1993, 87). Neither the list of members of this 
network nor the fate of their research are readily available.  
In 2005, Gallup revitalised the push to conduct systematic polls in as many 
countries as possible, launching the Gallup World Poll. With the intention of 
regularly surveying the world over, this World Poll seeks to “(1) quantify the 
current state of well-being of those living in each country and (2) to collect 
additional data of importance in each of six regions around the world. The 
driving design principle is to conduct nationally representative surveys in each 
country” (Tortora, Srinivasan, and Esipova 2010, 535). On the Gallup website is 
written: “In every corner of the Earth, the Gallup World Poll tracks the opinions 
that matter most” (Gallup World Poll). The World Poll operates in roughly 160 
states today. It omits countries with small populations, countries where a 
national government bars access to public opinion research, and countries that 
Gallup deems to be a security threat for researchers. As Gallup does not have 
operations in each country for which it polls, it hires local partners or vendors to 
conduct the research, acting as the ultimate overseer from its base in Washington. 
The World Poll is funded entirely by Gallup and costs roughly $200 million USD 
per year. The majority of the data is not public but rather purchased by clients, 
including governments and international organisations, who might choose to 
add their own questions to the standard battery of questions designed by Gallup 
at an additional cost. 
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Gallup as an organisation rests its laurels on pioneering a type of social research 
and more or less maintaining a consistent record for political fortune-telling, so to 
speak. Through its history, the Gallup name has been almost synonymous with 
public opinion research. As one of the original pollsters, George Gallup’s legacy 
is tied to a deep belief in his method and his ability to convincingly make social 
surveys scientific. His missionary zeal for the method has left a mark: “In public 
speeches, several books, and more than a hundred articles in journals and 
popular magazines, Gallup mythologized polling’s history of ‘progress’, 
deflected doubts about the polls’ accuracy and technical procedures with a 
rhetoric of scientific mystification, and celebrated the collective wisdom of ‘the 
people’” (Hogan 2009, 161). George Gallup therefore worked to ensure a legacy 
that would enshrine polling as a gateway to the precise, unmediated voice of the 
people. 
5.2 Key American Pollsters and Institutions 
The ties that bind pollsters and institutions have traditionally been strong, such 
that leading institutions for public opinion have been constructed by pollsters, 
while these institutions have produced some of the most recognisable and 
sought-after social scientists in the field. The American institutions that 
developed in quick succession from the 1930s to the 1970s, that would serve as 
models for other institutions around the world, focused their efforts on 
conducting applied public opinion research (i.e., the application of polling and 
survey research to social or wartime problems) and on developing new methods 
and techniques influenced by social psychology and studies of group dynamics 
and mass communication. While these institutions were responsible for carrying 
out thousands of high-cost, methodologically ambitious national and 
international studies, particular pioneers in public opinion research bear lasting 
legacies for their hand in “the development and improvement of methodologies, 
scope, and standards” (Roper Centre for Public Opinion Research 2018). Below I 
introduce some of the early pathbreakers, who together formed an elite network 
of actors and institutions, sharing in financial resources, expertise, collegial 
relationships, scholarly debate and outputs, and professional opportunities, and 
expanding together as a result of this networked collaboration and the support of 
the political machinery (and funding) of United States government agencies. 
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The American Association of Public Opinion Research (AAPOR), along with its 
sister organisation WAPOR, are professional organisations with norm-setting 
agendas that count as members private research firms, academics, media, 
government and non-profit research outlets. Both associations emerged following 
the second World War and activated a set of guidelines, fundamental principles, 
codes of ethics, publications, and conferences to carve out a central space for 
public opinion research activities. Over the years, their primary efforts have been 
directed not so much to the pursuit of international security, as to bringing 
practitioners of public opinion research, commercial institutions, and academics 
under one banner, such that public opinion research is ensured to be a shared 
and collaborative enterprise. Archibald Crossley (1896-1985), who served as 
Director of Research for the influential Literary Digest and ran his own survey 
firm, helped to establish both the journal Public Opinion Quarterly in 1937 and 
AAPOR in 1947. WAPOR was formed on its heels in the same year. Crossley’s 
daughter Helen Crossley (1921-2016), educated at the National Opinion Research 
Centre (NORC), was also a founding member of AAPOR, served as the first 
female president of WAPOR, and held a long tenure conducting survey research 
for the US Information Agency (USIA). Until it was subsumed by the Department 
of State in the 1990s, the USIA (1953-1999) was a federal public diplomacy agency 
built to “communicate with foreign populations” most centrally during the Cold 
War (Chodkowski 2012). Meanwhile Helen Dinerman (1920-1974), who along 
with Helen Crossley was one of comparatively few female pollsters in the 
twentieth century, “worked at Columbia University in the Bureau of Applied 
Social Research, the first academic research centre dedicated to survey research” 
(Roper Centre for Public Opinion Research 2018). She later acted as Secretary-
Treasurer of AAPOR, worked for the United States Office of War Information 
(OWI, 1942-1945), and specialised in sociology and psychology.  
Those who served as Presidents and Secretary-Treasurers for AAPOR and 
WAPOR were pioneers of scientific polling, behavioural psychology, and/or 
sociology in their own right. In the early years, American figures like Elmo C. 
Wilson (1906-1968), Paul F. Lazarsfeld (1902-1976), Bernard Berelson (1912-1979), 
George Gallup (1901-1984), and Harry Alpert (1912-1977) helped shape AAPOR 
as an institution. Wilson also served as President of a New York-based company 
called International Research Associates, which was contracted by the 
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Department of State to conduct polls in Western Europe during the 1950s. 
Lazarsfeld, a celebrated opinion analyst and sociologist, headed the Bureau of 
Applied Social Research (BASR) based at Columbia University. BASR grew out 
of the Radio Research Project at Princeton University (1937-1939), a largescale 
Rockefeller-funded study on the human effects of radio which also involved the 
work of psychologist and pollster Hadley Cantril, psychologist Gordon Allport, 
media executive Frank Stanton, and philosopher Theodor W. Adorno (Frankfurt 
school). Berelson, a behavioural scientist who contributed to the field of 
communications research, worked with Lazarsfeld at BASR, served in the 
Foreign Broadcast Intelligence Service during World War II, and helped to 
establish the Centre for Advanced Study in the Behavioural Sciences at Stanford 
University, founded by the Ford Foundation. Sociologist Alpert was most 
notably a director at the National Science Foundation (NSF), but also worked 
during the war in the OWI, the Office of Price Administration (OPA), and 
provided research consultancy for the US Air Force.  
Meanwhile, WAPOR’s early leadership positions were filled with pollsters 
conducting opinion research outside the United States, including George Gallup 
(US), Stuart C. Dodd (US), Jean Stoetzel (France), and Leo P. Crespi (US, 1916-
2008). Dodd (1900-1975) was an American sociologist born in Turkey who spent 
time teaching at the American University of Beirut (AUB), conducting polls for 
the Allied Expeditionary Force in Sicily, Lebanon, Syria, and Palestine (Dodd 
1946a). These studies involved radio polls in Lebanon, Syria, and Palestine for 
listeners of United Nations broadcast programmes and other polls relating to the 
effects of propaganda. He would later lead polling research at the Washington 
State Public Opinion Laboratory at the University of Washington. Stoezel (1910-
1987) was a sociologist who founded the French Institute of Public Opinion 
(IFOP), built on the model of Gallup. He once wrote that political polling in 
France “is more than an institution; it is a kind of fact of nature. It is something 
the French expect to find when they look out into the world, just as when you 
and I walk out into the street we expect to step upon a pavement” (Stoezel 1983, 
18). Psychologist Crespi (1916-2008), an expert on sampling techniques, directed a 
world polling division within the USIA between the 1950s and 1980s where he 
surveyed perceptions of American prestige in Western European and Soviet 
public opinion, much of which was classified data. 
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The natural fit between opinion research and government programs, beginning 
with, for instance the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) and the 
case of rural opinion in the 1930s and developing into wartime communications 
research, helped foster a mutually dependent relationship between pollsters and 
federal agencies. Harry Field (1897-1946), for instance, supported George Gallup 
in establishing BIPO in London, the Australian and French Institutes of Public 
Opinion, and the NORC in 1941 at the University of Chicago, which played a 
major role in conducting war-time research commissioned by the US 
government.27 Additionally, the NORC housed the General Social Survey (GSS) 
(1972-present), a running face-to-face sociological survey concerning the attitudes 
and practices of American society. Samuel Lubell (1911-1987) bridged the dual 
roles of public opinion analyst and journalist, devising a method of surveying 
key precincts within a state to predict how a state would vote. His correct 
prediction of Eisenhower’s landslide win in the 1952 American election propelled 
him to star status, after which point he directed the Opinion Reporting Workshop 
at Columbia University from 1958-1968. The link between polling and the media 
grew even stronger through figures like Warren Mitofsky (1934-2006), who 
worked with the New York Times through the 1970s to create a joint polling 
organisation with CBS News. The Times/CBS News joint poll remains one of the 
oldest American public opinion polls, with over five hundred studies conducted 
to date since 1975.  
Elmo Roper (1900-1971) entered polling from a retail background. Following his 
accurate prediction of the 1936 Franklin Roosevelt win, he worked in the United 
States Office of Strategic Services—a World War II-era intelligence agency and 
predecessor of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)—as well as the Office of 
War Information, Office of Production Management, the Army, and the Navy 
(Roper Centre for Public Opinion Research 2018b). He founded the Roper Centre 
for Public Opinion Research at Cornell University in 1947, which also serves as 
one of the largest archives of national social science data, particularly from 
surveys conducted by news media and commercial polling companies. A host of 
 
27
 For a more detailed account of the war-era contracts between the NORC and the United States 
Department of State, see, for instance, Brown (1961). 
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leading social scientists worked at the Roper Centre, including Elmo C. Wilson. 
Roper’s son, Burns Roper (1925-2003), was another influential figure in the 
polling world, taking over leadership of the Roper Centre and serving as 
president of AAPOR during the 1980s. And soon after the founding of the Roper 
Centre, the Institute for Social Research (ISR) at the University of Michigan was 
founded (1949), now the largest academic survey research centre in the world. At 
present, the ISR has an annual research budget of $80 million USD and is 
comprised of five major research centres, each of which are centrally involved in 
the field of opinion research. They include the Centre for Political Studies (CPS), 
the Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research (ICPSR), the 
Populations Studies Centre (PSC), the Research Centre for Group Dynamics 
(RCGD), and the Survey Research Centre (SRC). The ISR’s founding director, 
Rensis Likert (1903-1981), was a renowned social psychologist with previous 
experience in the Division of Program Surveys (DPS) at the US Bureau of 
Agricultural Statistics (BAS). His key contributions were the advancement of 
open-ended interview techniques and the Likert scale, which remains the most 
commonly used scaling system in survey research.28  
The development of American public opinion research institutions was, perhaps 
unsurprisingly, greatly propelled by American interest in wartime propaganda 
and the government’s willingness to fund research on propaganda and 
psychological warfare. For instance, pollster Hadley Cantril (1906-1969) set up 
the Office of Public Opinion Research (OPOR) at Princeton University through 
the Rockefeller Foundation, which lasted through the World War II years and 
surveyed many Americans and Germans on wartime events and policy. Cantril 
later acted as a Program Director for the UN Educational, Scientific and Cultural 
Organization (UNESCO), led a number of psychology studies institutes, 
including the CIA-funded Institute for International Social Research (IISR), which 
conducted intelligence polls in Cuba regarding support for Fidel Castro in the 
1950s, on the social psychology of Soviet populations, and on protest voters in 
France and Italy, for instance (Simpson 1994). Simpson notes that at least some of 
 
28
 The formal Likert scale would be familiar to most people who have conducted or filled out a survey 
questionnaire: a five-point scale where the responses are (1) Strongly disagree, (2) Disagree, (3) Neither 
agree nor disagree, (4) Agree, and (5) Strongly agree. Multiple variations of the Likert scale now exist. 
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the most important American centres for post-war information and 
communications studies “grew up as de facto adjuncts of government 
psychological warfare programs. For years, government money—frequently with 
no public acknowledgement—made up more than 75 percent of the annual 
budgets of Paul Lazarfeld’s Bureau of Applied Social Research (BASR) at 
Columbia University, Hadley Cantril’s IISR at Princeton, Ithiel de Sola Pool’s 
Center for International Studies (CENIS) program at the Massachusetts Institute 
of Technology (MIT), and similar institutions” (1994, 4).29 By some accounts, 
confidential political polling in the United States through the Cold War years 
accounted for the vast majority of national polling activities (see for instance, 
Field 1983). “Private polling was being conducted at every level of political 
office—presidential, gubernatorial, senatorial, congressional, state legislature, 
country supervisor, mayoralty, as well as for other smaller polls” (Field 1983, 
204). And though it did not amount to as much by comparison, polling outside of 
the United States was also largely private for the duration of the Cold War. 
Finally, the behavioural approach to political science, spearheaded by Charles E. 
Merriam, entered public opinion research through students of his, like V. O. Key 
Jr. (1908-1963), Gabriel Almond (1911-2002), Harold Lasswell (1902-1978) and 
others. Key, a scholar of electoral politics and voting behaviour, was an 
important member of the Social Sciences Research Council (SSRC), “which aimed 
to raise the social sciences to the same level of rigor and respect that the natural 
sciences enjoyed” and dispense knowledge to American policymakers (Gilman 
2003, 115). Almond used systematic mass interview research in The Civic Culture 
(Almond and Verba 1963) to determine the capacity for democracy in countries 
with dissimilar political cultures, though the method and assumptions were 
problematic. Lasswell, a political psychologist and another founding member of 
AAPOR, had a prominent role in MIT’s Center for International Studies (CIS). 
The CIS received funding from the CIA and later the Rockefeller and Carnegie 
Foundations to target public diplomacy communications to the developing 
world, and Lasswell’s involvement in the CIS his many affiliations have led to 
 
29
 It was communications specialist Ithiel de Sola Pool who asserted that through “mandarins of the 
future”, i.e. this elite class of self-styled rational social scientists, society would become modernised and 
civilised. 
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him being described as a “shadowy presence” in the modernisation and 
developmental work gaining ground in the CIS at the time (Gilman 2003, 165). 
The relationship between modernisation theory and public opinion research is 
explored in greater depth in the Arab case in Chapter 5. 
5.3 “Towards World Surveying” 
In 1957, American pollster Elmo C. Wilson penned an article for Public Opinion 
Quarterly titled “World-Wide Development of Opinion Research”, in which he 
bluntly stated that “opinion research in the world outside the United States is 
basically a post-World War II phenomenon” (174). What he meant was that large-
scale, systematic polling and survey research of the kind that had been devised 
and conducted across the United States since the 1930s had only recently 
conquered territory abroad. Given that World War II exposed, to a great extent, 
the ignorance of Western states toward foreign security issues and foreign 
publics, the war had had a genuine impact on the development of global opinion 
research. In 1946, following the end of the war, the first international conference 
on public opinion research was held in Colorado, with pollsters from across the 
United States, Britain, France, Australia, Canada gathering to discuss “further 
steps and the possible means of combatting the forbidding, falsification, or 
frustration of the polls by individual countries” (Wilson 1957, 179), in reference to 
Soviet and other non-Western countries where systematic polling was either 
extremely difficult or non-existent. The goal of the conference was to create a 
constitution for a future institution, which would amount to the founding of 
WAPOR in 1946, and was laid out in the conference proceedings, titled “Toward 
World Surveying” (Dodd 1946b).  
The main purposes of this world institution would be: 1) “To establish and 
promote contacts between persons in the field of survey research on opinions, 
attitudes, and behaviour of people in the various countries of the world”, 2) “To 
further the use of objective, scientific survey research in national and 
international affairs”, and finally, 3) to advance the aims of the United Nations 
(Wilson 1957, 179). On this last point, the community of (mainly American) 
pollsters present at the founding of WAPOR—many of whose names appeared in 
the previous section—agreed to build closer ties to UN agencies such as 
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UNESCO, ECOSOC, and the Public Information or Statistical subsections of the 
Secretariat, so that institutions like “the United Nations may use a tool the 
League of Nations never had—public opinion” (1945, 194). Thus, one larger aim 
of the institutionalisation of public opinion research in the post-war era was to 
ensure the creation of a liberal international order by pre-empting global security 
threats and preventing the outbreak of future world wars (Dodd 1945; 1959). 
Given that public opinion research rapidly expanded from that moment on, this 
aim was an indirect response to war: “In other words, the very release from the 
war, and from the various kinds of censorship which accompanied it, led to a 
greatly heightened desire to know what people were saying and thinking about 
important national and international issues” (Wilson 1957, 176). 
WAPOR was never responsible for carrying out polls and surveys itself, instead 
promoting coordinated international survey efforts using the original 
pathbreaking American methods as a prototype. Its early alignment with the UN 
facilitated the signing of contracts to jointly poll across countries, as well as the 
establishment of centralised committees to further international survey research. 
In 1956, WAPOR and UNESCO produced a joint report on survey and polling 
methodology, in hopes of standardising techniques internationally.30 “In general, 
surveying could be used by an international organisation to predict social trends 
and thereby achieve greater control over them” (Dodd 1945, 196). In other words, 
the method was seen not only as a science, but as a (hegemonic) form of 
knowledge production that could organise the global political system. The belief 
was that worldwide standardisation would improve the universality, reliability, 
validity, representativeness, and the utility of opinion information. In practice, 
early world surveying involved subcontracting a handful of international 
researchers to ask various questions in different locales. By giving distinct 
datasets a common affiliation or copyrighted name (e.g. UNESCO or Gallup 
polls), they appeared to be a uniform and consistent venture, regardless of the 
dissimilar nature of collecting data in different places, or socio-cultural variations 
themselves.  
 
30
 The report was summarised in Dodd and Nehnevajsa (1956), “Techniques for World Polls: A Survey of 
Journal Articles on Cross-Cultural Polling, 1925-1955”. Paris: Mimeo.  
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The ultimate vision of a single world survey, as imagined by WAPOR and the 
UN in the early 1950s, has not manifested as such, but its liberal democratic 
motivation is still embedded in the foundational principles of WAPOR (and other 
institutions like AAPOR, NCPP, and ESOMAR). These institutions understand 
public opinion as necessary to the workings of a democracy and hence view it as 
a mechanism for engaging and promoting a world government. For these 
institutions, public opinion research has been a normative pursuit. This sweeping 
optimism of world surveying from the American perspective is best recounted by 
Stuart Dodd in his 1957 article on WAPOR: 
In scientific affairs, a world demoscope would give the social sciences a 
new instrument, comparable in power to the telescope in astronomy or the 
microscope in micro-biology. Research in the behavioral sciences could 
observe for the first time the exact difference and similarities, the cultural 
and biological processes, the expressible feelings, knowings, and doings of 
all living people. It could overcome current limitations of the human 
sciences to observing parts of humanity. It could progress to develop a 
fuller and more exact science of man.  
In practical world affairs, an opinion barometer could help build one 
world by democratically amplifying the voice of the people in United 
Nations councils. The distribution of opinion on any world issue could be 
quickly, accurately, and cheaply determined to help guide international 
decisions of statesmen. World government could more truly fulfill 
Lincoln's definition of a democracy as government of, by, and for the 
people (183-4). 
This idea of a demoscope or international barometer is likely the origin of the 
Global Barometer Surveys, a loose collection or network of regional public 
opinion polls focused primarily at the level of states and interested in issues of 
democracy and political change, economy, social and public policy, institutions, 
international relations, media, and religion. The Eurobarometer, for instance, was 
launched in 1973 with member-state polls conducted by the European 
Commission. The Afrobarometer began in 1999 as a joint initiative of Michigan 
State University, the Institute for Democracy in South Africa, and the Centre for 
Democratic Development in Ghana and today polls in more than thirty-five 
African countries. The Latinobarometró, Asian Barometer, Eurasian Barometer, 
New Europe Barometer, and the Arab Barometer have emerged since, 
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independent of each other and at the same time modelling themselves off the 
same original idea: that international polling “can measure conditions in a 
population and the behaviour of people as well as their opinions” (Dodd 1945, 196 
[emphasis in the original]). As Figure 9 shows, a composite image of the Global 
Barometers approaches the idea of a demoscope.   
 
Figure 9: Countries included in the Global Barometers today. 
 
As a 1963 UNESCO report described: “The introduction of public opinion 
surveys in underdeveloped countries, is, of course, only one aspect of a general 
problem, namely, that of bringing modern techniques, evolved elsewhere, into 
countries hitherto untouched by them” (Girard 1963, 7). From early on then, the 
poll was considered an ideal technological instrument for enabling 
modernisation in diverse settings; it could be scaled down or up and involved 
human interaction, which allowed researchers to adapt and make decisions in the 
field. Some fundamental difficulties with polling in the developing world arose 
where “freedom of speech, and the integrity of the surveyors” was compromised; 
“In any given country, surveys can be forbidden, or falsified, or simply frustrated” 
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(Dodd 1945, 198 [emphasis in the original]). This shrouded world opinions under 
a veil of secrecy. Stuart Dodd argued that to get around cases where surveys are 
forbidden in authoritarian countries, measures including avoiding politically 
sensitive questions on surveys, or in extreme cases creating a “name and shame 
list” of countries barring free speech should be taken (1945). Dodd went so far as 
to argue that states who chose to forgo global polling should be denied 
membership in the United Nations and the UN Security Council, to stress the 
necessity of polling for democratic freedoms. There was never any semblance of 
the idea that systematic polling should not be undertaken everywhere. The 
geographic extension of polling and survey research from the developed to the 
developing would only be possible through the efforts of already established 
(Western) institutions for research or through the funding of “indigenous and 
self-supporting institutes of public opinion in new territories with the assent of 
their government” (Dodd 1946b, 471). As will be seen, polling in the Arab region 
has developed along both of these lines. 
5.4 Contemporary Practices 
While polls and surveys have, through their recent past, served very different 
end-games (domestic politics, foreign policy, wartime intelligence, 
commercial/consumerist markets, and media), the preceding sections have 
shown that there have long been linkages between individual pollsters, 
knowledge sharing practices, institutional capacities, funding, and professional 
governance and oversight. As Heath et al. note, if the globalisation of public 
opinion research has meant the emergence of social and cultural developments 
that change the very processes of research as well as the export of Western 
technology and practices to the rest of the world, then overtime, we can expect to 
see greater ease and speed of communication between countries, closer 
collaboration between national teams, a rise in cross-national programs of survey 
research, and the penetration of particular brands in global markets (2005, 297). 
Further, Groves writes that if polling and survey research prior to 1960 was about 
the invention and refinement of the method, the period following this can be 
characterised as an age of expansion (2011). Indeed, Newport asserts that one of 
the most apparent changes in the field of polling over the years has been the 
differentiation of the practice into discrete activities (2005). Polling is conducted 
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as an ancillary service provided by research firms to businesses, by government 
and educational institutions, by “niche providers that focus only on one small 
aspect of the polling process”, and by companies concerned with “high-volume, 
low-cost polling” to undercut the market (Newport 2005, 124). The assemblage of 
niche services means that technical parts of the polling process are outsourced, 
for instance to sampling companies and independent vendors. 
The economics of polling dictates that the practice is unprofitable: it is an 
expensive, involved method and the presence of actors seeking to undercut the 
market (especially since the advent of online polling) should effectively make 
high quality polling non-viable. And yet, the practices have continued to spread 
and thrive. As an illustration, consider the widening scope of Gallup’s polling 
and survey activities, from its origins in US election polling in the 1930s to the 
creation of the World Poll in 2005. Figure 10 below shows the geographic 
coverage of the Gallup World Poll in 2018, which includes 167 countries.31 
 
 
31
 Based on a core age-related question asked for each respondent in each country. The question text 
[English] reads: Please tell me your age. Source: The Gallup World Poll Reference Tool. 
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Figure 10: Gallup World Poll coverage, 2018. Based on a core age question asked in full set 
of countries. 
Today, Gallup aims to capture a nationally representative snapshot of public 
opinion for every country possible, and it is one of a long list of polling entities 
that have also grown considerably in global scope over recent years. The 
reputation and reach of polling companies such as Gallup are now perceptible 
nearly everywhere. 
Insofar as the objective of the political pollster is to measure political opinion, 
market researchers also traditionally have used the same methods to measure 
market trends, the intention to purchase a good, loyalty toward a brand, or 
cognitive recall of an advertisement. The expansion of international marketing 
through the application of traditional survey and polling methods and predictive 
techniques has certainly helped to bolster the continued relevance of polls in 
surveys in other fields of research. The globalisation of polling in a market-
oriented setting has led to an explosion in the sheer number and types of polling 
entities in existence. These include major enterprises like Nielsen (1923), GFK 
(1934), Ipsos (1975), and Kantar (1993) with offices in dozens of cities globally and 
where researchers are not considered pollsters in the same way as in political 
polling, yet continue to engage in knowledge and technology sharing with the 
political polling world.32 Indeed, by industry classification standards, Market 
Research and Public Opinion Polling today is considered to be a single 
consolidated industry, one that comprises “establishments primarily engaged in 
systematically gathering, recording, tabulating, and presenting marketing and 
public opinion data” and includes political opinion polling, broadcast media, 
market research, statistical services, and other opinion research services.33  
The commonly used label of “industry” is an accurate descriptor. An industry 
implies that economic activity is undertaken as a result of the processing and 
 
32
 It is estimated that there are over four thousand market research companies in the United States alone, 
totalling $20.1 billion USD in sales in 2018 (MarkeResearch.com).  
33
 For instance, the North American Industry Classification System (NAICS) used by businesses and 
government to organise economic activity in Canada, the US and Mexico. The Market Research and Public 
Opinion Polling industry carries the NAICS code 541910 (SICCODE). 
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production of raw materials or manufactured goods. It also implies that an 
assemblage or association of actors produce a common good for economic 
benefit. If we consider the good in question to be opinion data, then we can begin 
to sort producers of public opinion (pollsters, public opinion firms) from 
consumers of opinion data (the public, private audiences). Public opinion data, 
like most statistical data, has a raw, unprocessed form and a processed form, the 
latter of which comes about through the practice of research and analysis by 
experts. And the sheer size and scale of the market research and public opinion 
polling industry speaks to the attainment of economic benefit, or profits. Though 
difficult to measure, the worldwide market for this industry generated $76 billion 
USD in revenues in 201834, dominated by American actors who conduct research 
on their home fronts and abroad. 
Non-profit academic polls and surveys funded by major research councils and 
philanthropic organisations have also increased in scale. The SRC at the 
University of Michigan, for example, has traditionally conducted large-scale 
national election studies which focus on an individual’s socio-psychological 
motivations for party preferences. Heath et al. write that “after their 
establishment in the United States, the Michigan Studies were exported, not 
unlike Gallup’s export, via links with scholars in other countries” (2005, 301). 
Since the 1980s the world has seen a rapid spread in the conduct of election 
studies, including the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems (CSES), which 
includes over fifty countries, as well as the International Foundation for Electoral 
Systems (IFES). And other mass-scale collaborative and comparative opinion 
studies have emerged: the British Social Attitudes survey, the GSS, the 
Allgemeinen Bevölkerungsumfrage der Sozialwissenschaften (ALLBUS), the 
International Social Survey Program (ISSP), the European Social Surveys (ESS), 
the European Values Survey, the World Values Survey, the Global Barometers, 
and the Pew Global Attitudes Project. Each of these follows standardised 
procedures and methodology with a representative sampling of adult 
 
34
 Global revenues for the market research industry have grown steadily year-over-year, reaching $76 
billion USD in 2018; further, “across all corners of the globe, quantitative research accounted for 81% of all 
spending, while qualitative research held a 14% share, a decline of 1% on the year previous. The remaining 
5% of the market is distributed across other research methods” (Consultancy.org). The United States 
accounts for almost half of the market share (44%). 
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populations, fixed practices around administering the survey, and systematised 
questionnaires.  
Academic initiatives are far easier to identify as opposed to the full register of 
actors involved in political public opinion research (even after omitting market 
research from the picture). Today, the arena is simply too dense, and we have 
started to lose track of who the actors are. There are countless numbers, they 
emerge and disappear, and much of their data—often a snapshot of opinion in 
time—quickly becomes obsolete. The opinion analysis resource FiveThirtyEight 
conducts polling aggregation analyses, i.e., predicting political outcomes using 
aggregates of other published polls. In their annual pollster ratings, they count 
nearly four hundred separate polling organisations who engaged in American 
election polling in 2016-18 alone. The networks between actors that were easily 
traceable in the middle of the twentieth century have become far too chaotic to 
parse out. Today, WAPOR has five hundred members in more than sixty 
countries, ESOMAR has over six thousand individuals and six hundred 
corporate members in over one hundred and thirty countries. The political and 
normative authority that an institution like WAPOR held at the time of its 
inception—of working toward global government through the pursuit of liberal 
and democratic ideals—has somewhat faded as polling and survey research have 
become commercial pursuits in a highly saturated market. What has not 
diminished, however, is the keen desire to continue to pursue a standardised 
form of public opinion inquiry across all corners of the world.  
As we have seen, what began as a wholly American enterprise rapidly spilled 
over borders and spread to other parts of the world, in part through the sheer 
determinism of scientific ambition, whether for the purposes of covert 
government research, international sociological research, or consumer market 
research. In any case and regardless of the aims of research, key actors 
transposed the methodology of polls and surveys onto different settings, 
assuming from the outset that standardisation was not only possible, but 
scientifically sound and socially necessary.  
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6 Conclusion 
In this chapter, I have tried to tackle the rise of global polling by focusing on 
aspects of key importance (and not a chronological re-telling), namely, the basis 
for the methods, the special status of polling in society, and prominent actors and 
institutions in the field who grew out of the American social science tradition and 
whose legacies are memorialised in the lasting popularity of opinion polling 
today. In the context of post-war America, these actors formed an elite class, 
imagining themselves “as handmaidens to power, advisors whose ‘scientific 
objectivity would help to guide political leaders toward elite ‘consensus’” 
(Gilman 2003, 51). In considering the ways in which these actors are linked, how 
they negotiated their political roles, relationships, and knowledge-sharing, I find 
the idea of knowledge networks to be particularly helpful. Knowledge networks 
work to organise knowledge produced by (in)formal entities (Stone 2003). The 
multiple overlapping linkages that allowed the field of polling to build rapidly, 
to the point where an agenda for world polling under the auspices of the UN was 
being pursued, is evidence of the creation of a knowledge network. This network 
is located between people and governance structures and derives meaning from 
both. It is also located between the local and the global, taking recordings and 
signals from specific spaces and abstracting them to say something about public 
opinion more broadly and how it operates on the conscience of international 
affairs. Through the exercise of mapping a knowledge network in development, 
two epistemological issues come into view: first, it was never doubted that 
American-styled polling was applicable the whole world over, and second, these 
actors “generally considered the disparate countries of the ‘third’ world as faced 
with broadly similar problems, and therefore amenable to a broadly similar 
theoretical conceptualization and policies” (Gilman 2003, 34). The practical 
problems with these fundamental assumptions about knowledge are explored in 
Chapter 5, which follows. 
This chapter rounds out Part 2 of the thesis, which seeks to describe the field of 
public opinion inquiry in a less conventional way. Rather than outlining the 
chronology, terminology, and everyday practices of the field, I have chosen to 
focus on elements generally missing from view in the broader literature; namely, 
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the concept of public opinion in the practitioner’s world, the legacies of counting 
and control in survey research, and the hegemonic rise of American polling 
through the twentieth century. The theoretical discussion in Part 1 combined 
with this toolkit of ideas in Part 2 sets the stage for Part 3, which builds a case 
around the pursuit of Arab public opinion.  
  
Part Three  
 
 
The Case of Arab Public Opinion Inquiry 
  
Chapter 5  
Stage 1 | Arab Opinion in the Colonial Imaginary 
 
Those Middle Easterners whose private lives have become permeated by the public 
questions will prove most enlightening for us. 
Daniel Lerner (1958) 
 
One of the core arguments of this thesis is that public opinion, as a form of data 
or as the output of specific empirical practices, cannot be divorced from the 
context and legacies from which it has emerged. To this end, I consider the legacy 
of Arab public opinion inquiry as something with roots in early census-taking 
practices by colonial actors who sought control through the production and 
dissemination of scientific knowledge in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. 
This chapter is an attempt to identify twentieth century epistemic interventions 
into the Arab region by foreign actors who carried with them the same colonial 
legacies. I illustrate cases that I consider to be representative of the early history 
of Arab public opinion inquiry: the King-Crane Commission of 1919, Daniel 
Lerner’s 1958 study of Middle Eastern modernisation in The Passing of Traditional 
Society, and the question of Palestine as it appeared in Western polls from the 
creation of the state of Israel to the Six-Day War. These cases contribute to what I 
see as a first stage in the development of Arab public opinion inquiry, though I 
stress that compressing this tradition of inquiry into discrete stages of growth is 
somewhat formulaic and might cause us to overlook important details. Rather, 
the cases presented in this chapter help to demarcate the parameters within 
which we can view specific approaches to opinion inquiry on the Arab region at 
work. This first stage has no exact temporal endpoints, but for my purposes in 
this chapter it roughly covers the fifty-year period from the end of the First 
World War in 1919 to just after the Six-Day War of 1967. 
In delimiting the earliest stage of Arab opinion inquiry within colonial and 
postcolonial settings, I am tracing a particular mode of social-scientific inquiry 
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carried out by Western experts and scholars whose goal it was to contribute to a 
unified science of global public opinion research (of the kind envisaged by Stuart 
Dodd in the 1930s and 1940s). This mode of inquiry was based on the methodical 
codification of individuals, recorded observations of social phenomena, the 
formulation and testing of theories, and the application of the scientific method 
to the politics of the Middle East. Elements of the scientific method, like the 
neutrality of the observer and the translation of observations into hard-coded 
data, can be seen in each case presented in this chapter. They serve to bolster the 
authenticity of the research but should also be viewed as political acts precisely 
because the conduct of research was at all times politically motivated. In each 
case, I therefore focus more on issues of epistemology and methodology rather 
than analysing the findings that came out of each case analysis.  
While there is very little that has been written on the tradition of opinion inquiry 
in the Arab region, some scholars like Ilya Harik have made mention that prior to 
the 1970s, this field was largely “the product of research initiated and conducted 
by foreigners” (1987, 66). The process of seeking the attitudes and counsel of 
communities outside of the so-called industrialised sphere is treated (in the 
Anglo-American literature) as something that was not naturally occurring but 
instead brought in from the outside. Harik, for instance, says that “in Third 
World countries, interest in survey research has been the product of 
dissemination of information and technology from advanced nations to the less 
advanced. It has no indigenous cultural or technological basis in the new lands 
where it has been adopted” (1987, 66). He goes on to say more specifically that 
“the Arab world is one such recipient culture” and asks, “has the Arab world 
been a hospitable recipient of survey research as we know it?” (Harik 1987, 66). 
This configures the two cultures as Western donor (of scientific research) and a 
recipient, less-advanced “other”, a similar framing to that of foreign development 
and assistance. I believe that the case studies presented in this chapter do a good 
job of showing how enduring this benefactor/saviour mentality was in early 
opinion inquiry.  
I believe that each of the cases presented in this chapter represents an epistemic 
intervention on the part of foreign actors. What I mean by an epistemic 
intervention is a point of incursion or interference, as when one mode of thinking 
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or set of ideas about what constitutes knowledge inserts itself into another 
epistemic tradition and then claims the right to represent the other.35 Just as a 
military intervention can be seen as a political act with the use of military means, 
I see an epistemic intervention as a political act using epistemic means. Epistemic 
interventions are orchestrated by external actors, usually without an awareness 
of the consequences. In practical terms, it might entail the systematic deployment 
of scientists into “new”, foreign territory in order to extract particular forms of 
knowledge using specifically designed technologies of inquiry, to then be 
processed outside that territory and communicated using the instrumental and 
technical vocabularies of the scientific community. An epistemic intervention can 
be direct or indirect, can be more or less benign, and can occur with or without 
consent from the territory of knowledge being interceded. If it is the result of a 
power imbalance (i.e., colonial forms of knowledge production), it can lead to the 
supplanting of indigenous knowledge systems by outside ones. In the process of 
an epistemic intervention, people (as subjects) become figures of alterity, seen as 
epistemic means rather than epistemic ends.  
Stage 1 represents the earliest attempts by foreign parties to extract opinion from 
people largely situated in the Middle East on issues relating to governance, 
statehood, identity, culture, religion, and other social and political matters. Stage 
1 comes at a time when opinion research is undergoing a scientific 
transformation; within this window of twentieth century, polling comes into 
existence and quickly becomes the dominant tool for measuring opinion. We can 
conceptualise Stage 1 as an analytical guide, allowing us to trace the practice of 
Arab public opinion inquiry over time. Figure 11 below is a visual guide: 
 
35
 My use of the term “epistemic intervention” can be compared with U. Kalpagam’s concept of 
“epistemological conquest”, whereby Western technologies of governance (i.e., bureaucracies and colonial 
discourses of administration) not only served as representations of modern power in parts of the non-
Western colonised world, but also imposed an entire “world-view” or approach to knowing that displaced 
what previously existed (Kalpagam 2000). Kalpagam explores the case of British colonial and statistical 
governmentality in India.  
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Figure 11: Stage 1 in the development of Arab public opinion inquiry. 
Stage 1 is found in the bottom-left quadrant of this visualisation. This is where a 
form of historical inquiry carried out by external or foreign actors is positioned. 
The axes of time and geographic location in Figure 11 are purposefully indefinite. 
It is not my goal to set temporal parameters or pinpoint every relevant actor 
implicated in the history of Arab public opinion inquiry. This would be too 
daunting and, I think, too problematic an exercise. It is nearly impossible to 
account for the full universe of actors. Rather, in my attempt to highlight a mode 
of epistemic inquiry, I find this visualisation to be a helpful way to focus in 
specific context—a time and place where certain practices were prevalent and 
would have an enduring effect on the contemporary conduct of public opinion 
inquiry in the region. Each of the three cases outlined below thus contributes to 
the earliest stage of systematised empirical research on people of the Arab world. 
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1 The King-Crane Commission of 1919 
The rise of Arab nationalist fervour during the First World War would provide 
the setting for a major epistemic intervention into the region by foreign actors. 
The slow corrosion of Ottoman rule from 1915, when Turkey first declared war 
on Britain and France, ultimately led to the liberation of greater Syria supported 
by these two powers and with help from the Hashemite Arab leader Sharif 
Hussein and his son, Emir Faisal. At Versailles in February 1919, it was the Emir 
who made a strong case to British and American officials for Arab self-
determination, declaring that “the Allies had now won the war, and the Arabic 
speaking peoples thought themselves entitled to independence and worthy of it” 
(Little 2004, 159). This pronouncement of the will of the people could be seen as 
an assertion of an “Arab public opinion” through discursive representation, with 
Emir Faisal as its representative. Political complications amounting from the 1917 
Sykes-Picot agreement between Britain and France, “which carved out a British 
sphere of influence in Iraq and Palestine and a French sphere in Syria and 
Lebanon” (Little 2004, 159), along with America’s unsteady, mistrusting position 
that any encouragement of Arab self-determination could spark revolution and 
disorder, contributed to delaying a decision on Arab independence.  
Thus in 1919, when the question of whether and how to divvy up the Ottoman 
Empire among the Allied forces was being debated, as well as what was to be 
done with Palestine and the Jewish peoples, the idea of conducting a “scientific 
investigation” (Reimer 2006, 129) to determine how people in the Middle East 
wanted to be governed was proposed—in essence, a study of Arab public 
opinion. This was not an entirely novel idea for the time, as a similar American-
led commission had been assigned earlier to investigate in Russia following the 
1917 revolution. Still, it was novel for the Middle East. The seed for it came from 
Howard S. Bliss, a missionary and President of the Syrian Protestant College 
(now the American University of Beirut) who proposed the idea to the French, 
British, and Americans of establishing an on-the-ground and “neutral” 
diplomatic mission to “establish facts” and ascertain local sentiment (Howard 
1963). American President Woodrow Wilson was in strong support of the idea, 
recommending “that the fittest men that could be obtained should be selected to 
form an Inter-Allied Commission to go to Syria, extending their inquiries, if they 
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led them, beyond these confines. Their object should be to elucidate the state of 
opinion” (Howard 1963, 32; Reimer 2006).  
Communication during the planning process between the Americans and their 
European counterparts was marred with misunderstanding and in the end, due 
to diplomatic backtracking, the Europeans declined to participate. Only an 
American commission was sent—led by Charles R. Crane, a businessman and 
noted Arabist, and Dr. Henry Churchill King, an author and educator at Oberlin 
College, as well as a small team of American field observers. In Harry N. 
Howard’s 1963 historical monograph on the Inter-Allied Commission, he 
recounts that King and Crane were seen as especially qualified precisely because 
they had no prior contact or experience with greater Syria and its peoples; they 
were considered to be well-positioned as neutral, unadulterated observers. The 
British Prime Minister David Lloyd George, who was in office at the time, 
recounted in his memoirs the basis for King and Crane’s selection as principal 
investigators: “If we were to send a Commission with no previous contact with 
Syria, it would, at any rate, convince the world that the Conference had tried to 
do all it could to find the most scientific basis possible for a settlement” (in Ben-
Bassat and Zachs 2014, 3). 
As researchers, their stated aim was to learn “the sentiments of the people of 
those regions with regard to the future administration of their affairs” and 
acquaint themselves “as fully as possible with the state of opinion there with 
regard to these matters, with the social, racial, and economic conditions” 
(Howard 1963, 34). The culmination of knowledge from their investigation would 
“serve to guide the judgement of the Conference, and to form definite opinion 
[...] of the divisions of territory and assignment of mandates, which will be most 
likely to promote order, peace, and development of those peoples and countries” 
(King and Crane, 1919). But as epistemological envoys of the imperial West, their 
larger mission to “ascertain whether the Arab peoples were ready for self-
government” proceeded alongside a deep scepticism as to whether Arabs were fit 
for self-liberation (Little 2004, 160).  
The first major Arab public opinion study to go on record, with the official title of 
“The American Section of the Inter-Allied Commission on Mandates in Turkey”, 
was thus an American epistemic inquiry and “an exercise in positivistic 
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sociology”, i.e., the study of society that relies on scientific evidence to advance 
truths about the social world (Reimer 2006, 136). Not everyone was in favour of 
an investigative mission. Speaking about general public reactions to the 
establishment of a commission, Reimer describes resistance from many Western 
Middle East specialists “who argued that the sending of a commission might 
generate political disturbances by raising false expectations (i.e. of 
independence)” (2006, 132). The act of inquiring about local opinion without the 
full intention to uphold its demands would potentially be—as Gertrude Bell put 
it—“tantamount to a ‘criminal deception’” (Reimer 2006, 132).  
With King and Crane at the helm, the research Commission travelled through 
thirty-six towns across greater Syria, Mesopotamia, Anatolia, Thrace, and other 
margins of the Ottoman sphere. They had planned to include Iraq, but never got 
that far. Forty-two days in the summer of 1919 were spent “in the field” 
traversing over a thousand miles, amounting to a large-scale ethnographic 
undertaking.  
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Figure 12: Map of the King-Crane Commission’s 1919 itinerary, from Yafo (Jaffa) to Mersina. 
Map image courtesy of the Oberlin College Archives. 
In each of the sites visited, the Commission called upon local delegations and 
individuals “who should represent all the significant groups in the various 
communities, and so to obtain as far as possible the opinions and desires of the 
whole people” (King and Crane, 1919). They also spoke with European officials, 
“local notables”, and American aid workers using the method of informal 
interviews and hearings (Tejirian and Simon 2012, 183). Delegations representing 
different interests were invited to share their opinions and attitudes toward 
Syrian unity and independence, Zionism, Iraqi independence, a French mandate, 
a possible American mandate, democracy, the designation of Emir Faysal as king 
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of Syria, a British mandate, clandestine treaties like Sykes-Picot and the Balfour 
Declaration, and other subjects (Reimer 2006, 136). In all, 442 Arab delegations 
were heard from (orally and in writing), representing 1,520 cities and villages 
and a total of 1,863 individual petitions. This data was compiled into a final 
report, along with commentary on the conditions of the region and 
recommendations for the Allied powers from the Commission leaders.  
No formal or consistent methodology was employed for determining “what the 
group thought would provide a composite picture of popular attitudes”, and 
further, “the sample was not proportional and was heavily weighted toward 
Christian representation” (Tejirian and Simon 2012, 184). As the expedition pre-
dated scientific polls, which would arrive with George Gallup in the coming 
decade, the assumption at the time was that petitioning was the best way to 
evaluate public opinion; in this way, an individual or delegation was elected to 
represent a significant group, and all significant groups combined could account 
for “the whole people” (Ben-Bassat and Zachs 2014, 2-3). As for the approach to 
measurement, the Commission recorded opinion in favour and against each 
issue. For instance, 80.4 percent (1,500) of those asked about the prospect of a 
unified Syria were recorded as being in favour, the remainder, opposed. But as 
Reimer points out, there were considerable conceptual holes in the inquiry. 
“What did the petitions mean by ‘Syria’ and why did the demand for unity 
outrank all others? [...] Most importantly, what precisely are the petitions 
measuring? What evidence is there that they represent ‘public opinion’ in Syria in 
1919?” (Reimer 2006, 136). Further research by Gelvin (1996) has shown that 
“what King–Crane took as the more or less spontaneous expression of 
indigenous opinion” in 1919 was in reality more of “a measure of the Arab 
government’s powers of mobilization and manipulation than of Syrian ‘public 
opinion’” (Reimer 2007, 137). There were thus other dynamics and motives at 
work, something that Commission could not easily detect in their methods. 
The methodological validity of what came to be known as the King-Crane 
Commission has been criticized on the grounds of selective sampling, omissions 
of voices that may have been important and other inherent biases (including the 
Americans’ links with Protestant missionary communities in the Middle East), 
artificial paradigms, and “positivistic assumptions underlying its collection and 
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presentation of data” (Reimer 2006, 130). There is indication that some identities 
were purposefully undercounted, and it’s not clear that King and Crane’s own 
positions were politically impartial. The selection of opinions that were heard 
likely came from the more elite stratus, linked to wealthier delegations or those 
with political stakes and strategic connections to primary actors like Emir Faisal. 
In the study of Anatolia, investigations were only conducted in Istanbul, which 
overcounted the Christian population, and their views “obviously 
underestimated the Muslim nationalist movement in the provinces” (Reimer 
2006, 134). And in general, there were sweeping racial generalisations made 
about ethnicities, such that the opinion of few became the opinion of all. But on 
the whole and in retrospect, some of the Commission’s findings were 
illuminating in the sense that they tapped into genuine aspirations and 
expectations surrounding the acute issue of political unity and self-
determination. 
 
Figure 13: Portrait of the King-Crane Commission at the Hotel Royal, Beirut. Henry 
Churchill King and Charles R. Crane are seated at the table, left to right. Standing, left to 
right: Sami Haddad, physician and interpreter; Capt. William Yale, Technical Adviser for the 
Southern Regions of Turkey; Albert Howe Lybyer, General Technical Adviser; George R. 
Montgomery, Technical Adviser for the Northern Regions of Turkey; Donald M. Brodie, 
Secretary; Laurence S. Moore, Business Manager. Photo courtesy of the Oberlin College 
Archives. 
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The Commission’s final report, compiled by Albert Howe Lybyer of the 
University of Illinois, was heralded as a legitimate scientific study of public 
opinion in the Arab region. For political reasons and accidental ones, the report 
was never shared upon completion. In the immediate aftermath of its 
publication, the King-Crane Commission was favourably received by the 
American Delegation in Paris. One copy was left with the Secretary of the 
American Commission to Negotiate Peace and the other was sent to President 
Wilson. It was delivered to his desk in the White House a few months later in the 
autumn of 1919 but Wilson happened to be away, and so no official confirmation 
of receipt came. Subsequently, Wilson fell ill—“a near-fatal stroke that paralyzed 
his foreign policy and enabled Britain and France to establish their own systems 
of mandates (British in Palestine and Iraq, French in Syria and Lebanon), dashing 
Arab hopes for independence” (Little 2004, 160). There was no arrangement 
made for a review of the report among the Allied administrations; a political 
move. “Thus it was that the King-Crane Report remained entirely confidential, 
insofar as the general public was concerned” (Howard 1963, 258).  
The contents of the final report, as a record of the epistemic intervention, were 
potentially far-reaching. The results carried the language of objectivity. “What 
counted as data”, writes Allen, “was that which could be counted” (2017, 396)—
and so the data that emerged made up the totality of what was known and 
understood about the political preferences of the Middle Eastern delegations. The 
findings revealed that the consulted peoples of then-Syria were vehemently 
against French rule, preferring either American oversight or complete 
independence. King and Crane’s own conclusions were that “full independence 
for the Arabs would be premature and recommended instead that the United 
States assume a League of Nations mandate system for Syria and Palestine” 
(Little 2004, 160). There were also perceptible warnings within the data regarding 
how Jewish populations returning to Palestine should be governed to avoid 
conflict and what to do about the competing claims for the Holy Lands. Some 
historians have made the counterfactual argument that had the opinions 
expressed in the King-Crane Commission been heeded, the history of Arab 
nationalism would have unfolded in a much different manner and a lasting peace 
in the region that is today Syria, Lebanon, Israel, the State of Palestine, and 
Jordan would perhaps have been attainable (Howard 1963). In any case, by the 
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time the report was unearthed and published by the American Editor & Publisher 
and New York Times three years later in December of 1922, it was far too late to 
renegotiate the imperialist course of action that had been taken. The Editor & 
Publisher report opened with the headline, “The Vital Significance of the Report 
That Follows” and the grave words: “Facts are first. The world is askew today 
because facts have been concealed or perverted” (1922). Even if the masking of 
the document was journalistically embellished, the importance of the document 
was not lost on American media at the time. 
The King-Crane Commission was, in many ways, a “quintessentially American 
undertaking”, particularly in its epistemological view of public opinion as 
something that could be measured as an evidence-based form of discursive 
knowledge and as something that could move politics (Reimer 2006). Further, it 
initiated a pattern of using “foreignness” as a proxy for neutrality on the part of 
public opinion researchers. Around that time, the dominant American scientific 
view on public opinion understood it to be “the gross aggregate of individual 
opinions freely expressed rather than a consentient position articulated by an 
elite” (Reimer 2006, 135). This reflects the positivistic zeitgeist in post-war 
America. Reimer continues,  
The only way to ascertain the true direction of public sentiment was to 
poll as accurately as possible the whole population. This was the genesis 
of the King–Crane Commission, a fusing of the American faith in the 
certitudes of ‘science’ and the values of ‘democracy.’ For both scientific 
and democratic reasons, quantity mattered: the quantitative dimension of 
the commission's work was the reason for the confidence with which its 
authors spoke, reflecting the peculiarly authoritative character that 
quantitative discourses had acquired in the United States by 1919 (2006, 
135). 
Subsequent analyses of the King-Crane report reveal no precedent for this type of 
undertaking in the Middle East. Still, its scientificness has been called into 
question on many occasions. It was very much taken for granted that foreign 
commissioners would have had an ability to read the feelings of their empirical 
subjects (Allen 2017). Another problem can be read directly from the text of the 
report itself, when the authors attest that “The process [of hearing delegates] 
Itself was inevitably a kind of political education for the people, and, besides 
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actually bringing out the desires of the people, had at least further value in the 
simple consciousness that their wishes were being sought” (King and Crane, 
1919). This motif of Western scientific salvation manifests itself throughout the 
report. 
For both its methodological breakthroughs and its imperious assumptions, the 
King-Crane Commission represents an early landmark in the pursuit of Arab 
public opinion by Western imperialist actors. Reimer warns us that opinion data 
itself cannot be considered outside of the historical and cultural settings from 
which it emerged. In his words, “the statistics amassed by the commission must 
be interpreted therefore with an awareness of both the Ottoman background and 
the unusual and transitory conditions under which they were collected” (2006, 
138). This cautionary advice, I would say, transcends the King-Crane case. 
2 From Tradition to Modernity: Arab Opinion 
Inquiry in Lerner’s The Passing of Traditional Society 
As a social scientific paradigm that promised to explain macro-level 
transformations and progress in contemporary societies, the breed of 
modernisation theory that emerged from the 1950s is now usually treated from a 
historiographic perspective—as an artefact of a time and place. Embedded within 
this modernisation paradigm was an elite and unidirectional understanding of 
the world order, with the superior Western democratic and industrial society 
positioned at the helm, far ahead of an “unprogressive and unimaginative” 
Global South (Bah 2008, 799). Modernisation was premised on ideal notions 
about the trajectory of social development from tradition to modernity. It 
assumed, among other things, that “development tends to proceed toward the 
modern state along a common, linear path” and that “the progress of developing 
societies can be dramatically accelerated through contact with developed ones” 
(Latham 2000, 4). The process of modernisation was generally conceptualised as 
scientific and rational, one that would increase a society’s productivity and 
efficiency as it came into being as modern. Further, modernisation was viewed as 
something that could be empirically verified. Gilman, for one, speaks of the 
“elitism of technical expertise” that prioritised “fact, knowledge, and the 
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indisputable authority of science” during this time (2003, 8). The attitude that 
pervaded modernist thinking was that “traditional societies had to be 
reorganised to make individuals subject to the epistemological control of social 
science” (Gilman 2003, 8), and opinion research offered the technologies 
necessary for doing so. 
The discourse of modernisation developed in the context of the Cold War, when 
American intellectuals, policy elites, public opinion and propaganda specialists, 
and social scientists were engaged in a prolonged exercise of countering the 
influence of Soviet-styled communism in the world. The discourse of 
modernisation has also been considered as an ideological response to the 
decolonisation process, which “presented a new and potentially dangerous force 
to be channeled and controlled” (Latham 2000, 22) and “established the need for 
development” (Gilman 2003, 42). Modernisation and development theory—its 
proponents and its critics—form an expansive body of literature (see, for 
instance, Rostow 1960(1991); Wallerstein 1974; Shils 1975; Pye 1979; Schelkle et al. 
(eds.) 2000; Engerman et al. (eds.) 2003; Ekbladh 2010; Latham 2011). And more 
recent analyses have considered the immense effects of the modernisation 
paradigm on the production of scholarship and knowledge, particularly with 
reference to the epistemological development and institutionalisation of the 
American behavioural social sciences (see Appy (ed.) 2000; Gilman 2003; Cooke 
et al. 2005; Shah 2011).  
Of the key modernist social scientists who worked to refashion postcolonial 
societies in the image of America, Daniel Lerner’s work stands out as explicitly 
implicated in the history of Arab public opinion inquiry. Lerner was one of a 
network of American intellectuals and academics who thrived from an 
unprecedented wave of funding for the social sciences in the late 1950s and early 
1960s that came as “government agencies sought to enhance their knowledge of 
the politics and culture of geopolitically sensitive areas where the Cold War 
might be fought” (Shah 2011, 18). Within Lerner’s intellectual network were 
characters that we are already now acquainted with—Harold Lasswell, Paul 
Lazarsfeld, Ithiel de Sola Pool, Gabriel Almond, Bernard Berelson, for instance—
all major influencers in the development of American public opinion research. 
Indeed, Hemant Shah’s critique of Lerner’s formative research on the Middle 
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East disentangles some of the complex, tightly connected networks of American 
government agencies, private public opinion research firms, universities, and 
social science research institutes involved in postwar foreign policy research. 
Lerner’s work was greatly influenced by Harold Lasswell’s psychologistic 
approach to opinion research, which, in true behaviouralist fashion, sought to 
build a link between ego and personality development and political behaviour 
(Gilman 2003, 165). Lerner was a trained sociologist and, having spent time 
working on psychological warfare during World War II, eventually joined the 
Bureau of Applied Social Research (BASR) at Columbia University. BASR’s 
legacy of research lay in the field of media and communication studies. One of its 
largest projects, contracted by the Department of State and in collaboration with 
MIT’s Center for International Studies (CENIS), monitored the reach and effects 
of Voice of America (VOA) radio broadcasting around the world. VOA 
programming was an integral part of American postwar foreign policy and a 
counter-strategy to Soviet radio stations, and Lerner’s involvement in assessing 
VOA’s reach in the Middle East was a key element of his 1958 book, The Passing 
of Traditional Society: Modernizing the Middle East. 
The Passing of Traditional Society was funded and conducted under the auspices of 
American institutions working on anti-Soviet foreign policy objectives. The object 
of Lerner’s study was to identify audiences of VOA broadcasts, as well as to 
understand how messaging was being received and evaluated by Middle Eastern 
populations in order to target “vulnerable audience segments” with more specific 
propagandistic messaging (Bah 2008, 814). The study exemplified the fusion of 
modernisation thinking with the epistemology of behavioural social science, at a 
time when each was in need of the other. It relied on surveys and post-hoc 
comparative analysis to explain how societies become “modern”, i.e. “Western”, 
and where the role of mass media was to be found in all this (Shah 2011, 3). For 
the study, survey interviews were conducted in Egypt, Iran, Jordan, Lebanon, 
Turkey, and Syria in 1950 and 1951; three hundred in each country, reaching a 
total of roughly 1,600 individual respondents from the Middle East. The survey 
questionnaire itself comprised a total of “117 questions about their living 
conditions, their opinions on politics and foreign countries, their use of mass 
media, their level of happiness, and their basic demographic characteristics” 
(Shah 2011, 3). From this data, “Lerner statistically extracted three types or 
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categories of people and nations—the traditional, the transitional, and the 
modern” (Shah 2011, 3). What Lerner essentially provided was a three-pronged 
typology of modernity derived from a pseudo-scientific, psychological 
assessment of a given Middle Easterner’s capacity for opinion-making (in his 
view). For Lerner, political consciousness separated the modern individual from 
the traditional one, while a transitional individual, standing halfway between 
traditional and modern, might represent the key to social change (modernisation) 
in the Middle East. It was the promise of the transitional’s passage to becoming 
modern that was encapsulated in the idea of the passing of traditional society.  
In questioning what differentiated a modern individual from a non-modern or 
traditional individual, Lerner reasoned that opinion-formation held the key. It is 
within this notion where fragments of the theories of Lasswell and other similar 
social scientists of Lerner’s day are found. The ability to hold and express 
opinions on matters of public and political life suggested that the individual had 
certain personal attributes which made them more or less amenable to becoming 
modern. One of these was empathy, which for Lerner meant the ability of an 
individual “to identify with people and situations different from him- or herself” 
(Shah 2011, 107). Lerner instrumentalised attributes such as empathy by creating 
an index against which respondents could be placed along a linearly-structured 
opinion continuum (Shah 2011, 105). This continuum categorised respondents as 
a traditional Middle Easterner with no ability to express an opinion, a 
transitionalist with some clues about opinion-formation, and a modernist with 
developed opinion-formation capabilities. The tripartite index was based on a 
smaller set of questions that tested the opinion-capacity of each respondent and 
was constructed by adding up the number of questions to which the respondents 
answered (Shah 2011). Lerner himself explains this methodological approach:  
A person becomes participant in society by learning to ‘have opinions’—
further, the more numerous and varied the matters on which he has 
opinions, the more participant he is. To rank each respondent as a 
participant in the Middle Eastern opinion arena, we counted the number 
and variety of items in the questionnaire on which he expressed some 
opinion (i.e. did not say ‘I don’t know’ or ‘I have no opinion’) (Lerner 1958, 
71 [emphasis in the original]). 
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The methodology of The Passing of Traditional Society is notably unclear. No 
details on the construction or cut-off points of the modernisation index were 
given. Of the many methodological problems that have been traced in Lerner’s 
study, perhaps one of the most jarring is that respondents were classified not on 
the content or the essence of their opinions—not on what they said—but on 
whether they said something at all. “The justification was that it was only the 
holding of the opinion that mattered, not the substance of the opinion” (Shah 
2011, 106). Further, Lerner’s questionnaire, like other similar studies of global 
opinion, was drafted in English and subsequently translated into Arabic and 
other languages, with little attention paid to concept equivalence and the 
distortive effects of translation. This (still common) practice of privileging the 
language of the interrogator diminishes the discursive authority of the 
respondent. 
The smaller set of nine questions used to construct the empathy index related to 
media, politics, and “role playing”, in the sense that the respondent was led “to 
imagine himself in a situation other than his real one” (Lerner 1958, 70). The 
questions read as follows: 
1. If you were made the editor of a newspaper, what kind of a paper would you run?  
2. What do you think you miss by not knowing what the newspapers have to say?  
3. How do you think people who go to the movies differ from those who don’t?  
4. If you were put in charge of a radio station, what kinds of programs would you 
like to put on?  
5. If for some reason you could not live in our country, what other country would 
you choose to live in?  
6. Suppose that I could tell you anything you wanted to know about (this country): 
What two questions would you be most interested in asking?  
7. What is the biggest problem that people in the same circumstances as yourself face 
in life?  
8. What do you think people in the same circumstances as yourself can do to help 
solve this problem?  
 POLLING AND THE PURSUIT OF ARAB PUBLIC OPINION 176 
 
9. Suppose that you were made head of the government. What are some of the things 
you would do?  
Lerner gives little indication as to why these questions were chosen and worded 
in this way, or about the reliability of the interviewer and translation process, or 
the logic behind the scoring mechanism that determined an empathic individual. 
From these questions, the problems that we encounter include conceptual 
confusion and ambiguousness. Some questions are open hypotheticals (i.e. q.2, 
q.9), under-described (i.e. q.1, q.2, q.3), force the imagination beyond plausible 
bounds (i.e. q.4, q9), are tricky and invite no clear answer (i.e. q.6, q.7), rely on 
other questions (i.e. q.8), or are worded such that “I don’t know” would 
constitute a reasonably sound opinion (i.e. q.5). The connection between an(y) 
answer to these questions and the label of “modern” has been challenged as both 
arbitrary and conceptually flawed. Bah (2008), for instance, demonstrates how 
Lerner’s model rests on preconceived and untested notions of society in the 
Middle East. As a result, Lerner’s methodology to a great extent reifies the 
hypothetical categorisations of modernity that it sought to find, such that his 
index of modernity seems a neat, historical inevitability. Lerner clues us in to this 
when he remarks, “our data fell beautifully into place”, as if it could not have 
been otherwise (1958, 72). 
Combined with the larger dataset, Lerner paid particularly close attention to the 
media-consuming habits of his respondents, those “found to be literate, urban, 
and relatively well off would have been the ones most likely to score higher on 
the index than others”, while those with “little or no access to international news 
or with limited interest in world politics were destined to score lower on this 
index, even if they held opinions on many other issues of importance to them” 
(Shah 2011, 107). Lerner thus concluded that “mass communication technologies 
were the essential vehicle of modernization, creating similar cultural traits 
everywhere they penetrated” (Gilman 2003, 172). He judged as well that the 
overall benefits of modernisation made people happy, and thus modern Middle 
Easterners were happier than traditional ones.  
Lerner’s claim to speaking for Middle Eastern public opinions was validated by 
his fellow American academics, who shared in the spirit of modernist thinking. 
Elie Salem, for instance, wrote that The Passing of Traditional Society “reflects 
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faithfully the state of mind of the Middle Eastern peoples in their process of 
transformation from a traditional to a modern society” (Salem 1959, 127). The 
study was commended for its use of “modern techniques of sociological 
research”, and Lerner was applauded for being “amply qualified to analyze the 
attitudes of these peoples” and handling “with mastery” the “varied and 
immense” dataset of cross-national surveys (Salem 1959, 127-128). Another critic 
wrote that the study was “bound to retain an honoured place” in the literature on 
the Middle East (Lengyel in Shah 2011, 4).  
Of course, there is much in Lerner’s study that provides for an uncomfortable 
read. As Gilman notes, Lerner remains “unsympathetic toward the local, the 
particular, and the unique” (2003, 173). The structure of his analysis follows an 
Orientalist fantasy about parochial characters like the Grocer and the Chief of 
Balgat, a “deprived and remote village” outside Ankara, and false imaginings of 
the Middle East. The discourse that permeates The Passing of Traditional Society 
projects an otherness and backwardness onto the region that serves to justify the 
Western mission of development. At the same time, the language of science and 
recency of statistical application to social research had the effect of propelling the 
validity and rigour of the study. At this point, I return to Lerner’s own words 
inscribed at the beginning of this chapter: “Those Middle Easterners whose 
private lives have become permeated by the public questions will prove most 
enlightening to us” (1958, 75). Indeed, this one passage lays bare the self-serving 
nature of American inquiry into the Arab region during the age of 
modernisation. 
3 “The Palestine Question” and Arab Erasure in 
Western Public Opinion 
In the lead up to the United Nations Partition Plan for Palestine (1947), the 
dismemberment of the British Mandate for Palestine, and creation of the state of 
Israel in 1948, public attitudes toward “the Palestine question” were being closely 
monitored. Indeed, the subject has been one of the most consistently observed 
cases in the study of public opinion of the Arab world. The Arab position in the 
struggle for self-determination was that “Palestine was an integral part of the 
 POLLING AND THE PURSUIT OF ARAB PUBLIC OPINION 178 
 
Arab world and that from the beginning its indigenous inhabitants had opposed 
the creation in their country of a Jewish national home” (Tessler 2009, 259). 
Edward Said has written of Palestine as a topic around which knowledge is ever-
evolving, leading us to reflect on the ways by which this knowledge has been 
“implicated in the contest over and about Palestine” (1986, 30). To see this 
contestation in action, one can look toward different forms of knowledge. Here, I 
consider the subtle ways in which erasure—the writing out of Arab identity and 
agency—comes to be embedded in the design of opinion research. With small 
examples from Western polls and surveys from the mid-twentieth century, we 
can see how public opinion knowledge becomes politicised not once media 
pundits and politicians have their hands on it, but early in the planning stages, 
well before any opinion has been uttered. 
In 1951, the Office of Public Opinion Research (OPOR) (led by Hadley Cantril 
and based at Princeton University) collected funding from the Rockefeller 
Foundation to publish a volume of major opinion studies conducted in sixteen 
countries between the years of 1935 and 1946. These studies originated from 
roughly two-dozen polling institutes based in Europe and the Americas. In 
publishing this volume, Cantril and his colleagues at Public Opinion Quarterly saw 
“the potential value and usefulness this type of information could have for a 
wide range of people: historians, sociologists, political scientists, economists, 
editors, policy makers, businessmen, labor leaders, and a host of others whose 
professional lives are, in one way or another, concerned with public reaction to 
events” (Cantril and Strunk 1951, v). A good number of the studies in the 
compendium were conducted on behalf of governments, media, and private 
clients, and not all data were publicly available until being published by OPOR in 
1951 as a knowledge-sharing tool. These were also large-scale polls, with sample 
sizes in the hundreds and thousands. The compendium assembled public 
opinion polls on a lengthy list of social, political, legal, and cultural topics. As one 
of the first substantial collections of opinion data for its time, Cantril, as editor, 
cautioned readers “that this scientific tool, like all others, is in itself neutral and 
can be used for good or evil according to one’s own definition and purposes” 
(Cantril and Strunk 1951, v). The sentiment here was that the data itself (and, it 
could be assumed, the process of data collection as well) was wholly apolitical, 
with the politicisation of data being a post-hoc effect of interpretation. 
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The OPOR compendium, titled Public Opinion, 1935-1946, is organised around the 
classification of subject headings and cross references “which are the result of 
careful thought and wide experience” (Cantril and Strunk 1951, vii). In this way, 
a single topic might contain results from different polls of different years. This 
allows for a comparison of question wording, results, and shifts in opinion over 
time. The topics are far-reaching, covering anything from abortion and 
aeronautics to weather and World War. The large majority of polls included in 
the roughly 1,200-page compendium surveyed American and British 
respondents. Additionally, many of the polls included in the compendium were 
institutions in their own right: the Fortune Survey (Elmo Roper), the National 
Opinion Research Center (NORC) polls, and the Gallup and Crossley polls, 
among others. The analysis below examines the specific instantiations of Middle 
East public opinion from this compendium. 
In the years preceding the Nakba, the “catastrophic” expulsion and exodus of 
hundreds of thousands of Palestinians after Israel’s declaration of establishment, 
inquiry relating to “the Palestine question” appeared more frequently in opinion 
polls and surveys. In his account of the development of public opinion on 
Palestine through these years, Michael Suleiman writes that “in 1948, when 
Palestine was dismembered and the Palestinians were dispersed, ‘world public 
opinion’ on the Palestine issue—as on many others—was to a great extent shaped 
by the West” (1984, 87). American and British polls and surveys found in the 
OPOR compendium greatly contributed to this sense of a “world public opinion” 
on the issue, which in turn motivated a decidedly pro-Israeli stance in Western 
media discourse (Suleiman 1984, 87). At this crucial time in state formation, 
Suleiman notes that no major polls were commissioned to communicate the 
opinions of Jews and Arabs caught in the political crossfires of 1948, though 
Western pollsters had the means to interview people in Mandatory Palestine in 
the lead up to the 1947 UN General Assembly vote on Resolution 181 (II) 
regarding the international community’s partition plan for Palestine. While an 
extensive three-volume descriptive and statistical Survey of Palestine was 
prepared by British officials in 1945/6 for the Anglo-American Committee of 
Inquiry, it did not constitute a study of local public opinion. Others have noted a 
lull in the presence of foreign organisations conducting survey research inside 
Arab states in the 1950s and 1960s as a result of political upheavals and the 
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influence of the Arab national movement, but few details are to be found as to 
why the dearth of research in the territories during this time (see S. Ibrahim 1987, 
28). 
Instead, the question of what to do about Palestine and claims to a Jewish 
homeland were put toward people living in countries far from there, with little 
background knowledge or first-hand encounters with territorial conflict and 
partition. The way in which this knowledge was organised is captured in the 
1951 OPOR compendium.  
In the subject index to the compendium, entries for “Palestine”, “Arabs”, 
“Middle East”, or variants of these terms appear as below: 
Arabs in Palestine. See Jews: Colonization. 
Jews in Palestine. See Jews: Colonization. 
Palestine question. See Jews: Colonization. 
This displacement of Palestine through the codification of knowledge within the 
index alone is striking. Arabs, Palestine, and the Palestine question do not make 
up their own subjects (and here I mean both subjects as entries and subjects as 
agents with recognition and representation). Rather, they are subsumed into the 
Jewish subject such that they become subsets of public opinion knowledge 
filtered through a different label and experience. Here, it becomes even more 
interesting that Mildred Strunk’s introduction to the compendium explicitly 
comments on the careful crafting of subject headings and cross references.  
When we scan the index for mentions of “Jews”, “Zionism”, or derivative 
terminology, we find the following entries: 
JEWISH QUESTION 
See also Jews: Colonization; Minorities; Music; Race; War crimes and 
trials; World War, 1939-45: Atrocities. 
JEWS 
See also Church unity; Jewish question; Minorities; World War, 1939-
45: Children: U.S. 
COLONIZATION 
See also International cooperation: U.S.-Great Britain; Jewish question; 
World War, 1939-45: Displaced persons. 
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Persecutions. See Jewish question. 
These two main entries for the Jewish question and Jews include the sub-
headings of colonisation and persecutions, and various cross references including 
cooperation between the great powers, though there is no mention of Palestine or 
of Arabs. It seems a stark omission given the keen interest of British and 
American foreign policy in the future of Palestine and the Middle East more 
broadly. This erasure within the OPOR codified index of opinion is present 
despite the numerous polling questions included in the compendium that probe 
attitudes relating to how boundaries and land claims should be dealt with by 
foreign actors. Suleiman argues that the centrality of the Jewish case in Western 
public attitudes “is not merely because Palestine ceased to exist as a country in 
1948” (1984, 107). Rather, there is a larger problem at work; one which he calls a 
“concomitant lack of concern for the Palestinian Arabs” in Western polls (1984, 
107). The reasons for this include racial prejudice, long-standing othering of the 
Arab in European political thought, and a hierarchical approach to opinion 
production whereby the Jewish question becomes a more pressing issue than the 
Palestine question. This renders the latter unessential; blotted out from the 
writing and design of public opinion inquiry. In the aftermath of the Shoah, the 
Nuremburg trials, and the struggle to reconcile the brutality of the Holocaust in 
human history, the weight of the Jewish plight was unequivocal. But where there 
was opportunity to create space for the turbulent issues of statehood and self-
determination in the Middle East, the polls expose an “almost ignorance, or 
deliberate negligence, of the fate of the Palestinian Arabs” (Suleiman 1984, 107). 
In 1944, at a time of increased tensions between Jewish and British forces within 
Mandatory Palestine due to restrictions on Jewish immigration, a NORC poll 
(Cantril and Strunk 1951, 354) asked the following to Americans: 
Do you think the Jews should be given a special chance to settle in Palestine after 
the war, or do you think all people should have the same chance to settle there? 
The answers were operationalised into three categories: “Jews”, “All people 
same”, and “Don’t know”.36 The bias in support of Jewish settlement reverberates 
 
36
 The published results were Jews (45%), All people same (44%), and Don’t know (11%). 
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through the question wording, with its mention of “a special chance” but without 
reference to Muslim populations and existing inhabitants of the territory. This 
leaves the Palestinians indiscernible, concealed within the category “all people” 
but unable to represent themselves. Over thirty more questions from different 
American and British polls appear in the same section of the OPOR compendium, 
regarding opinion on the possible creation of a Jewish state. Very few make 
explicit mentions of Arab peoples or ask of their fate. 
A similar question from a 1946 NORC poll (Cantril and Strunk 1951, 356), 
employing a Western saviour discourse, asks Americans: 
As you remember, the report [by the Anglo-American committee on 
Palestine] recommends that one hundred thousand more Jewish refugees be 
admitted to Palestine in spite of protests by the Arabs there. President Truman 
has said he thinks this ought to be done. Now England says that the United States 
ought to help her keep order in Palestine if trouble breaks out between the Jews 
and the Arabs. Do you think we should help keep order there, or should we keep 
out of it? 
The three possible responses were “Keep out of it”, “Help keep order”, and 
“Undecided”.37 There is a binary framing of the Jewish refugees in opposition to 
“the Arabs there”, the latter not inhabiting the territory by any right worth 
mentioning, but “there” as if an inconvenient truth and an uncooperative 
disturbance. The positive reinforcement for the United States to involve itself in 
the escalating conflict comes from the recommendation of the report, Truman’s 
declaration of support for intervention, and the British stimulus. This obscures 
the neutrality of intervention by casting it as an officially ordained position. The 
only options given are to “help keep order” in case “trouble breaks out”. The 
Palestinians are incapable of solving the issue, which justifies an intercession by 
the West to preserve order and control as only they are capable of. Left to its own 
devices, Palestine would degenerate into a frenzy of internal strife, threatening 
stability in the region and more broadly jeopardising the world order. The idea of 
Palestinian autonomy as a solution is not even entertained, and intervention by 
foreign actors comes in only one flavour: the complex of the colonial saviour. 
 
37
 The published results were Keep out of it (61%), Help keep order (28%), and Undecided (11%). 
 STAGE 1 183 
 
Another common type of question that appears in the compendium asks the 
respondent whether they agree with one given statement over an alternative. 
When not randomised, the ordering of the statements can often create a cognitive 
bias in favour of the first statement mentioned. For this reason, misleading 
question designs like this no longer appear in scientific public opinion surveys. 
An example from a 1945 Roper poll (Cantril and Strunk 1951, 385) reads: 
Here are two statements. Please tell me with which one you most nearly agree: a 
Jewish state in Palestine is a good thing for the Jews, and every possible effort 
should be made to establish Palestine as a Jewish state, or commonwealth, for 
those who wanted to settle there; Jews are a religious group only and not a nation, 
and it would be bad for the Jews to try to set up a Jewish state in Palestine or 
anywhere else. 
The question was only asked of an American cross-section of Jewish individuals 
and published in the New York Herald Tribune. In fact, it was standard practice 
to probe opinion of religions subgroups: Jewish, Protestant, and Catholic, though 
never Muslim. The respondents were classified as “Pro-Jewish state”, “Anti-
Jewish state”, and “Undecided”.38 The two statements themselves are not on a 
level continuum. The wording of absolutes (“every possible effort should be 
made”; “Jews are a religious group only”), the non-randomisation, the 
encouragement to pick what one “most nearly” agrees with (as opposed to just 
agrees with), a false equation of a positive deed with a negative decision 
prejudice a “Pro-Jewish state” opinion, and the likelihood of ingroup pressure for 
the Jewish subgroup are factors that might expressly produce a non-neutral 
opinion.  
The OPOR compendium covers a critical time span where tensions were flaring 
in the run up to 1948 and the creation of Israel and first Arab-Israeli war. Patterns 
in research production reveal that polls tend to emerge in swarms during these 
critical junctures in Arab-Israeli relations (times when foreign policy has high 
stakes in the region), only to fade away in the interim. As Suleiman has argued, 
“opinion often follows policy”, i.e., discussions of specific policy only begin after 
they have been initiated by public officials (1984, 88). Further, Hazel Erskine 
 
38
 The published results were Pro-Jewish state (80.1%), Anti-Jewish state (10.5%), and Undecided (9.4%). 
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notes that in the first two decades following Palestinian partition, Western public 
opinion was apathetic, uninformed, and unevenly collected until just after the 
Six-Day War of June 1967, which then “not only focused attention on the Middle 
East, but turned sympathies of the western world overwhelmingly toward the 
victorious small nation” of Israel (1969). Scanning many of the major Western 
polls that included questions on the conflict between 1948 and 1969 allows us to 
trace the evolution of the Palestine question. These polls include those from 
Instituto Gallup de Opiniāo Publica Brazil (BGI), EMNID Germany, Gallup, 
Gallup Markedsanalyse Denmark (GMA), Harris USA, IFOP France, MINN USA, 
Norsk Gallup Institute (NGI), Nederlands Instituut voor de Publieke Opinie 
(NIPO), NOP Britain, NORC USA, SOC Britain, SRC-C USA, and USIA (in 
Erskine 1969).  
After 1948, the question of who had claim to the land (which was originally 
mentioned in the OPOR compendium) became a matter of whose side was 
deserving of greater sympathy, Jews and Israel or Arabs and the Arab states, and 
who was to blame. For instance, consider this selection of questions sourced from 
the aforementioned polls: 
If war breaks out between the Arabs and the Jews in Palestine, which side would 
you sympathise with? (Gallup, November 1947) 
In the conflict between Israel and her Arab neighbours, do you tend to sympathize 
with Israel, with the Arab states, or with neither side? (USIA, November-
December 1956) 
Suppose there were a war between the Arab nations and Israel. Which side do you 
think you would probably sympathise with? (SRC-C, November 1964)  
Which side do you feel is more to blame in this dispute—Israel or the Arabs? 
(NORC, November 1953) 
Following the Six-Day War, these questions appear in higher frequencies in the 
following form: 
In this trouble (between Israel and the Arab nations in the Middle East), are your 
sympathies more with Israel or more with the Arab states? (Gallup, June 1967) 
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Which side are you in sympathy with in the present conflict between Israel and 
Egypt and the other Arab countries? (IFOP, June 1967) 
Who do you think has more right on their side—the Arabs or Israel? (Harris, 
June 1967) 
Who do you think is more to blame for the failure to reach a settlement of Mid-
East issues—the Israelis or the Arabs? (MINN, January 1968) 
Do you tend to agree or disagree that: 
The Arabs have wanted to start a war with Israel for a long time. 
Israel has wanted a war with the Arabs for a long time.  
(Harris, June 1967) 
Each of these and the many other similarly-worded formulations in the polls 
strike at one basic question: “Where do you stand on the question of Palestine?”, 
which Edward Said has called “shamelessly provocative” (1986, 29). Certainly, 
the methodology of polling places textual limits on researchers, forcing them to 
ask concise, to-the-point questions. But in each of the cases above, we can see a 
clear binary built into the questions that pits the allegiance of respondents against 
each other and between opposing factions, forcing opinion toward the side of 
Israel and the Jewish peoples or toward the Arab peoples. The only middle 
ground is a “Don’t know” or non-response; there is no other opinion that one can 
hold.  
Not only does this reduce the complex historical trajectories of Jewish and 
Palestinian Arab statehood and statelessness to an either/or conditional 
statement, it also inevitably shapes the way that public opinion on the conflict is 
framed and talked about. Policymakers, media, and practitioners (those who 
collect and commission the polls) are not interested in whether the public can 
offer a solution to the protracted conflict; they are not seeking the public’s 
counsel or advice. Rather, testing on which side of the fence people stand (after 
first constructing a fence) can be a legitimating tool or affirmative signal for 
policy decisions like intervention (or non-intervention). The issue of who to 
blame for the complex and enduring struggle is similarly framed in a binary 
fashion, which does little more than to absolve colonial/Western powers and 
other actors like the UN for their role in orchestrating or prolonging the conflict. 
Finally, the framing of the conflict between the two identities as “symmetrically 
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balanced, polarized at dead centre”, in the words of Said, misrepresents the 
Palestinian case. As he says, “to place the Palestinian and the Israeli sides within 
the opposition on what appears to be equal, opposite, and symmetrical footing is 
also to reduce the claims of one by elevating the other” (1986, 31). This great 
levelling is its own form of erasure.  
4 Conclusion 
Through the three cases presented in this chapter, I have provided historical 
evidence of early Western epistemic interventions into the Middle East by way of 
public opinion research. These examples, I argue, are emblematic of a first stage 
in the broader story of Arab public opinion inquiry in which experts seek control 
over their objects of inquiry (everyday people). In each of the cases, we see the 
application of a reductionist epistemology characterised by an unchallenged 
emphasis on scientific principles and methodological protocols. As objects of 
inquiry, people’s opinions and desires are purposefully isolated “from their vital 
context” (Mazzocchi 2006, 464). Complex historical and social realities are 
compressed and abridged, and then replaced with the outputs of measuring 
techniques meant to transmit the degree of importance of the questions asked of 
people. As a means of extracting, compressing, and recasting the voices, wants, 
and experiences of others through the Self’s systems of knowledge, each of these 
instances of epistemic intervention was orchestrated by foreign, predominately 
American, actors motivated by the desire to collect technical information and 
control knowledge of the Other. And yet each case study is also quite distinct. 
They are not meant to show a continuity of actors or methods per se. Indeed, the 
methods and audiences differ in each case. Instead, I believe that the King-Crane 
Commission, Lerner’s widely influential study on modernisation, and 
commercial polling on the Palestine issue in the post-Mandate era each made a 
significant contribution to the empirical construction of the Arab world using the 
truth-seeking tools of science. 
In the case of the King-Crane Commission of 1919, the collection of numeric 
population information using the method of petitions was aimed at a more 
systematic (scientific) way of governing the collapsed Ottoman empire; an 
alternative redrawing of borders to the Sykes-Picot mandate system based on 
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empirical data. As one of the first major studies of Arab public opinion to go on 
record, the Commission was an ethnographic investigation of the hyper-local; of 
the three case studies, it displayed the strongest commitment on the part of 
experts to distil the state of opinion “of the people concerned” from the places 
where they were forged (King and Crane 1919). Yet what was taken to be the 
representative opinions of all was in fact only a selection of strategically relevant 
positions on issues relating to colonial leadership and self-governance. By its 
very design, the empirical pursuit of public opinion here was cut on the bias; it is 
more a study of elite opinion than of (mass) public opinion. It was framed as a 
scientific triumph that presented “the cold, matured facts in the case, as fully 
gathered and fearlessly stated by a responsible, unbiased American group of 
investigators” (Editor & Publisher 1922). It was this scientific stamp of approval 
that solidified the value of the Commission’s work as a major feat of international 
social science research. 
In the second case of Lerner’s The Passing of Traditional Society, the nature of 
intervention was both epistemic and developmental. The text itself exemplifies 
the paradigm of modernisation that was cultivated in wartime institutions like 
BASR (introduced in the context of the rise of global opinion polling in Chapter 
4). Whereas the King-Crane Commission was meant to enlighten the major 
powers, Lerner’s study provided a path toward enlightenment for what he saw 
as traditional or backward societies of the Middle East. The West, with its 
scientific advancements, media technologies, systems of mass communication, 
and democratic political structures, served as a prime model for enlightenment. 
Lerner’s methodology was more specialised than King and Crane’s. By the 1950s, 
polls and standardised surveys were being used widely. These were employed 
alongside psychosocial theories about modernisation that allowed Lerner to 
systematise the process of social change. In the context of public opinion inquiry 
on the Arab region, The Passing of Traditional Society should be read as “a 
‘production’ in the sense that it was an outcome of a research process embedded 
in a particular postwar political and cultural economy” (Shah 2011, 9). 
In the third case, we witness the implicit erasure of Palestinian identity through 
the design of mass polling. Unlike the previous two cases, opinion is decoupled 
from experience here. What I mean by this is that foreign public opinion on the 
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Palestinian issue was canvassed widely after 1948 instead of local (Palestinian or 
Israeli) opinions formed through lived experience. Partisanship in both question 
wording and the codification of data manufactured a particular narrative of the 
Arab-Israeli conflict, within which the Palestinian right to representation was 
nullified. This erasure took place within the design of public opinion 
questionnaires, before results even came to be interpreted and instrumentalised 
by media pundits and politicians. Examples from Western polls after 1948 
display a tendency to treat Palestinians, with no internationally recognised state, 
as stateless people and as “non-people”. As Suleiman writes, “if Palestinians are 
non-people, it is easy to wish them away, refuse to talk to them or their 
representatives, the PLO, and to persist in excluding them from any formula for a 
proposed solution to this nagging problem” (1984, 106). Ironically, years earlier, 
Henry King and Charles Crane had proposed a very different future for 
Palestinians with relation to “the Zionist program” (King and Crane 1919). Based 
on all that their Commission had heard, they cautioned against the contents of 
the Balfour Declaration, arguing that “‘a national home for the Jewish people’ is 
not equivalent to making Palestine into a Jewish State; nor can the erection of 
such a Jewish State be accomplished without the gravest trespass upon the ‘civil 
and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine’” (King and 
Crane 1919). The initial suppression of the Commission report amounted to the 
suppression of opinions in support of this position. Repeatedly, and in different 
ways, indigenous public opinion supporting the right to Arab self-determination 
was subjected to foreign empirical control or altogether silenced in the process of 
creating scientific knowledge about public opinion during this first, early stage of 
inquiry. 
 
  
Chapter 6  
Stage 2 | Great Transformations: The Rise of Embedded 
Institutions and Practices 
 
Between the ecstasy and the agony, we must take stock of what has been accomplished, of 
what has not been accomplished, and of where we go from here. 
Saad Eddin Ibrahim (1987) 
 
By the late 1970s and early 1980s, opinion polling and survey research had 
“become common in the Arab world and in other developing areas” (Tessler 
1987a, 1). We have detailed records of nearly four hundred studies, from Algeria 
to Yemen that used quantitative and behavioural methods that form a relatively 
unified set. These are mainly found in Monte Palmer’s 1982 compendium, Survey 
Research in the Arab World, which in all probability represented “little more than 
the tip of the iceberg” (Tessler 1987a, 3; Palmer et al. 1982). And although Marc 
Lynch has written that “as recently as the late 1980s, the idea of conducting 
scientific surveys of public opinion about controversial political issues would 
have been virtually unthinkable” (2006, 33), we have evidence to the contrary—
politically sensitive ideas were making their way into opinion research earlier, 
but permanent records of this are scarce.  
While Stage 1 (Chapter 5) traced a mode of inquiry wherein societies across Arab 
countries were participant to the development of Western social science merely 
as objects of research (Zghal and Karoui 1973), the rapid institutionalisation of 
public opinion inquiry in the latter part of the twentieth century, as part of 
broader global economic and political shifts, provides a segue into (what I 
demarcate as) a second stage in the development of Arab public opinion inquiry. 
While the first stage was characterised by epistemic interventions at the hands of 
foreign actors, Stage 2 is characterised by a deeper co-dependency between actors 
situated within and outside of the Arab region. Stage 2 covers substantial 
transformative ground over roughly four decades, during which time we witness 
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the coalescence of a regional Arab public sphere, hastened by revolutionary 
advances to the media landscape. This period is marked by political and social 
developments that “created an unprecedented mobility in Arabian societies”, 
sparked a vested interest in the region “as a strategic asset” to global onlookers 
(Ayish 2008, 13), and eventually provoked foreign policymakers to interrogate 
“Arab opinion” more deeply following the shattering events of September 11 and 
the ensuing war in Iraq.  
Similarly to how I approached Stage 1, my goal is not to suggest that concrete 
temporal bounds apply to this next phase of inquiry; however, for the purposes 
of this chapter, I focus on the period from the late 1970s at a time when Arab 
social science institutes began to flourish, until the final years of the George W. 
Bush presidency, when by 2009, Arab public opinion was appearing in 
congressional testimonies relating to American foreign policy in the Middle East. 
Recalling the visual map of inquiry used to locate Stage 1, the figure below plots 
Stage 2 in a similar fashion.  
 
Figure 14: Stage 2 in the development of Arab public opinion inquiry. 
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Stage 2 is found at the intersection of the axes in this visualisation, where 
transnational networks are forged by actors located inside and outside the Arab 
region. Once again, the axes are purposefully indefinite; I do not attempt to map 
out and rank every relevant actor on this visualisation. Rather, in shining a light 
on a more heterogenous group of actors than was the case in Stage, I find this 
visualisation a helpful way to differentiate and show geographic and temporal 
progression. 
My investigation of Stage 2 begins with the Bellagio Conference on Survey 
Research in the Arab World, held in 1983 by international scholars and 
practitioners. It is at this moment of inflection where a marked change in the 
discourse of Arab opinion inquiry is discernable. It was here where Egyptian 
sociologist Saad Eddin Ibrahim mused on the agony and the ecstasy of doing 
social research in the Arab world, a field that was described as both frustratingly 
underdeveloped and wildly promising (1987). In Section 1, I highlight not the 
findings of the Bellagio conference per se, but rather the main epiphanies that, I 
argue, signal an altogether new way of thinking about the study of Arab public 
opinion. Section 2 overviews the rapid institutionalisation of Arab opinion 
research during the 1980s and 1990s, as part and parcel of the expansion of an 
American neoliberal agenda for international development. Here, Western 
epistemic actors and practices become embedded in urban centres, and a more 
collaborative field of international (foreign and local) actors began to take shape. 
During this time, we increasingly find that “the distinction between foreign and 
indigenous scholars is not always clear cut” (Tessler 1987a, 20). Finally, Section 3 
examines the resurgence of American interest in the Arab mind and the Arab 
streets between 2002 and 2009, a time when “Arab public opinion” made 
appearances in congressional hearings in Washington. I discuss the emergence of 
Arab opinion in transcripts and testimonies from these hearings as an illustration 
of how Arab opinion came to be politicised in the post-2001 environment.  
Above all, what I wish to highlight with this chapter is the shift from colonial and 
post-colonial modes of inquiry by way of epistemic interventions to a more 
embedded institutional framework that precipitated the rise of an industry for 
polling people in Arab countries. In Stage 2, we see foreign actors embedding 
themselves into the local setting, bringing with them some of the same methods 
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and epistemological assumptions as in Stage 1, but leaning on local actors—at 
times collaboratively, at times as a prop—to help illuminate (and frame ideas 
about) the “Arab other”. 
1 The Bellagio Conference of 1983: An Inflection 
Point in Arab Public Opinion Inquiry 
Jointly funded by the Ford and Rockefeller Foundations, an international 
conference on the “Evaluation and Application of Survey Research in the Arab 
World” was convened over six days in June 1983, hosted at the Rockefeller 
Bellagio Centre in Italy. An interdisciplinary group of two-dozen senior experts 
and academics were in attendance, a quarter of whom represented development 
institutes such as the Ford Foundation (Cairo), the Arab Development Institute 
(Tripoli), and the World Bank (Washington). The remainder were 
interdisciplinary scholars based in the US and Middle East (Egypt, Jordan, 
Lebanon, Tunisia, Palestine, Libya, and Sudan). The aim of the conference “was 
to assess the utility and limits of survey research as a tool for the study of Arab 
society”, to take stock of what the scientific community had achieved so far and 
the obstacles it continued to face in conducting (political) polls and surveys in the 
Arab region (Tessler 1987a, 11).  
The conference proceedings, published in 1987, shed considerable light on the 
state of the art of Arab public opinion research by the 1980s. Titled The Evaluation 
and Application of Survey Research in the Arab World (Tessler et al. 1987), the 
published volume was “addressed to a number of audiences, both Arab and 
Western” (Tessler 1987a, 19). It represents one of the earliest resources at our 
disposal that plainly shows a transnational knowledge network at work, focused 
on building a research agenda around the study of Arab public opinion. This 
research agenda touched on four key areas: (1) substantive opinion surveys 
underway at the time in countries like Sudan, Tunisia, Morocco, and Saudi 
Arabia, (2) methodological obstacles and ways to overcome them, (3) contextual 
issues (i.e., social, cultural, institutional, and political) that hindered the free 
expression of opinion and the implications for restrictions placed on political 
research in countries such as Egypt, and finally (4) normative and 
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epistemological concerns relating to the ethics and embedded assumptions of 
opinion research. The 1983 Bellagio conference, in other words, served as a sort of 
self-examination, prognosis, and diagnosis for a budding epistemic community 
engaged in navigating a politically and culturally dynamic landscape.  
Departing from the orientalist and modernising discourses that characterised 
earlier opinion inquiry in and on the Arab region (see Stage 1), the Bellagio 
conference set a new tone—one that signalled a more reflexive approach. As 
Tessler wrote, “it would be erroneous to assume that change is synonymous with 
Westernization. Attitudes and behaviour patterns derived from a people’s own 
traditions may be no less conducive to societal development than social codes 
imported from the West or elsewhere” (Tessler 1987a, 4). The plain realisation 
that scholars and practitioners originating from the West, armed with the latest 
empirical tools, with teams of enthusiastic field assistants, and with the powers of 
deductive reasoning, were still not adequately equipped without some contextual 
knowledge and a relinquishing of their a priori assumptions indicated that 
working collaboratively with locally-situated actors was a necessary next-step. In 
this way, there was no specific end-game in sight for the Bellagio attendants 
aside from cultivating this collaboration. As described by political scientist Mark 
Tessler, who was in attendance and co-edited the conference proceedings,  
The Bellagio conference did not attempt to fashion a precise blueprint 
associated with the conduct of survey research in the Arab world. 
Participants recognized that such a blueprint cannot be established by 
intellectual fiat and then imposed on a scholarly community. The growth 
and improvement of social research, they concluded, must be built from 
below (1987a, 14).  
This yielding to a more grassroots approach was altogether new for the study of 
global public opinion, and through the course of Bellagio, we sense an 
epistemological reckoning taking place in the reflections of its participants. For 
this reason, I consider the 1983 Bellagio conference a point of inflection, i.e., a 
turning point or a signal of directional change in the pursuit of Arab public 
opinion. 
We can reassemble the learnings and debates from Bellagio under three 
subheadings: political, epistemological, and methodological realisations. The first 
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two, as we will see below, share some overlap, while methodology combines 
both the techniques of polls and surveys and considerations about the cultural 
climate for social scientific research in the late 1970s and early 1980s. While the 
Bellagio conference was fairly comprehensive in scope, some points of discussion 
were notably missing. For one, there seems to have been little talk of the effects of 
foreign funding on opinion research. How did the legacy of endowments from 
American government agencies and philanthropic, democracy-building institutes 
like Rockefeller and Carnegie, for instance, come into play? Was it a determining 
factor in the types of questions asked or the nature of the research carried out? 
While we do see mentions of different funding bodies in the Bellagio 
proceedings, there is little exploration of the relationship between financing and 
knowledge production. At the very least, we can assume that granting agencies 
had thematic requirements and expectations in line with their political values. 
Their influence was likely felt most strongly at the start of a commissioned study 
(the approval and funding stage) and at the end (reviewing and promoting the 
final report), while the meat of the research process—survey design and testing, 
fielding and interviewing, data collection and statistical processing, and 
compilation of results—were left in the capable hands of the researcher. But we 
do not have clarity on the extent to which this was the case. 
Another point of discussion that is surprisingly absent concerns how researchers 
interacted with the hundreds if not thousands of peoples they interviewed. 
Across North Africa, the Middle East, and the Gulf countries, people, as research 
subjects, remain almost completely shielded from view, their everyday 
experiences sidelined in the process of becoming scientific objects. We learn very 
little about peoples’ involvement and effect on methodological breakthroughs. 
Instead, polls and surveys were understood to involve only three primary 
parties: sponsors, researchers and practitioners, and consumers, wherein 
sponsors and consumers constituted the post factum audience for public opinion 
data (Ibrahim 1987, 78).  
Finally, theory-building relating to the operationalisation of public opinion in 
non-Western and non-democratic settings was not addressed. To be fair, there 
had been little written at the time on macro-theorising about public opinion in 
non-democracies (especially until Zaller and Geddes’ 1989 study of public 
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support for authoritarian policies in Brazil was published). And although not an 
explicit goal of the conference, we can read the missing references to theory as a 
field of knowledge still very much in its infancy. As Lynch says, “for opinion 
surveys to be useful, analysts need a theory of the role of public opinion in 
political processes” (2006, 40). The perceived usefulness, then, of these early 
studies for theory-building remains an open question. 
Political Realisations 
On the whole, there was a consensus among the Bellagio participants that their 
epistemic community of scholars and practitioners had roots in the strained 
history of colonial knowledge production. Saad Eddin Ibrahim, for instance, 
draws a thread that begins with Pharaonic traditions of cadastral survey-taking 
(see the Wilbour Papyrus, c. 1150 B.C.), runs through the empire-building 
practices of social research during the Napoleonic expedition to Egypt (see 
Description de l’Égypte, 1809-1829), and through twentieth century colonial 
administrations responsible for the creation of the modern Middle East (1987, 27). 
But what differentiated contemporary opinion inquiry from its strained past was 
a new-found awareness or sense of agency on the part of the researcher. In 
Ibrahim’s view, those (mostly non-Arab) scholars, scientists, and experts who 
designed and carried out contentious early research ought not to be implicated in 
colonial legacies of oppression because their intention was purely scientific and 
not political—they would “not have been aware that what they were doing 
would later be helpful to the colonialists” (1987, 28). Contrast this with his view 
that from the interwar years onwards, opinion research had become an 
“intentional and deliberate” act. At once, then, “pre-modern” scientists are 
exonerated, while contemporary scientists are independent agents that can be 
held accountable for their ideas.  
There was also a consensus among Bellagio participants that historical practices 
of opinion inquiry had been problematically fixated on extraction, i.e., mining for 
information only to be remitted to foreign audiences. In general researchers had 
not been overly concerned with elevating the social well-being of people they 
investigated. Instead, they were part of a top-down and externally driven process 
whereby researchers trained in the West were in the habit of “directing their 
findings back to the Western social science community” without engaging local 
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audiences (B. Ibrahim 1987, 79). At the same time, “the extent and depth” of early 
opinion research was considered to be ineffective; as Harik remarked, “the total 
product is meager” (1987, 67). There was a sense that the push for scientific 
research initiated after the First World War had failed to produce a sophisticated 
body of knowledge, and further, that far too much intellectualising had taken 
place abroad to generate any clear understanding of how to conduct research 
within the region (Tessler 1987a, 8). 
At the same time, Arab political systems under development presented 
obstructions to the ideal of free, uninhibited political research about the political 
lives and proclivities of citizens, which posed a problem for the study of public 
opinion. Some felt that “only under conditions of political freedom can one 
inquire about how people feel and think about policy and public servants. Under 
such conditions, inquiry of all kinds flourishes” (Harik 1987, 66). But in the 
absence of democratic political systems, American-styled mass opinion research 
found shaky footing (particularly in the cases of Egypt and Tunisia). 
Additionally, people as interview subjects were found to be hesitant toward 
foreign researchers (even those of Arab origin). One participant explained this 
hesitation by arguing that Arabs and their political representatives lacked the 
interest or desire to engage in social science activities and “reap the benefits” of 
knowledge-producing activities (Harik 1987); a view that privileged the 
“enlightened West”. Another argued that a community’s “only contact with 
survey takers was likely to have been connected with tax collection, military 
conscriptions, or other forms of arbitrary intervention by a distant authority” (B. 
Ibrahim 1987, 86) and so the reluctance to engage with Western researchers was 
part of larger historical power asymmetries rather than a lack of appreciation or 
education. In any case, the Bellagio cohort found lack of trust to be a common 
issue and debated the ways in which trust could be deepened between 
researchers, participants, and host governments. 
Epistemological Realisations 
The epistemological problems that the Bellagio cohort confronted in 1983 struck a 
reflexive chord. For social scientists trained or accustomed to carrying out 
research elsewhere, there was a question as to whether methods could simply be 
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cut and pasted, and if not, in what ways they should be adapted. As Barbara 
Ibrahim wrote,  
In the Arab world, opinion surveys have been introduced into a vastly 
different political and cultural environment. For the most part local social 
scientists have not examined critically the assumptions of opinion 
research, either conceptually or in terms of practical application. The 
Bellagio conference afforded an opportunity to begin that critique (1987, 
94).  
This critique offered two perspectives. As Palmer wrote, “At the heart of the 
issue is the fundamental question, Is science applicable the world over, or is there 
one scientific method for the West and another for the East? Arab participants at 
the conference were sharply divided on the answers to these questions” (1987, 
111). The first perspective was that true, objective social science could be applied 
anywhere, at all times. This perspective rejected the idea that the tools and 
techniques of opinion research were products of Western cultures, 
incommensurate with non-Western value systems. One participant remarked 
that “instruments of science have no nationality and only confused minds would 
think otherwise” (Harik 1987, 70). Adding to this,  
The social sciences are based on the principles of consistency of deductive 
thinking and the truth of empirically derived information. Violation of the 
deductive or inductive methods cannot be justified in Timbuktu any more 
than in Paris. There is no geographic home for the laws that govern 
rational thinking and empirical inquiry (Harik 1987, 71).  
This sentiment displayed a strong commitment to the scientific method, which 
certainly was not new for the time. We might refer to this view as “scientism”, 
i.e., the belief that the methods of natural science are the best ones for all forms of 
inquiry (and any objects of inquiry which cannot be studied by these methods 
cannot be known) (Blackburn 2005). 
The second perspective tried to account for what it saw as normative disjunctures 
across cultures. As Tessler wrote, “the enterprise of science is inescapably 
embedded in a normative context” (1987c, 190). In this way, science is 
acknowledged as one among many methods by which truth could be sought; 
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tenacity, intuition, and authority (especially with relation to Islam) represented 
other methods. Consequently, a key question raised at Bellagio was: What exactly 
were surveys able and not able to reveal about Arab society to the scientific 
community? While the question was left open-ended, the fact that it was raised 
shows a weakening of absolutist attitudes toward social science research. 
Another issue raised was that of concept equivalence, i.e., whether the meaning 
of social constructs can be expressed in similar ways across cultures and 
geographic lines. As Palmer wrote, 
The issue of an Arab paradigm is much broader than that of the 
unperceived concept because it questions not only the ability of Western 
scholars to understand the Middle East well enough to include the right 
concepts in their research designs, but, more important, the ability of the 
Western scientific method to discover and chart human behaviour in the 
Middle East (Palmer 1987, 111). 
There were serious worries against the dangers of imposing Western concepts on 
Arab societies. Not only were theoretical ideas like democracy, development, 
modernity, and liberalism considered problematic from the standpoint of 
measurement and geocultural translation, but even presumably fixed or simple 
variables such as age, occupation, social status, and income were found to be 
incompatible in the cultures that researchers encountered. These seemingly 
simple stratifying variables like occupation and income represented cases of how 
“traditional patterns in the region have been overlaid with a veneer of 
Westernization resulting from colonialism, economic development, and other 
forces of social change” (Palmer 1987, 107). Data from these variables often made 
their way into theorising about class structure in Arab societies, and “if Western 
measures of social class are used (imposed) in Middle Eastern questionnaires, 
they run the very real risk of creating fictional classes that have no basis in 
reality. Such a procedure, then, results only in self-deception” (Palmer 1987, 108). 
Again, though the issue of concept equivalence was discussed, it remained (and 
still remains) far from resolved. 
A final epistemological issue concerned social scientific training in American and 
European institutions. The community at Bellagio recognised that while there 
was a plurality of ethnicities represented between them, they were each trained 
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in Western institutions. This of course meant that the epistemological groundings 
of Western social science would carry over to their practice, and what was 
missing was a semblance of what an indigenous approach to the study of Arab 
public opinion and social research might look like, as well as where that might be 
found.  
Methodological Realisations 
Finally, there were methodological realisations that came out of Bellagio, relating 
to the techniques and culture of survey research. On the technical side, there was 
a growing suspicion that surveys or polls were increasingly insufficient tools for 
gauging mass opinion on their own; they could capture snapshots of reality but 
should ideally be combined with other research procedures to be maximally 
useful (Tessler 1987a, 1). Methodological pluralism, or the idea that combining 
methodological approaches and theoretical models was a legitimate and 
beneficial approach, and was gaining ground as practitioners considered the 
relationship between method selection and cultural/geographic context. Some 
participants lamented that too much faith was being placed in arbitrarily or 
experimentally-designed questionnaires, otherwise described as tangible 
expressions of research problems used to infer causality (Zurayk 1987, 53). And 
participants considered whether less emphasis should be placed on 
questionnaires and more on the cultivation of a social bond between interviewer 
and interviewee. As Barbara Ibrahim opined, “social researchers should see 
themselves as entering into a dialogue with their subjects”, and not as impartial 
onlookers of the social world (1987, 85). 
The Bellagio proceedings also gave insight into the culture of research at the time, 
namely, the expectations, norms, values, and experiences held in common within 
the research community. For instance, participants spoke of the overabundance 
of social data that existed on Arab peoples. They recognised that knowledge 
production was a possible and productive engagement. Yet much of this data 
was virtually inaccessible because dissemination channels such as archives, 
repositories, and other institutional storehouses simply did not exist in the 
Middle East. It was lamented that “even the published work frequently has not 
found its way to everyone in the Arab world or to scholars everywhere” (S. 
Ibrahim 1987, 29). 
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At the NCSCR [National Center for Sociological and Criminological 
Research] in Egypt, for example, a researcher is overwhelmed by the 
impressive quantity of research that has been done over the last twenty-
five years. But the national center has not succeeded in disseminating the 
results of its studies to a wider audience, and thus researchers cannot take 
advantage of much of its work. The studies may be valuable, but we do 
not know much about any results or breakthroughs that may have come 
from the NCSCR’s research. (…) As a result, this great effort in survey 
research is hardly known in Egypt, to say nothing of the rest of the Arab 
world and beyond (S. Ibrahim 1987, 33).  
The problem of dissemination was therefore agreed to be an inhibiting factor for 
knowledge production. It was also greatly affected by practices of censorship by 
governments who sought to maintain control over the knowledge space. 
Another realisation was that the research climate was sensitive and could differ 
considerably from country to country. From this, it became apparent that the 
entire region could not be targeted with blanket approaches and methods. 
Climates of research were seen as either more or less open and friendly, and 
more or less engaged, depending on government support for opinion research 
and access to areas of conflict. At the time of Bellagio, it was easier for foreigners 
to conduct opinion research in Morocco and Sudan than in Egypt, where it had 
become increasingly tricky to access government statistical data and receive 
research permits. At this time, participants noted that only nine out of twenty 
states were allowing opinion research to be conducted freely, without 
government impediments. The relationship between authoritarianism and public 
opinion inquiry was being tested. “Authoritarianism”, as Harik wrote, 
“complicates the picture further in that the free flow of information is viewed as 
inimical to the political interests of national leaders. Thus even if research is 
permitted, its publication is by no means certain” (1987, 67). 
While much ground was covered at the 1983 Bellagio conference, the lasting 
impression is one of a budding epistemic community working toward a coherent 
research agenda. A sign of charting new epistemological territory, more 
questions were raised than were answered. Through the conference proceedings 
we are witnesses of a point of inflection where the tradition of foreign control 
over the field of Arab opinion inquiry was being abandoned in favour of a more 
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collaborative approach. There was an increasing understanding of the value of 
local knowledge and a desire to procure it. The final message from Bellagio was 
that foreign researchers should work in closer cooperation with locals who have 
some level of native access (Palmer 1987, 110). It is this rallying cry for 
collaboration across geographies, against the backdrop of an expanding 
neoliberal agenda for global knowledge, that initiated a new direction in Arab 
public opinion inquiry in which Western actors began to plant or embed 
themselves in the region, hastening the local institutionalisation of American-
styled public opinion inquiry. 
2 Times of Transformation: The Institutionalisation 
of Polling in the Arab World 
The years that followed the Bellagio conference saw fundamental shifts to the 
international system with the end of the Cold War and unravelling of the Soviet 
Union. Critical regional events like the Iran-Iraq war and its ceasefire in 1988 and 
the First Palestinian Intifada, together with the impact of the Gulf crisis in the 
early 1990s, ushered in a precarious era for the Arab region. These were unsettled 
years of “formidable tensions and contradictions” (Karawan 1994, 434) marked 
by popular disaffection with ruling elites, conflicting identities, the dominance of 
single-party systems, and a growing authoritarianism that reasserted state 
control and restricted civil liberties in a period where much of the rest of the 
world was riding a democratic wave. The 1990s introduced a dualism between 
stagnation on economic and political fronts and widespread technological 
advancements, and while the polarising effects of the processes of globalisation 
were not uniquely felt in the Arab region, they certainly helped to propel the 
coalescence of a “new Arab public sphere” (Eickelman and Anderson 2003; 
Lynch 2006; Ayish 2008).  
This space for public dialogue, by a great measure, shaped and has been shaped 
by contemporary opinion research practices. In this section, I outline the 
accelerated institutionalisation of public opinion research during the latter part of 
the twentieth century; revolutionary years in terms of advancements in consumer 
culture and media proliferation and penetration. Rather than highlighting any 
specific case study, I discuss some general trends and transformations during this 
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period that illustrate the rapid-fire rise of an Arab “industry” for opinion polling 
leading up to the dawn of twenty-first century. 
Prior to the advent of commercial polling in the region, we know that cross-
national opinion research was being forged by different American actors and 
institutions. Gallup was measuring human needs and satisfactions across 
countries as early as the 1960s, working collaboratively with groups like the 
Institute for Social Research, the National Council on Public Polls, Crossley 
Surveys, and Gallup affiliate offices or researchers stationed around the world 
(Gallup 1976). Western media pollsters continued to probe the Israel-Palestine 
issue in depth among different groups of respondents through the 1980s and 
1990s. Questions of territoriality and Palestinian claims to nationhood evolved 
into interrogations about the nature and legitimacy of the Palestine Liberation 
Organization (PLO) (Moughrabi 1986). Meanwhile from the 1970s, social impact 
studies were being widely funded by American and European development aid. 
USAID, for instance, was involved in studying the impact of aid in countries like 
Egypt, Sudan, Jordan, and Yemen, waging “free foreign reign in the research 
domain” (Harik 1987, 69). Through the 1980s and until it was subsumed into the 
Department of State in 1999, the United States Information Agency (USIA) was 
polling frequently (at times monthly) on issues related to the Israeli-Palestinian 
Peace Process, Israeli opinion on foreign policy, and the politics of the Middle 
East (Roper). Records exist of USIA polls conducted in Bahrain, Egypt, Jordan, 
Kuwait, Lebanon, Morocco, Oman, Syria, Turkey, the UAE, and Yemen, some in 
the interest of general political public opinion, others in search of the difference 
between Islamic and Western values, and yet others tracking post-factum opinion 
around “critical events” like the Gulf War. Changes in the field of global social 
research should thus be viewed against the background of an expanding 
neoliberal agenda that served to benefit from the extraction of information. 
These polling efforts are indicative of a rising empirical trend: the cross-cultural 
comparative survey. Instead of designing a survey for a single sub-group or 
political issue, cross-cultural surveys aimed to highlight differences and associate 
similarities between cultural groups. They engaged the efforts of investigators 
coordinating the same methods and assumptions across different countries, and 
emerged from the idea that at a high enough level of abstraction, people of one 
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culture or nationality formed a box (a culturally or geographically identifiable 
public) with a unique set of characteristics that could be analytically compared 
and contrasted with people of another culture or nationality. A Gallup outpost in 
Israel, for instance, was tasked “to draw a sample that would accurately reflect 
the attitudes of adults fifteen years of age or older” in the region demarcated as 
“North Africa and the Middle East”, in its entirety (Gallup 1976, 461). Countries 
within this region were viewed as similar enough to group together and 
compare, while the region as a whole was viewed as different enough to 
contrasted against other categorically-defined regions of the world. And further, 
geographic borders were superimposed on individual opinions, such that it 
became not only possible but encouraged to speak of competing national 
opinions (i.e., Egyptian public opinion, Iraqi public opinion, etc.). In many ways, 
this method was propelled by the ease of its design. The prevailing attitude that 
“social scientists are justified in replicating surveys across cultures, with 
modifications only at the level of translation of question items” encouraged a sort 
of one-size-fits-all approach to polling and survey design (B. Ibrahim 1987, 93). 
Use of the cross-cultural survey meant that the infrastructure for polling across 
countries, i.e., the procurement of “experienced fieldwork teams, market and 
social science research organisations, and survey analysts”, had to be secured 
(Norris 2009, 532). Just as this infrastructure helped to facilitate the coordination 
of cross-national surveys, the surveys themselves facilitated “cross-national 
networks among networks of collaborators” (Norris 2009, 532). In this setting, 
comparative research thrived.  
The coordination of these empirical efforts across countries was certainly aided 
by the rapid proliferation of regional social science institutes, elite universities, 
and research programmes replicating the “Anglo-Saxon model” in the Arab 
world (Waast 2010, 195). Of the small body of English-language scholarly 
resources relating to the practice of polling in the Arab region, very few seem to 
draw a connection between contemporary commercial actors and earlier (Cold 
War-era) social science institutions, and because of this oversight, contemporary 
polling in Arab countries is so often treated as a new phenomenon, when in fact 
it should be seen as a byproduct of the globalisation of social sciences in general 
(see for instance Lynch 2006; also Norris 2008). Arab social science institutes 
funded by local and Western donors with democracy-promoting neoliberal 
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agendas formed the original bedrock for a future commercial industry, and 
similarities can be drawn to the way the field played out in other non-Western 
markets. Philanthropic funding from the Carnegie, Ford, and Rockefeller 
Foundations enabled the expansion of “overseas” establishments that linked 
“Third-World elites to major institutions in the United States and the norms 
embodied in them” (Berman 1983, 26). The effect of this was that local 
informational “elites” were tasked with providing support for foreign (Western) 
actors in the form of technical resources and situated knowledge (Tessler et al. 
1987). Furthermore, as foreign practitioners increasingly undertook permanent 
working roles within institutions situated abroad, they were more seamlessly 
able to transmit their knowledge and training (of systematised face-to-face 
interviews using pre-designed questionnaires and post-hoc statistical analyses) to 
the local setting. Through this process of transmission, the methods and 
assumptions of social science research were absorbed by local actors. 
By the 1990s, Arab social science institutes were widely dispersed and had 
experience in conducting, facilitating, or sponsoring opinion research as part of 
their repertoire. Many of these institutions were initially based in universities, 
and later emerged as independent entities. According to Ibrahim, “Lebanon was 
one of the first countries where social research was conducted” in the region 
(1987, 28). The AUB, where Stuart Dodd was designing polls in 1940s with the 
idea of world surveying in mind, was described as a producer of “usable social 
science data” (S. Ibrahim 1987, 28); Saint Joseph University and the Center for 
Arab Unity Studies in Beirut were other known centres. In Tunisia, the Centre 
d’Études et de Recherches Économiques et Sociales (CERES) established in 1962 
was considered “one of the bulwarks of social research in the Arab world” by the 
1980s (S. Ibrahim 1987, 28). Iraq had the National Center for Criminological 
Research and Center for Arab Gulf Studies (University of Basrah), while Jordan’s 
Royal Scientific Society and Center for Studies and Information were involved in 
survey-based opinion research from the 1980s. Another Center for Gulf Studies 
was based at the American University of Kuwait, while in Libya, the Arab 
Development Institute (established in 1972) was for some time a major sponsor of 
regional research. The PLO maintained its own planning and research centres in 
Palestine, which carried out surveys “with varying degrees of conformity to the 
canons of social research” (S. Ibrahim 1987, 29). Meanwhile the Israel National 
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Election Study of pre-election polls took off in 1969. And Egypt was home to 
several institutes that had “carried out important and extensive research 
programs since the late 1950s” (S. Ibrahim 1987, 29). These included the Social 
Research Center at the American University in Cairo (AUC), established in 1953, 
the state-run National Center for Sociological and Criminological Research 
(NCSCR, established 1956-57), and the national statistics bureau otherwise 
known as the Central Agency for Public Mobilization and Statistics (CAPMAS), 
established in 1964. Another Cairo institute—the al-Ahram Center for Political 
and Strategic Studies—emerged shortly after, in 1968. Opinion research was also 
taking place in pan-Arab centres that formed specialised agencies within larger 
institutions like the League of Arab States (LAS), the International Labour 
Organization (ILO), UNESCO, the UNDP, and the World Bank. 
Much of the research that emerged from early institutions focused on attitudes 
toward “benign” social and administrative matters such as population and 
family planning, agriculture, class and society, women and family, social 
improvements as a result of aid programmes, and various other indicators. 
Political public opinion research was generally found to be a far more sensitive 
and difficult pursuit. But countering the impression that Arab social science 
institutes functioned entirely to service Western knowledge needs, Ibrahim’s 
analysis on the state of social-science research in the 1990s found that experts 
based in many of the above-mentioned institutions were also “heavily studying” 
regional debates like the Arab-Israeli conflict, the fallout from the Egypt-Israeli 
peace treaty and Camp David Accords, the role of the military in politics, 
electoral politics, and attitudes toward democratisation (2000, 112). Work was 
being done on new theoretical paradigms that could recover knowledge about 
the Arab plight in the context of international relations—as Ibrahim put it, a way 
of “re-discovering non-Western worlds” (2000, 112).  
One event that had an astounding effect on institutional development during this 
time and provided a purposeful boost for political public opinion research was 
the signing of the Oslo Accords in 1993 that resulted in mutual recognition 
between the State of Israel and the PLO. Ibrahim found that “some twenty 
research centers or research groups sprang up between 1993 and 1998 in the West 
Bank and Gaza” and that Oslo fuelled “a robust public opinion survey 
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movement” (2000, 113). The Center for Palestinian Research and Studies (CPRS) 
and the Jerusalem Media and Communications Center (JMCC) emerged at this 
time. Shortly after, the Jordanian Center for Strategic Studies (CSS) and the 
Lebanese Center for Policy Studies (LCPS) were established. Hawatmeh has 
argued that “the importation and adoption of public opinion surveys in Palestine 
can be viewed as part of the larger process of political and economic 
liberalisation” following the collapse of the Soviet Union and defeat of Iraq in the 
Gulf War (2001, 4). Within the context of the Oslo negotiations, “polls were seen 
as a tool that could support peace negotiations by linking diaspora negotiators 
more closely with Palestinian constituencies, inserting much needed public 
participation in the process” (Schwarze 2012, 142). Public opinion research was 
thus heralded as a mechanism through which the public could participate in the 
process of self-determination. 
While public opinion research was more widely carried out in this stage, the 
institutional channels to ensure its publication and dissemination were often 
missing.  
Results of many survey projects are frequently restricted to local 
distribution or supressed by nervous governments. Communications 
between countries and institutions is poor and survey researchers tend to 
operate in a vacuum. Data sharing does not exist, nor is there a coherent 
picture of what surveys have been conducted or where the data might be 
found (Palmer et al. 1982, 3). 
As such, records of opinion research conducted during the 1980s and 1990s are 
sporadic, and there is only scattered evidence that the studies we do have 
contributed to macro-theorising, discourse and policy-formation, or political 
growth in the region until after the turn of the century. There remains a 
prevailing attitude that Western institutions and academies were still “far ahead 
of the Arab world in theory construction and cumulation of evidence, so that 
researchers naturally seek to learn from the vast body of literature produced in 
the Western world”, whereas the history of “modern education in the social 
sciences” in the Arab region was still considered nascent (Harik 1987, 67). 
The proliferation of research institutions in the Arab world coincided with the 
expansion of media services that were “pan-Arab” in reach (Ayish 2008, 152), and 
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to a great extent helped to address the problem of dissemination. The emergence 
of an Arab public sphere, which has been defined as “the public arguments 
enacted by self-defined Arabs within widely accessible new media” (Lynch in 
Ayish 2008, 152), is evidenced in part by the growing number of media outlets. 
The transformation of the Arab media landscape has undoubtedly changed the 
relationship between people and politics and between media and policy. The 
1990s were revolutionary in terms of consumer culture, media diversification, 
and media access and penetration, which served as precursors to the digital age. 
During the latter half of the 1990s, “satellite television brought disparate local 
debates in the various Arab countries and the Arab diaspora together in a 
remarkably coherent, common, and ongoing public argument accessible to 
almost everyone. Even as (or perhaps because) Arab regimes struggled to 
maintain their control over local media, transnational media emerged as an 
alternative location of vibrant and open political debate” (Lynch 2003a). Arab 
press had been in circulation transnationally since the 1970s, but its popularity 
was overshadowed by the boom in satellite television, entertainment 
programming, and Arabic news that challenged state-owned broadcasting (for 
instance MBC and BBC Arabic, and later Al Jazeera), followed by the 
introduction of the Internet and its rise as a primary source of news and 
information. While it is beyond the scope of my research to analyse the 
relationship between pan-Arab media and public opinion research, one key point 
is that public opinion research increasingly found outlets for dissemination, and 
further that debates and ideas about “the public opinion” shaped and were 
shaped, to some extent, by transformations in the public sphere.   
Since 2000, the field of Arab opinion inquiry has taken on a “two-track” 
structure. While an undercurrent of regional institutions has developed at one 
level, American-led research and policy agents operating at the macro level have 
developed along a separate trajectory. Between the two levels, there has certainly 
been communication and coordination, and often the outsourcing of macro-level 
studies to local Arab researchers. But overall, the knowledge (data) that emerges 
from the macro (foreign) level has been prioritised in terms of global knowledge. 
The United States Information Agency (USIA), the United States Bureau of 
Intelligence and Research (INR), the International Republican Institute (IRI), the 
National Democratic Institute (NDI), the National Endowment for Democracy 
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(NED), and later the Arab American Institute (AAI), the Middle East Peace 
Initiative (MEPI), the Washington Institute for Near East Policy (WINEP), and the 
Centre for International Strategic Studies (CSIS) have grown to become some of 
the most prolific and recognisable actors involved in advancing not only 
American knowledge interests in the region, but also in the production and 
sponsorship of raw data from the MENA region.  
MEPI, for instance, a division Department of State’s Near Eastern Affairs Bureau, 
has funded Arab NGOs and research since its creation in 2002 by the Bush 
administration, representing a form of soft power public diplomacy with the goal 
of promoting democratic reform in the Middle East. MEPI has provided funds for 
local polling institutes, such as the Yemen Polling Centre, to conduct studies on 
their behalf. Once the results are published, they bear the name of the primary 
commissioner and often not the local parties carrying out fieldwork or data 
collection. The IRI, founded in 1983, has promoted democratic reform 
internationally and is funded by USAID. The IRI jointly carries out polls with 
local vendors on a consistent basis. The NED and NDI (both founded in 1983) 
operate in a similar fashion though the IRI is far more active in the Arab region. 
Meanwhile, the INR provides intelligence support to diplomats and senior 
policymakers and is the American government’s leading source for polls and 
surveys of foreign public opinion. Between 2004 (immediately after the fall of 
Saddam Hussein) and 2009, resources were being directed toward conducting 
polls in Iraq on security matters as well as “sustained research into the 
demographic and attitudinal profile of Muslim minorities” in Europe (Bureau of 
Intelligence and Research 2009). In 2009, the INR’s budget for polling was just 
under $60 million USD. 
One of the most prominent hybrid polling initiatives is the Arab Barometer, 
which was jointly established by practitioners at the University of Michigan, Ann 
Arbor and Princeton University (Mark Tessler, Amaney Jamal, and later Michael 
Hoffman). Part-academic, part-activist, the Arab Barometer works in close 
collaboration with participating Arab institutions from each country in which it 
polls (including the Palestinian Centre for Policy and Survey Research (PCPSR), 
Jordan’s Center for Strategic Studies (CSS), the Social and Economic Survey 
Research Institute (SESRI) in Qatar, and others). The Steering Committee of the 
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Arab Barometer is composed of a leading member of each of these institutes. It is 
therefore a collaborative endeavour. At the same time, it receives funding from 
bodies like MEPI and the International Development Research Centre (IDRC), 
and the American contingent has close working and training relationships with 
the US Department of State’s public opinion sector (INR/OPN).  
In more recent years, a small but steady stream of European actors have become 
involved in polling in the Arab region, i.e., GlobeScan and Opinion Research 
Business (ORB) International (both of whom conduct regional polls for the BBC), 
YouGov and Oxford Research International, and other actors like Ipsos (France), 
Voluntas Advisory (Denmark), the World Values Survey (Austria), and the Arab 
Reform Initiative, a joint French-Jordanian venture.  
Other Western commercial firms polling extracting data from the region since 
2000 include Greenberg Quinlan Rosner, D3 Systems, Pechter Polls, Princeton 
Survey Research Associates International, iPOS Polling, Caerus Associates, the 
Program on International Policy Attitudes (PIPA), Zogby/Arab American 
Institute (AAI), Gallup, and Pew. Pew is a non-profit venture (established in 
2004) based in Washington DC and funded through the Pew Charitable Trusts 
and the Evangelical Protestant Templeton Foundation. Pew ventured into the 
Arab region through an initial polling study on religious freedoms and a later 
initiative called the Global Attitudes Project, though they do not conduct regular 
polls in the region. Gallup began incorporating Arab countries into their World 
Poll in 2005. In an interview with a Gallup Senior Analyst, the question of what 
spurred Gallup to monitor Arab countries more closely led the analyst recount an 
anecdote from a closed-door policy session in Washington. In this session, a 
discussion on Arab public sentiments reportedly led Secretary of Defense Donald 
Rumsfeld to remark, “It’s not like you can do a poll in the Middle East”. Gallup 
executives present in the room supposedly took this as a challenge, and soon 
after had incorporated many countries from the region into their poll. Finally, the 
AAI was established in 1985 in Washington as a non-profit, nonpartisan 
“national leadership organisation” and lobby group that concerns itself primarily 
with the political interests of Arab Americans. The AAI is presided over by James 
Zogby, an influential pollster who rose to prominence after accurately predicting 
the 1996 and 2000 American federal elections (Warren 2008, 877). His brother, 
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James Zogby, sits on the board of AAI and counts himself as an equally 
influential pollster and president of Zogby International, which has conducted 
opinion polls in the Arab region since 2002. 
The exercise of mapping the emergence of Arab and non-Arab actors in the field 
of public opinion research might seem belabouring, but it is necessary, especially 
as there are no existing accounts or databases listing actors in the field. 
Understanding who is responsible for doing research becomes especially 
significant when we look to examples where polls and data come to be 
politicised. We arguably see this most starkly in the case American policy debates 
in the post 9/11 environment.   
3 9/11 and the Myth of the Arab Street 
The events of September 11, 2001 ushered in a period of increased tensions and 
renewed foreign policy engagement between the United States and the Middle 
East. Fears of terrorism and possibilities of retaliation created a frenzied search 
for answers in the polls. During the Bush administration’s time in office, Arab 
public opinion was unquestionably high up on the agenda for American foreign 
policy. Between 2002 and 2007, testimonies were heard before congressional 
bodies like the Committee on Foreign Affairs and Committee on Government 
Reform, which were called to help policymakers work through the main question 
that was on their minds; namely, why do they hate us? The first to ask this 
question was Bush himself in a presidential address to the country on September 
20, 2001, where he declared that al Qaeda and Islamic extremists “hate our 
freedoms” (Washington Post). The inability to make sense of acts of terrorism 
and a general ignorance about the region exposed a gap in knowledge that gave 
pollsters, who by now had means to poll in the region, the opportunity to 
demystify Arab opinion for American policy elites.  
It is in these testimonies where we see how the “Arab street” was used and 
misused to stand in for public opinion knowledge. The use of the term “Arab 
street” provokes imagery of a passionate and proud mass uniting in the face of 
tyrannical elites (Lynch 2003a). The term has also been used as a negative 
framing that evokes the image of a volatile, irrational, and potentially dangerous 
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stratum of society. The metaphorical framing of the streets has led to sweeping 
generalizations with very little clarity about who the Arab streets represent and 
what issues unite them. It has roots in the idea that the streets of cities represent 
the realm of common people and are a source of conflicting ideas like unruliness, 
unity, and political chaos, and organisation (Regier and Khalidi 2009). The “Arab 
street” as a turn of phrase surfaced in Western media during the 1980s but 
dominated the post-9/11 media discourse. Its widespread usage after 2001 as a 
placeholder for public opinion, “rather than ‘public sphere’ or ‘public’, imputes 
passivity or a propensity to easy manipulation and implies a lack of formal or 
informal leadership”, yet on some levels it also “indicates that policy makers at 
least acknowledge that even regional authoritarian and single-party states now 
have ‘publics’ to take into account” (Eickelman 2002, 40). 
Post-9/11 testimonies called on American pollsters, some of whom were new 
entrants to the market for polling in the Arab world. The same seven American 
pollsters gave multiple testimonies over a five-year period. They represented the 
American Arab Institute, Zogby International, the University of Maryland, the 
Washington Center for Near East Policy, the Wilson Center, the Program on 
International Policy Attitudes, and Pew. In total, we have evidence from five 
testimonies: 
2002 (Oct 8):  “Are We Listening to the Arab Street?” (J. Zogby, J. Zogby, S. 
Telhami, D. Brumberg). Hearing before the Subcommittee on 
National Security, Veteran Affairs and International Relations 
of the Committee on Government Reform. 
2005 (Nov 10): “How the United States is Perceived in the Arab and Muslim 
Worlds” (A. Kohut). Hearing before the Subcommittee on 
Oversight and Investigations of the U.S. House International 
Relations Committee.  
2007 (May 3): “Arab Opinion on American policies, Values and People” (J. 
Zogby, D. Pollock). Hearing before the Subcommittee on 
International Organizations, Human Rights, and Oversight 
and the Subcommittee on the Middle East and South Asia of 
the Committee on Foreign Affairs.  
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2007 (May 8): “Two Sides of the Same Coin: Jewish and Palestinian 
Refugees” (S. Telhami). Hearing before the Subcommittee on 
the Middle East and South Asia of the Committee on Foreign 
Affairs. 
2007 (May 17): “Declining Approval for American Foreign Policy in Muslim 
Countries: Does It Make It More Difficult to Fight Al-Qaeda?” 
(S. Kull). Hearing before the Subcommittee on International 
Organizations, Human Rights, and Oversight of the 
Committee on Foreign Affairs.  
The first testimony on record was held on October 8, 2002. John Zogby, James 
Zogby, Shibley Telhami, and Daniel Brumberg, were among the American 
pollsters invited to testify and submit evidence before the Committee on 
Government Reform (United States Committee on Government Reform 2002), 
submitting data from their own polls as evidence. The testimony was titled “Are 
we listening to the Arab Street?” and opened with the following statement from 
Republican Senator Christopher Shays: 
On September 11, many Americans got their first glimpse of the hostility 
and resentment harbored by some against our people and our culture. 
Others have known for decades that a toxic antipathy often dominates the 
so-called Arab Street of Middle East public disclosure. Left unrebutted, 
anti-American invective invites others to translate animus into deadly 
action. So the war against terrorism must also be fought with words. 
Public diplomacy, our efforts to understand and inform and influence 
foreign publics, plays an indispensable role in arming the soldiers of truth 
against the forces of fear and hatred (United States Committee on 
Government Reform 2002). 
Over thirty references to the term “Arab Street” are littered throughout the 
testimony transcript, and polling was seen as a means of accessing it (while 
public diplomacy was seen as a way to tame it). The Committee heard calls to 
reject the notion of the street; as James Zogby declared, “Arab opinion is 
dehumanized referred to as the Arab street, generalized, treated as an object 
usually of scorn and therefore dismissed”. Further, the question of why the Arab 
street was only conjured in relation to America was put forth. At the same time, 
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essentialising ideas about public opinion in the Arab region (“there is Arab 
public opinion just as there is American public opinion”) persisted. 
Following the 2003 American invasion of Iraq, appearances of Arab public 
opinion in testimonies became more policy-oriented; specifically, America’s 
public image or brand in the Middle East was a question put to pollsters. Andrew 
Kohut, Director of the Pew Global Attitudes Project, provided evidence from Pew 
surveys that anti-Americanism was a pervasive sentiment among samples of 
respondents in Lebanon, Jordan, and Morocco, to different degrees. Only 
selective information relating to the American image, terrorism, and prospects 
for democratic reform were presented (Kohut 2005).  
By 2007, opposition to American policies and leadership was described as 
“spreading and deepening around the world”, and the question “Do they hate us 
because of our freedoms?” was still being asked (United States Committee on 
Foreign Affairs 2007a). American pollsters aimed to diversify their questionnaires 
by asking respondents not whether they disliked America, but about their 
feelings toward American values of freedom and democracy, television 
programs, education, science, technology, culture, and finally American policy 
(United States Committee on Foreign Affairs 2007a). The attempt to balance 
positive perceptions of American popular culture with negative assessments of 
American policy in the polls reveals an institutionalised sense of insecurity. As 
Zogby explained, “We also examined how Arabs learned about us, the degree to 
which their views were shaped by experience or received knowledge, and 
whether or not this made a difference in their attitudes. We found, for example, 
that Arabs who know Americans, have visited America or even just report 
watching American television programs are more inclined to like our people, 
culture, products and values” (United States Committee on Foreign Affairs 
2007a). Further, measuring attitudes relating to the inevitability of conflict 
“between Muslim and Western cultures” invoked a West vs. the Rest or Us vs. 
The mentality that policy-makers were particularly keen on enacting (United 
States Committee on Foreign Affairs 2007a). While pollsters like Zogby, Telhami, 
and David Pollock made efforts to provide country-by-country assessments so as 
not to give the impression that Arab public opinion was a monolithic object that 
could be polled uniformly, we often hear a disjuncture in the testimonies 
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between experts and policy people, the latter of whom would backtrack and 
return to fixations with an overly simplified clash of civilizations mentality. 
Later testimonies in 2007 focused on specific foreign policy areas relating to 
Jewish and Palestinian refugees and America’s role the Israeli-Palestinian crisis, 
as well as support for al-Qaeda the Middle East. The testimony relating to Jewish 
and Palestinian refugees and statehood is a telling one (United States Committee 
on Foreign Affairs 2007b). It reads as a tense exchange between support for Israel 
by Committee members and pleas for considering the Palestinian position by 
Arab pollsters. Republican Senator (and current Vice President) Mike Pence 
disputed evidence from Palestinian statistics, arguing that the plight of Jewish 
refugees is far worse. In his words, 
I would argue that the historical record is clear on at least one matter: 
Jewish refugees in Arab countries often face pogroms, execution, 
bombings, tortures, forced exile and nearly universally confiscation of 
property, often solely for the alleged crime of Zionism if not merely 
existing. There is really no comparison with that to what the Palestinian 
refugees have faced (United States Committee on Foreign Affairs 2007b). 
While much of “world opinion” had something to say about the Palestinian 
plight, the comparatively scant attention paid to the experiences of Jews in the 
Arab region became a topic of debate. Telhami’s testimony, replete with 
evidence, facts, and figures encouraging policymakers to take into consideration 
the unique factor of Palestinian statelessness, was treated as overly-partisan, and 
no middle ground was reached. 
Meanwhile, a testimony on Arab attitudes toward al-Qaeda reads as an 
unwillingness to accept non-American views (United States Committee on 
Foreign Affairs 2007c). There is an overall sense of exasperation and surprise as 
to why respondents in Egypt, Pakistan, and elsewhere would not denounce al-
Qaeda for perpetrating acts of terrorism to the extent that Americans did. Often, 
the absence of a firm “no” to the question of support for al-Qaeda was confused 
with support among Arab respondents for terrorism. Pollster Steven Kull 
explained that majority Arab attitudes that were unsupportive of the American 
position partially had to do with the fact that people “avoid paying attention to 
facts that are inconvenient” (United States Committee on Foreign Affairs 2007c). 
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In the reflections of congresspeople, there are realisations that perhaps American 
and Arab peoples are “talking past each other” (United States Committee on 
Foreign Affairs 2007c). Still, the American position was content to remain 
entrenched, hoping to win over Arab public opinion in the polls through 
diplomacy efforts and other means, in order to bridge this divide and quell their 
deep insecurities and unease. 
While a much deeper reading of these testimonies and the context from which 
they emerged would be beneficial, it is clear that there is a mode of thinking 
about Arab public opinion at work. What is unclear is the extent to which these 
testimonies shaped policies in the region or altered the agendas of pollsters, as 
many other testimonies and informational exchanges were taking place on a far 
greater scale at the time. Public opinion was only one piece of the puzzle. In sum, 
the repeated appearance of Arab public opinion in Bush-era policy discussions 
exemplifies how polls were used to serve foreign interests during this brief 
spell—a time of deep insecurities about America’s image in the world and when 
understanding the inner workings of the Arab mind was a clear desideratum. 
This selective engagement with American pollsters (which overlooked experts 
and pollsters from the region itself) widened the gap between foreign-led inquiry 
and local inquiry on Arab public opinion. In his 2002 testimony, James Zogby’s 
description of what Arab public opinion inquiry means to him summarises the 
treatment of “the Arab subject” through the foreigner’s lens:  
The effect is not unlike looking at a carpet through a magnifying glass. 
When viewed by the naked eye, the carpet reveals its pattern. By enlarging 
the image, however, what becomes clear are the individual knots and the 
inner workings of the weave that produces the overall pattern (United 
States Committee on Government Reform 2002). 
4 Conclusion 
While Stage 2 covers a period of global change and is not unified by clear set of 
cases illustrating a specific mode of inquiry at work as in Stage 1, I aimed instead 
to show the rapid transformation of the field of Arab public opinion inquiry from 
being scarcely populated in the 1970s to appearing centre-stage in high-level 
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American policy debates by 2007. The institutionalisation and embedding of 
foreign pollsters and processes into the region grew at a steady pace. In the 
background, the Arab region experienced media and technological 
transformations which strengthened or at least provided venues for civic debates, 
dissemination of data, and expressions of public opinion. These developments 
also came at a time when the dominant epistemic paradigm guiding the science 
of public opinion was shifting from cognitive and behavioural thought to media 
and communications theory, and while the agendas of development and 
democratisation were being promoted through neoliberal American institutions 
around the world.  
Aside from political and market transformations, a series of epistemological and 
methodological shifts help to distinguish Stage 2 from Stage 1. The 1983 Bellagio 
Conference showcases a budding epistemic community at work; a group of 
international practitioners and scholars in the midst of forming a “socially 
cooperative enterprise” whose goal it was to “produce and possess their 
knowledge together” (Ezrahi 2004, 256). For the first time, we see a growing 
number of Arab social science research centers, commercial actors, government 
research agencies, military institutions, and international donor organisations 
involved in promoting development and democracy in the region (B. Ibrahim 
1987, 78). With this, there is a shift that comes from Western and Arab researchers 
calling for the creation or reclamation of an indigenous social science, though 
“little progress toward the construction of new analytical frameworks and 
methodologies” was seen to be made (Tessler 1987a, 10). 
Stage 2 culminated in a “golden age” for American actors with a vested interest 
in Arab public opinion research, especially in the years following the invasion of 
Iraq in 2003. Geopolitical interests gave way to an insatiable hunger for data from 
policymakers, and American pollsters were repeatedly called upon to explain 
Arab political opinion and behaviour using scientific data. Despite calls for 
greater indigenous opinion knowledge years earlier at Bellagio, the prioritisation 
of American knowledge in the end amounts to two forms of control: the first is 
epistemic, while the second is political. In some ways, pollsters did help to 
reverse or renegotiate the idea of the Arab street by framing public opinion as 
something scientific and conclusive rather than anecdotal. And yet it’s clear that 
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despite the shifts and transformations that took place during this period, the 
“epistemic line” (Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2018) dividing not only the pollsters from the 
polled but also privileging Western knowledge and disqualifying non-Western 
knowledge remains in full view. 
  
Chapter 7  
Stage 3 | The Local Reclamation of Public Opinion Inquiry 
 
Everything has to be published; everyone has to have access […]. Like graffiti, polling is a 
channel for protest. 
Nader Said (in Schwarze, 2012)  
 
In coming to terms with the most recent stage in the development of Arab public 
opinion inquiry, this chapter considers the reclamation of practices at the local 
level by indigenous actors. Drawing on interview data in which pollsters 
reflected on contemporary issues in the field, I provide evidence of their agency 
as actors, acquired through processes of localisation. I argue that it is in this third 
stage where we most clearly see the workings of a self-sustaining and self-
serving industry, by way of a regional knowledge network of inwardly-attuned 
actors. While, as we have seen, public opinion studies on local societies by 
indigenous actors has existed as an undercurrent for decades, the cumulative 
effect of generative research practices (i.e., those that are learned and adopted 
from previously existing or imported practices), seen by way of the sheer 
intensification of polling studies and actors since the 1990s and their increasing 
ability to mold their own research agendas, has helped to shift agency and power 
from the foreign to the local.  
In this chapter, I explore some of the ways in which practices of doing research 
have become increasingly localised and how community needs and governance 
structures have helped to set research agendas on their own unique course, 
separate from the likes of Gallup, Pew, and other large Western players: 
questionnaires are adapted from the status quo to tackle local political dynamics 
and competitive markets, the means of obtaining statistical data rests on a 
nuanced understanding of administrative and political issues, the process of 
interviewing respondents and collecting data evolves alongside a fortified 
understanding of the unique specificities of the field, the tools of research (i.e., 
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randomisation systems, data collection devices, call centres, databases, and 
questionnaires) diversify as actors take on a more intuitive approach to methods-
selection, and network-formation and collaboration between local pollsters, the 
media, experts, and publics deepen. The expectation that local actors lacked 
agency in relation to foreign pollsters given the trajectory of social science 
research in Stage 1 and Stage 2 is upended, to some extent, in Stage 3. In 
particular, the Arab uprisings, which began in 2010, changed the environment for 
social science research in different ways. For instance, there is a greater 
engagement with questions of conflict, identity, demographics, and media in 
relation to public opinion—questions that researchers of the region who 
witnessed the events of 2010 and 2011 are better positioned to answer. Further, 
the uprisings led to an opening of the space for research, and we see a number of 
new entrants to the field over the past eight years. 
Following on the visual demarcations of the previous stages, the figure below 
maps the third stage of inquiry in the upper right quadrant. This positioning 
certainly does not account for all the actors polling in the region in recent years, 
but the focus is on recent trends toward more localised practices of knowledge 
production. 
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Figure 15: Stage 3 in the development of Arab public opinion inquiry. 
 
This chapter proceeds as follows: in the following section (Section 1), I discuss the 
nature of change ushered in by the Arab uprisings, in order to show how this 
political reckoning had implications for local knowledge production. Then, in 
Section 2, I provide a descriptive mapping of the rise of certain actors, so that in 
this third stage, we can visualise the growth of the field over time. In Section 3, I 
present the main findings of the interview research and use interview vignettes 
to illustrate localisation at work. Focusing specifically on the cases of Jordan, 
Lebanon, and Palestine, where we see some of the highest concentrations of 
public opinion actors today, I introduce the reader to different characters, 
describing their individual perspectives on methodology, practice, and their 
unique ethics of research. 
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1 The Arab Uprisings and the Changing Space of 
Empirical Research 
The sudden succession of high-profile events in late 2010 that sparked a populist 
uprising in Tunisia, and which precipitated anti-government protests and 
political upheaval in nearly every Arab state in the Middle East through 2011, are 
by now well-documented: the self-immolation of Tunisian Mohamed Bouazizi, a 
street vendor by trade, in response to corruption and sustained abuse at the 
hands of local authorities; ensuing clashes between civilians and police in Sidi 
Bouzid in Tunisia; prolonged campaigns of civil resistance and street 
demonstrations amounting to a national revolution and the ousting of Tunisian 
president Zine El Abidine Ben Ali; the January 25, 2011 demonstration in Cairo’s 
Tahrir Square, since commemorated as “Revolution Day”, where grievances 
about corruption, police brutality, lack of political freedom, inflation, and 
impatience with political rule spilled over borders; the widespread adoption of 
video blogging and social media to mobilise civilians and protesters; and the 
overthrow of Egyptian president Hosni Mubarak in February 2011. These early 
seismic movements precipitated the toppling of governments, civil war, protests, 
political change, and militant action across the Arab region, exposing a “pan-
Arab crisis of unemployment, low wages and the stifling of civil society” (Yassin-
Kassab 2011). Taking stock in 2012, the Arab uprisings had in some form 
politically and socially marked not only Tunisia and Egypt (revolution and 
government overthrown), but also Libya, Syria, and Yemen (armed rebellion or 
civil war), Bahrain, Jordan, Kuwait, Morocco, and Oman (protests and 
governmental changes), Algeria, Iraq, and Lebanon (major protests), and 
Djibouti, Mauritania, Palestine, Saudi Arabia, Somalia, and Sudan (minor 
protests) (Ibrahim 2018).39 Collective action across Arab states sought to challenge 
“the political status quo and the existing political and cultural systems in the 
region”, and within the first two years, four authoritarian leaders had been 
deposed (Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, and Yemen) (Inbar 2013, 1). The flow of events is 
by now familiar to scholars and political commentators working on the region, 
 
39
 No protests noted in Qatar, Comoros, or the UAE (Ibrahim 2018). 
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and of course the people who endured them, but the broader significance, 
explanations for, and prolonged consequences of these critical events are still 
being processed.  
A companion to the Arab uprisings is a new body of qualitative and quantitative 
scholarship seeking to account for these events that took the world by surprise 
(see Gause 2011; Farzanegan 2017; Gordon 2018). Within this body of literature, 
different narratives emerge (for instance, see Hoffman and Jamal 2013 on 
religious narratives about protesters; Valbjørn 2015 on framing Arab politics; 
Seeberg and Shteiwi 2014 on changing European narratives; and Abushouk 2016, 
Howard and Hussein 2013, and Diamond 2011 on democracy’s fourth wave). 
Diverse theoretical lenses have been applied, e.g. security and foreign policy 
theory (Mason 2014; Monier 2015; Almezaini and Rickli 2017), social movement 
theory (Leenders 2013; Meijer 2016), media and communications theory 
(Eltantawy and Wiest 2011; Aday et al. 2012; Smidi and Shahin 2017), 
postcolonial studies (Jabri 2012; Dabashi 2012), democratisation theory (Stepan 
and Linz 2013), human rights approaches (Harrelson-Stephens and Callaway 
2014; Alvi 2015), game theory applications and behavioural analysis (Gilli 2012; 
Zibin 2018), legal theory (Chertoff and Green 2012), and gendered perspectives 
(Khalil 2015; Khalid 2015). As Kohstall writes, the uprisings represented “a 
process of ‘mise a nu’ (public self-assessment). It allowed for unprecedented 
inquiry into different actors and institutional arrangements” (2017). Otherwise 
mainstream theoretical assumptions and approaches were challenged, and the 
field naturally diversified. New research opportunities were created, and 
different methodological instruments and approaches were conceived (for 
instance, social media analysis applied to non-democracies and transitional 
states). Kohstall suggests that the Arab uprisings have “contributed to a more 
comparatively informed study of Middle East politics” from within and without, 
which recognise the very distinct contexts and localised consequences of political 
change—from new forms of demonstration in Egypt and Bahrain, to foreign 
intervention in Libya and Yemen, to constitutional change in Tunisia—as 
compared to prior to 2010 (2017).  
One common thread that emerges from much of this new literature is the sense 
that traditional or mainstream ideas about (Arab) publics, the nature of the public 
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sphere in Arab countries, and the potential for collective political action in 
authoritarian settings, must be reconsidered and reconfigured. Scholars across 
disciplines, but particularly in Political Science, IR, and its subfields, were 
unprepared for the mobilising force of different strata of society. Indeed, this 
fundamental break from traditionally held ideas publics and collective opinion 
formation in non-democratic contexts spurred a renewed interest in public 
opinion in the region as a possible explanatory premise for the uprisings 
themselves. In this way, to understand local public opinion would help to explain 
and predict events unfolding in the region. Even public opinion polls and 
international monitors tracking sociopolitical conditions (economic indicators, 
purchasing power, level of trust in institutions, political affiliations, religious 
attitudes and community orientations, etc.) failed to predict or flag signs of 
growing discontent or deterioration in social welfare (Gordon 2018; World Bank 
2015). In an interview at Gallup (Washington), one Research Director remarked 
that a post-Arab Spring analysis of the Gallup World Poll showed a growing 
discontent among respondents of questions relating to lifestyle and life 
evaluation leading up to 2010. While Gallup claims to have seen the signs, they 
did not actually notice or perceive this change until after the eruption of mass 
protests (as an aside, this is an example of a common problem with the 
overabundance of data—large amounts of data are collected and peoples’ 
opinions are recorded, but analysis and interpretation happens on a selective 
basis, and much data is overlooked). 
Rather than spurring a distrust in the method of polling due to heightened 
political obstacles, there are some accounts that the events of 2010 and 2011 
created more space for research in the years immediately following. Many 
pollsters I spoke with sensed a moment of greater openness wherein polling 
faced fewer economic, bureaucratic, and political restrictions. A USAID Middle 
East Bureau Deputy Director discussed how a renewed interest in Arab public 
opinion post-uprisings spurred discussions amongst practitioners and 
policymakers, helping to boost funding and thus bringing the costs of polling 
down. One Jordanian pollster asserted that the Arab Spring made the region 
“more exposed” to research practices, while another talked about the increased 
willingness of people to speak “freely and without fear” to researchers once 
political transformations were in motion. And a Gallup Senior Analyst described 
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the period between 2010 and 2013 as “a window of opportunity for polling”, 
wherein polling grew easier in countries with transitional governments because 
the usual regulations against conducting politically sensitive research “were put 
on hold”. 
The post-2011 setting has also been described as “messy” and difficult to 
navigate, particularly for foreign researchers. The work of development 
institutions like USAID was complicated because of a loss of control over the 
research process and an inability to impose consistency in the field. A journalist 
and Senior Advisor at the Jordan Media Institute discussed the negative effects 
for the media, who were subjected to great censorship and reluctant to report on 
certain issues. Mark Tessler, who heads the Arab Barometer, said that to call it an 
“opening up of the research space” is “an overly dramatic description” because 
we cannot generalise patterns relating to the research climate for the region as a 
whole. And Shibley Telhami, based at the University of Maryland, spoke of the 
opposite phenomenon: a closing of the public sphere after 2012 in Syria, Egypt, 
and Lebanon, which caused setbacks for researchers looking to gain access to 
“on-the-ground” opinion in the aftermath of the uprisings.  
Perspectives from inside the region hint at other transformative effects on social 
scientific research beyond changes to the space for research. Transformations in 
the social sciences in the wake of the uprisings have been discussed by Ibrahim 
2018, Almansour (2016), Bamyeh (2015), Kamel and Huber (2015), Lynch (2014), 
and Haddad (2013). Many of these perspectives describe an increase in 
knowledge production and a greater number of outlets for publishing and 
disseminating ideas. Ibrahim (2018), for instance, examines the effect of the 
uprisings on scientific productivity and research performance in Arab countries, 
finding that productivity and collaboration among local researchers increased on 
average in the five years following the events than the years preceding 2011, even 
in countries that experienced revolution, government changes, and armed 
rebellion. With this has come a noted rise in censorship practices by state and 
military authorities (Bamyeh 2015) and increasing threats to academic freedoms 
(Grimm 2018; Yahia and Butler 2015). In the case of Egypt, political research has 
become a precarious and sometimes unsafe endeavour (especially considering 
the planned closure of the Egyptian Ipsos office, warnings from the regime 
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against taking part in surveys by foreign organisations, the heavy restrictions to 
NGO work since 2017, and imprisonment of commentators like Hesham Gaafar).  
While it may be tempting to generalise about the state of research in the 
aftermath of the Arab uprisings, the insights above point more toward a research 
sphere in a state of transformative flux, which for now evades meaningful 
abstraction.  
2 Mapping Arab Opinion Inquiry 
In different parts of the thesis, I have described the ascent of global polling 
through the proliferation of global polling actors. In this section, I will focus on 
actors who have worked or work today in the specific area of Arab public 
opinion inquiry “from within”. Stage 1 and Stage 2 are characterised by foreign 
actors leading the pursuit of Arab opinion, while local, indigenous actors emerge 
out of necessity to satisfy an outside demand for knowledge. In the third stage it 
becomes clear that local actors prioritise their own research agendas, while 
foreign commissions are treated as secondary. The space for foreign epistemic 
intervention has tightened and researchers are more interested in what data can 
tell us or how it can shape political processes in Arab countries. The foreign 
monopoly over “Arab public opinion” is gradually being displaced. 
The figure below traces this ascent, charting the emergence of foreign (blue) and 
local (orange) actors according to the year in which they were established (or the 
year in which polling on Arab publics began, where available). While some actors 
included in this construction are no longer in operation, there are others who 
may not be included here—as I have mentioned elsewhere, there is simply not 
enough transparent information and no central repository to draw from that 
could help create an exhaustive list of all relevant actors. However, charting 
cumulative growth of at least the most prominent polling actors gives us a sense 
of how the field is developing. 
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Figure 16: Cumulative growth of foreign and local actors, superimposed (1940-present). 
As we can see in Figure 16, there have been active pollsters in the region as far 
back as the 1940s, but in low numbers. I have demarcated each of the three stages 
on this timeline; however, recall from Figure 4 (Chapter 2) that the stages of 
inquiry from foreign-led, to foreign-embedded locally, to localisation, do not 
have specific temporal bounds and actors from earlier stages persist. Once again, 
as it is impossible to assume that this set of actors is complete and all relevant 
polling organisations accounted for, the focus should be on the rate of expansion 
rather than the absolute total numbers. 
Seen another way, Figure 17 and Figure 18 assess the same data geographically, 
filtered at the local level. We see the highest concentration of actors in Jordan, 
Lebanon, Palestine, and Egypt. With the exception of Egypt, where fieldwork 
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was not conducted, I explore the cases of Jordan, Lebanon, and Palestine in the 
subsequent section.  
 
Figure 17: Local actors by country. 
 
In the map below, we see the concentration of actors from few (light coloured) to 
a higher concentration (deeper colour). This can be taken as a proxy for the value 
and productivity of the public opinion industry in each country.  
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Figure 18: Local actors by country (map view). 
 
3 Local Politics Breeds Local Practices: Vignettes 
from the Middle East 
The theoretical and analytical thread that progresses through the thesis to the 
third stage supports the idea that Arab public opinion inquiry and the 
production of public opinion knowledge on Arab peoples have always been 
political. In this same vein, the local reclamation of inquiry by indigenous actors 
is a political act. Without perfect knowledge and complete access, I am only able 
to shine a light on select cases and aspects of the full knowledge production 
machinery. I hope that the illuminations presented for the cases of Jordan, 
Lebanon, and Palestine below help to convincingly support my central argument: 
that public opinion inquiry pertaining to the Arab region and its peoples can be 
seen to unfold in three successive stages, and the data produced should not be 
divorced from the context in which it emerges. With that in mind, I have collated 
interview data from some of the leading pollsters in the Middle East, paying 
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attention to their insights, innovations, and inspiration for their work. As 
compared to interviewing American pollsters working on Arab public opinion, 
pollsters in the three countries below were far more expressive and willing to 
engage in drawn-out conversations about their careers and approaches. There 
was less emphasis on due process, protocol, objectivity, and best practices, and 
many more instances of adaptive methodologies and supplementing polling with 
qualitative methods. Further, there was an added normative dimension for each 
pollster, which suggested that they operate according to their own “ethics of 
research” or a personal politics of research. The impersonal nature of scientific 
authority is softened in the local setting. Instead, pollsters relied on personal 
experiences, their education and training, memories, and relationships with other 
actors in the field to describe the nature of their work.  
The interview vignettes for each of the three country cases are aimed at showing 
the localisation (of practices) at work. Recalling Figure 4 from Chapter 2, I am 
narrowing down the analysis to the third stage, as illustrated in the figure below:  
 
Figure 19: The branching of modes of inquiry, highlighting the third stage. 
The interview insights represent some of the main findings from the empirical 
research conducted for this thesis. Through the interview process, it seemed that 
localisation was a naturally occurring phenomenon of increasing engagement in 
the field. Polling actors adapt to their locales and are well positioned 
(geographically, culturally, and epistemologically) to address the concerns in 
their immediate surroundings. The findings suggest that the field of Arab public 
opinion inquiry has grown to privilege local concerns, local practices, and local 
participation as researchers and researched (Smith 1999, 107). 
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One key finding that unites all of the interviews conducted in the Middle East, 
the Gulf, and with supplementary evidence from some American pollsters is that 
the most prominent Arab pollsters today form a special network. More than 
simply colleagues operating in the same field and sharing in the same expertise, a 
group of ten pollsters—an “old boys’ club”—trained together and trained each 
other in the same research centre; the Centre for Strategic Studies (CSS) at the 
University of Jordan, Amman. The CSS has served as a central hub for survey 
research training in the region and as we will see below, it served as a first point 
of contact for local Arab public opinion research. The members of this “old boys’ 
club” are intimately familiar with each other’s work. Over nearly three decades, 
their career trajectories have diverged (each of them runs their own operations 
independent of each other). Today, they are based in Amman, the West Bank, 
Beirut, Cairo, and Doha, and pursue their own niche interests in these different 
markets. Interestingly, it appears that they might not always agree with each 
other from a political and methodological perspective. Nonetheless, they engage 
in work-sharing and will call on each other for additional expertise. As one 
renowned Lebanese pollster powerfully put it, “We are the pioneers of the field”. 
Nowhere in the small body of literature on public opinion research in the Arab 
world is there any indication of a network of pollsters. A more detailed 
understanding of the implications of this special network of actors and the extent 
to which members see themselves operating as part of it would require its own 
additional project. But the finding itself is entirely novel and breaks new ground 
in the study of global public opinion and public opinion research.   
3.1 The Case of Jordan 
Through the process of searching for public opinion actors in Jordan, I identified 
eleven epistemic entities that emerged between 1962 and 2016. A selection of 
private firms, social science institutes, government bodies, and academic 
consortiums, it is clear from the large corpus of polls conducted in Jordan that the 
country has long been a bustling site for political research. The process of polling 
today, however, is belaboured, especially for actors who do not already have a 
trusting relationship with the state. For Jordanian or international actors wishing 
to conduct a large-scale opinion study, government permission must be granted. 
Information about the objectives of the study, the names of each of the field 
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interviewers, and the full questionnaire must be verified by the Department of 
Statistics, who reserve the right to reject the proposal or modify questions and 
question-wording. If approved, the proposal must then go through the Ministry 
of Interior and up to the General Intelligence Directorate, where it is subject to 
further checks. If approved at the level of state intelligence, notification is sent 
back down to the Ministry of Interior and finally the Department of Statistics, 
who will issue a notice of approval. It is not surprising then that the actors I 
interviewed in Amman had strong working relationships with the state, either 
through their institutions or because they themselves had worked in or with the 
Department of Statistics, which allowed them to bypass this political and 
bureaucratic architecture. This process certainly creates obstacles for research on 
politically sensitive areas, however it does not preclude polling on political 
opinion altogether. And while the issue of authoritarian control over free 
expression comes into play here, the pollsters I interviewed claim to experience 
an open field in which they have the ability to probe at “deeper levels”. They are 
therefore members of a small class of informational elites who have local access 
and are nonetheless passionate about methodology and thorough in their 
research process.  
Below, I expand on three leading Jordanian polling actors, each of whom trained 
in the United States or United Kingdom and have backgrounds in Political 
Sociology, Statistics, or Psychology. While each interview took its unique course, 
there were two points that were mentioned unanimously. The first was to do 
with the complex and sophisticated science of sampling in Jordan. Using maps 
and printouts of tables, each of them showed how Jordan is divvied up into 
hundreds of sampling clusters, i.e., geographically demarcated population 
blocks. Devised by the Department of Statistics, this regularly updated sampling 
map of Jordan is a tool that all pollsters have on hand. The randomised selection 
of respondents within these clusters is based on quotas and calculations that 
allow for a sample of one thousand people to mirror population demographics 
for the country. The second point made had to do with the nature of respondents 
themselves; namely, over time, people have become more at ease when being 
interviewed for political and government polls. This has been attributed to a 
general process of socialisation where “people in Jordan are accustomed to being 
polled”, as well as the post-Arab Spring environment in which “everyone now 
 POLLING AND THE PURSUIT OF ARAB PUBLIC OPINION 232 
 
answers freely and without fear”. While there are no existing studies examining 
the effects of the Arab uprisings on polling, the pollster’s perceptions are the 
closest measure we have.   
Actor 1: The State-Backed Research Hub 
The Centre for Strategic Studies (CSS) at the University of Jordan, Amman was 
established in 1984 by King Hussein as an academic research centre for the study 
of regional conflict, international relations, security, media, and policy. In its 
early years, research at the CSS was mainly concerned with regional issues, in 
particular Arab-Israeli relations, politics of the USSR, and regional conflicts. From 
1989, the centre expanded its activities and began to focus more on internal issues 
such as Palestinian refugees living in Jordan and parliamentary affairs. Within 
the CSS is a department of polling and survey research, which conducted their 
first national poll in 1993 on the subject of democracy and governance in Jordan, 
and since then has been a prolific producer of public opinion information on 
most countries in the region. The CSS serves as a regional institutional hub; many 
international researchers, scholars, and interns have walked through its doors, 
and the centre has long held a reputation as one of the most trusted and 
productive research centres in Jordan.  
Financial support for the centre is provided by the Government of Jordan, which 
has also commissioned continuous polling since 1996. The CSS conducts regular 
government performance surveys in the interest of understanding how people 
perceive their government and how these perceptions shift over time (results are 
published and made available to the press and public). The frequency of 
government performance polling is fairly systematic: it involves a poll conducted 
one hundred days before and after a parliamentary election, two hundred days 
after, and then at least annually from then. The sample size has been enlarged 
since the first study in 1996 to account for a larger and more diverse population, 
and now stands at eighteen hundred randomised respondents interviewed face-
to-face per poll. The government poll was described by the head of the polling 
division as popular and highly anticipated in the public sphere; “A lot hinges on 
the results and these polls have shaped the country”, though there is no way of 
knowing to what extent people answer honestly. While polling in Jordan cannot 
be done without permission from the state, the CSS is able to bypass this 
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requirement because they are a trusted ally and claim to operate as an 
independent entity.  
The organisation of polling operations within the CSS is compartmentalised, with 
different parts of the building assigned to a fieldwork division, statistical analysis 
division, and research division. The centre itself was newly remodelled in 1998-
1999 with funding from the Jordanian Government, Fredrich Ebert Foundation, 
National Canadian Development Agency, and others. It is a large and modern 
standalone building located on the University’s sprawling Amman campus. 
While the permanent staff is small (the polling unit, for instance, had three 
permanent employees at the time of interviewing), many part-time researchers, 
field interviewers, consultants, and student interns spend time at the centre, and 
the CSS has long hosted trainings and seminars for other regional actors working 
in polling. Further, the centre has built partnerships with international 
organisations like the ILO, and other polling actors like Gallup, the World Values 
Survey, and the Arab Barometer. These actors subcontract CSS to field their 
studies, collaborate, or collect raw data. The CSS serves as the regional hub for 
the Arab Barometer, working closely with the American contingent and 
managing relationships and coordinating fieldwork with polling centres in other 
MENA countries. Often, CSS pollsters will travel to nearby countries to train and 
monitor local research centres. Once data is collected in each country, local 
centres send their data to the CSS for processing and analysis. The process was 
described as a collaborative one; as the centre’s head pollster put it, “We work as 
one group”. 
This sense of unity also came through in the centre’s evaluation of regional public 
opinion. The Director of the CSS, a respected academic who completed a PhD in 
Sociology in the United States and has since spent over two decades teaching at 
the University of Jordan, asserted that “there most certainly is something that we 
can call ‘Arab public opinion’” because there is an “Arab stance” that is reflected 
in issues like democratisation, gender, and the role of religion in society. Thus, 
we can speak of an Arab public opinion if what we are talking about is social 
norms and codes, however there is not a singular regional opinion on every 
issue, and a distinction must be made. The centre’s lead pollster recounted a 
similar sentiment. This pollster began his career as a researcher in the CSS in the 
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1990s and returned to head the polling division after the centre sponsored his 
doctoral studies in Statistics at the University of Kent in the United Kingdom, 
where he specialised in election pre-predictions using modelling and simulations. 
He added that uniformity in survey design is possible and effective. “You can ask 
the same questions in different countries, especially using standard Arabic 
language. Concepts can translate country to country, no problem. This is why 
polls like the World Values Survey can ask the same questions everywhere”. 
There is no need then for polling to be a hyperlocal pursuit, rather, it works best 
when it is conducted at higher levels of abstraction. 
The CSS has an “official” air to it. Pollsters take pride in the prominence of the 
centre and are keen to discuss the technical aspects of their research. The lead 
pollster stressed that they follow ESOMAR standards and are “the only polling 
centre in Jordan to do so”, and “no one can criticise” the centre for bad practices 
and protocols. The CSS sees itself in a different league than other polling actors in 
the region and seeks to position its work as scholarly, not commercial. At the 
same time, it distances itself from Western pollsters who share some of the same 
scientific values. “The West think they are the best in the world [at polling]. They 
think they have the best methodology”. The same pollster went on to say that if 
closer attention is paid to methodological innovations taking place at the CSS—
relating to sampling, questionnaire design, and methods of interpreting data—
we will see micro-advancements to the field that are unique to the Middle East.  
Actor 2: The Long-Trusted Pollster of the State 
This pollster defies the assumption that localised polling in the Arab region is a 
recent phenomenon. Since 1962, he has helped to spearhead a polling firm that 
that has remained stable through decades of change. The company was initially 
established in Lebanon in 1962 with support from George Gallup, who was 
involved in setting up Gallup outposts outside the United States after World War 
II. Together with the German polling company EMNID (also affiliated with 
Gallup), funding was assigned to poll the Middle East. In its early years, the 
company primarily worked in market research, with the exception of polls 
conducted for the USIA during the 1960s in Lebanon. Between 1962 and 1976, the 
company’s operations grew to the point where they were “doing research in 
every Arab country except Algeria and Djibouti”. This included Cyprus, Iran, 
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and Turkey; unusual additions to Arab-region surveys. Prior to working with 
Gallup, the pollster studied psychology and trained at the British Market 
Research Bureau in London in the early 1960s and had some work experience in 
public relations. Between 1963 and 1975, he “observed new techniques” in the 
international community of research and sought to bring in his training in 
cognitive behaviour. He remarked, “Psychology is not the whole story [of public 
opinion], only part of it”, but it allows you to experiment with qualitative 
techniques that “put you in the frame of everyday people”. His approach has 
therefore combined psychology and sociology into the practice of polling, and he 
has conducted hundreds of focus groups over decades to find “anomalous” 
information and things that polls otherwise miss. 
The pollster achieved a seal of approval after correctly predicting the 1971 by-
election in Lebanon “against all odds, for a candidate who was not previously 
involved in politics”. When civil war broke out in 1975, he moved operations to 
Jordan, continuing with election-related polls both in Jordan and Egypt. He 
recounted how the trust in his methods and intuitions around elections was on 
the rise in the 1970s; his reputation was strengthened, his profile grew, and his 
work became of interest to the state. In 1989, the Jordanian Prime Minister 
requested the pollster to conduct a pre-election poll of the entire Jordanian 
electorate, curious as to whether people would respond honestly and reliably to 
interviews. The pollster’s work left a positive impression and in 1992, he was 
commissioned by King Hussein of Jordan to conduct regular election polling for 
the state. Around this time, parliamentary changes were enacted that limited the 
number of seats for political parties. The pollster recalled his intuitive sense that 
these structural changes in governance would require changes in polling design, 
and he reformulated approaches to constructing sample quotas in order to take 
into account “certain segments of the population outside the cities, to better 
understand the reality of the national public”. He also recalled how many 
government-sponsored polls came from questions that King Hussein himself had 
pondered about the electorate, for instance, whether people would participate in 
the elections, their perceptions of the United States, or their attitudes toward 
privatisation. King Hussein, as he fondly recalled, used data down to the last 
comma and in many ways they were able to “speak the same language” to one 
another.  
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Among his international clients, he counts the IRI, and formerly the UNDP and 
USAID. But it is his career as a trusted pollster of the Jordanian state that seems 
to define him. His company also has a close bond with the CSS, where he has 
worked as a consultant and trained new generations of researchers. But while the 
CSS has worked more with donor agencies, making research publicly available, 
this pollster has taken commissions on a selective basis “only from actors who 
value research”. At its height, he presided over a team of forty-three researchers, 
of which fifteen worked as full-time field interviewers. 
From the 1960s to the 1980s, the pollster said that the field of public opinion 
research was primarily taken up with methodology, scientific best-practices, and 
devising analytical frameworks. But later, the focus shifted to the question of 
“How do you read results?”, namely, what is in a number? This move toward 
interpretation, he argued, is now more important than ever, as traditional and 
social media are in the habit of reproducing problematic and unreliable 
interpretations. He also talked about how a poll should not be used 
independently of other information, but should be supported by data from pre-
existing studies, as best as possible. It is not a “standalone” method.  
At an advanced stage in his career, the senior pollster works out of a small office 
on a main street in Amman, where there is one secretary and one or two other 
senior field supervisors working alongside him. In his office, there is no 
computer. The only sign of technology at his desk, strewn with papers and hand-
drawn maps, was a large calculator, which he used to show how to calculate 
sample quotas. Around his office, one can find career memorabilia; newspaper 
clippings and pictures of him with the late King Hussein and the current King 
Abdullah II. Often he pulled decades-old paper surveys out of desk drawers, and 
recalled in great detail the technical issues and learnings from each of these. For 
instance, in a question with a Likert scale, he showed how he chose to use a 4-
point and 10-point as opposed to an odd-numbered scale because “midpoints are 
an excuse” for respondents to choose indifference. In another example, he 
showed a series of two-step questions he designed, where the first is meant to 
position the respondent on the issue, and the second measures the degree of 
sentiment on that issue. Further, he argued that questions worded “What is the 
likelihood that you will vote?” result in bad data in Jordan, and a subtle change 
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to a two-part question that asks “Do you intend to vote?” followed by “Did you 
vote in the last election?” has proven far more accurate when compared to voter 
turnout. He described methodological tweaks like these as his own innovations, 
and said that he is meticulous about process, often calling and monitoring 
interviewers to ensure they are “doing things correctly in the field”. His surveys 
use face-to-face methodology, and he does not conduct telephone or online 
polls.40 In the interview process, he believes the gender of the interviewer does 
matter; people are likelier to open up to female interviewers in general, though 
interviewer selection must also consider the nature of the questions being asked. 
When qualitative interventions are needed, he now partners with another 
Jordanian research company to create a “division of labour”.  
The pollster rejected the label “Arab public opinion”. To him, it negates the 
essence of the local and prevents experts from other countries having a say on a 
what is asked. Each poll has to be adapted to the local culture. This belief comes 
from a recognition that societies have unique communicative cultures; for 
instance, he described how British publics are verbally forthcoming, while there 
is more reticence to talk in the Middle East. A “discussion framework” must 
therefore be implemented in each study, and at times, this may mean choosing 
not to poll but selecting a qualitative alternative. The procurement of public 
opinion does not rest on the poll; rather, the nature of publics dictates the choice 
of method. Finally, he lamented the state of questionnaires today, saying that 
surveys are rife with poorly-worded, non-sensical, and broad questions that 
come about because of either ignorance or political interests, where pollsters 
want to produce results that support certain convictions. For him, “Public 
opinion research should help you describe the thing that is obscure to people”, to 
help them work through their thoughts and beliefs without manipulating them. 
Actor 3: The Tech-Driven Entrepreneur 
 
40
 According to the pollster, there is no framework for telephone polling because it can never be used to 
design a representative sample. At the same time, mail-out surveys only see a twenty percent response rate. 
By contrast, the success of face-to-face interviewing “never falls below 82%”, meaning that four in five 
people respond to interviews. 
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This Jordanian pollster began his career in 1994 as a data collector at the CSS, 
receiving training from Actor 2 above. Later appointed as a full-time researcher, 
the CSS sponsored the completion of a Master’s and PhD degree at the University 
of Kent in the United Kingdom, where he specialised in Political Sociology. Here, 
his research focused on political Islam using data from the World Values Survey. 
In 2006, he travelled to the United States as a Fulbright Scholar, working for at 
least some time with the Committee on Foreign Affairs (Middle East and North 
Africa) and the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS). Upon 
returning to Jordan, he was named Deputy Director of the CSS in 2009. His 
polling work crossed borders when he became the Director of IRI Lebanon in 
2009 and later helped to lead research at the Social and Economic Survey 
Research Institute (SESRI) in Qatar. During this time, he also worked as a 
consultant for King Abdullah II of Jordan in the government’s survey 
department. In his own words, he has carved a path “combining research and 
public opinion prescription in Jordan” as well as experience in academic settings.  
In 2016, the pollster established a research, polling, and consultancy firm in a 
new, gated business park development in Amman. At the time of interviewing, 
the pollster’s entrepreneurial venture was less than a year old, employing just 
under ten people as analysts, and between five and thirty women at a time to 
conduct field interviews at a time (as mentioned above, gender was found to 
have an effect on the success rates of interviews in Jordan). Most if not all of the 
staff are locally-based. The pollster remarked, “You need to know the context. 
You have to live the culture. That’s why you need real local people as 
researchers, and it cannot be automated or outsourced”. He stressed that this 
knowledge is essential for interviewing respondents, as it’s not just their answers 
that are recorded, but the non-verbal signals are picked up on as well.  
Already the business venture counts as clients a number of international actors, 
for which it conducts polls: IRI and USAID, the European Union, the Konrad 
Adenauer Stiftung, the International Center for the Study of Violent Extremism 
(ICSVE), LSE Enterprise, the Middle East Media and Policy Studies Institute 
(MEMPSI), the World Values Survey, and the Mediterranean-Gulf Forum. It also 
services Jordanian clients like the King Abdullah II Center for Excellence, the 
Royal Scientific Society, and maintains a close relationship with the Arab 
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Barometer. The business sees its relationship with clients and staff as 
“partnerships”, with all parties on equal footing. The pollster discussed the 
importance of investing in staff, promoting a “horizontal structure” whereby 
training is sponsored as it was for him. For instance, the company has established 
links with King’s Academy (Deerfield) and encourages staff to attend training 
and educational programs abroad.41  
The pollster has a firm pro-technology stance with regards to face-to-face 
interviewing techniques (CAPI or computer-assisted personal interviewing). 
Field interviewers are sent out with advanced tablets with the capability of 
immediately uploading data to a central repository. Audiences (i.e., 
commissioners and analysts) of surveys can read the results of survey questions 
in real time and suggest adjustments to the study design, even while in the field, 
thus the process of research is not static. Behind his pro-tech stance is a belief that 
technology eliminates human error and speeds up processing times. It “allows 
total control of the data” and is less expensive overall. Technology is therefore 
valued as a tool that smooths irregularities and gives immediate results; and he 
considers seamlessness, speed, and access to be the future of polling. But while 
the technology to enable real-time polling has existed for some years, it has been 
developed with the North American market in mind. Recognising a gap here, the 
pollster is working on “developing Arabic-enabled technology for the company” 
in order to improve communication capabilities through technology, that will 
appeal to overseas markets. 
Finally, on the subject of his dedication to the local market, the pollster discussed 
the importance of research from within the Arab region for countering the 
misinformation propagated by sensationalised issues like global terrorism. He 
believes that information from outside the region can misconstrue and 
misrepresent issues, with terrible consequences. External misinformation can be 
countered with internal clarity and more indigenously produced research. 
 
41
 King Abdullah II of Jordan graduated from Deerfield Academy in Massachusetts 1980. Deerfield helped 
established the King’s Academy in Madaba, Jordan in 2007. 
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3.2 The Case of Lebanon 
I identified eight major polling actors in Lebanon, two of which were prolific 
producers of data prior to the 1980s (working in university departments), while 
the remainder mainly worked in private commercial firms. Below, I introduce 
three unique actors among the interviews conducted. There were three common 
themes identified in each interview. The first was that polling in Lebanon faces 
minimal restrictions. The state and the industry of polling “do not speak to each 
other” and the state is relegated to a background role in the process. Rather, 
pollsters have strong relationships with non-state actors interested in public 
opinion data, policy specialists, and the people they interview. A second lesson 
was that all pollsters agreed on the need for localisation in questionnaires. The 
same questions cannot be cut and pasted and asked of people across countries, as 
it is considered “inappropriate” to assume that the social, political, and cultural 
contexts are similar enough to warrant standardisation. A third interesting point 
was that the absence of an official census (the last and only one was conducted in 
1932) has no bearing on the practice of research. As one pollster put it, “Figures 
are a point of view in Lebanon anyways” and there are ways to get at census data 
through reports compiled by NGOs and other independent parties. Thus in this 
case, we see workarounds to the standardised, status quo procedures of polling 
encouraged elsewhere on the global level. 
Actor 1: The Media Darling 
It was in discussion with one of Lebanon’s foremost pollsters that the extent to 
which Arab polling actors formed a loose epistemic network became most 
evident. This pollster was another who spent time training at the CSS in Amman 
and mentioned a number of others—Jordanian, Palestinian, and Egyptian 
pollsters and statisticians—who “all trained together in our early days. We are 
the pioneers of research in the region”. Many of them have built independent 
careers establishing research institutes or polling firms in different markets, not 
necessarily in the country from where they originate. To some extent, their 
diverging career trajectories have created distance between them over the years; 
they are not necessarily involved in each other’s day-to-day activities. Rather, 
they “have a certain complicité”: they interact with and assist each other from 
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afar, send projects to one another as friends and colleagues, and “act as a de facto 
unit” when representing research on the regional level. 
Following a similar pattern of training, this pollster studied outside the region, 
completing a Masters in Statistics and DEA in Canada. He spent time “in 
Washington ‘on the hill’ for policy work” before returning to Lebanon after the 
civil war. His public opinion career began in Lebanon with a poll published in a 
British Arabic magazine on the 1992 general election and contentious policy-
making. He described this first attempt as “haphazard, both methodologically 
and in terms of results” and recalled how only he and his secretary worked on 
the study. The sampling frame was incorrect, and the questions generated bias, 
but through a trial and error process, the polling process was refined. In 1994, he 
launched a research firm in Beirut that has grown to employ fifty-five people 
today. He positions himself not as a political or market research pollster, but as a 
specialist in public affairs. The majority of his work lies at the nexus of policy and 
communications and privately commissioned by political parties, media outlets, 
private sector firms, and international bodies like the US State Department, 
Gallup, UN, UNICEF, the World Bank, the IRI, and the Special Tribunal for 
Lebanon. Using a mixed-methods approach, he combines qualitative focus 
groups “that reflect what was not said in the polls” with face-to-face interviews. 
At the time of interviewing, he had conducted nearly fifty focus groups in 
Lebanon and had a fleet of thirty cars and teams of part-time researchers, and 
four full-time enumerators so that large-scale surveying could be done entirely 
in-house and systematically.  
The industry of polling in Lebanon was described as a highly competitive and 
growing arena. Each actor is aware of others in the field, and not all are treated 
equally respected. The pollster described the industry expanding like a 
“mushroom cloud”, with small players on the rise who produce low-quality data. 
However, “even if the industry is not so organised, the market will organise it”, 
meaning that inevitably, small players will be swallowed up. There is very little 
evidence of domestic collaboration between pollsters, unlike at the regional level. 
What further distances this pollster from others in Lebanon is his media 
affiliations. In 2006, he launched his own news media service with a mission to 
offer “objective nonpartisan news, as they happen”, which places him in the 
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unique and altogether rare position of being both a pollster and newsmaker. And 
since predicting the 2009 election “with 100% accuracy”, he became something of 
a star commentator, appearing on political talk shows and radio programs as a 
public expert on electoral politics in Lebanon. His media appearances allow him 
to talk to the public, which breeds a cult of popular familiarity around him. The 
extent to which political bias appears in his polls and media platform is unclear, 
but he is widely sought out by local and foreign parties, and is the Lebanese 
delegate for both the World Values Survey Wave 7 (in process) and the Arab 
Barometer.  
Actor 2: The Pre-Civil War Pollster 
Pollsters tended to display excitement in interviews when answering questions 
related to methods, technical aspects of the practice, and personal success, while 
shying away from talking about difficult times. Polling, like any professional 
field in Lebanon, was disrupted by the outbreak of civil war in 1975. This pollster 
established an independent polling firm just before the war, having built his 
early career polling for the BBC in Lebanon. While this firm has mostly worked 
in the area of market and consumer research, through the course of four decades, 
political opinion research had been conducted (though the company was 
reluctant to share any further information). Rather than shutting down 
operations, the outbreak of war led this pollster to grow his practice. He was 
forced to move to Jordan, where he lived and built a second establishment. After 
the war ended in 1990, he returned to Lebanon and has continued to run both 
offices since then. The years spent in both countries has given him a profound 
understanding of the differences in civic culture and the role of pollster in 
political life. “The people are different. The streets are different. You have to 
understand the difference in mentality”. In Lebanon, polling is seen to have 
“peaked” and the intensity of political discussion and debate is “felt everywhere. 
Politics affects daily life, and it is present in all media and all channels”. Here, the 
pollster has free reign, and there are no restrictions on asking politically sensitive 
questions. “People have been living with war and politics their whole lives. They 
are willing to speak and are very vocal”. But in Jordan, the need to obtain 
permission from the state for each fresh survey forces the self-censorship of the 
researcher. The result is that questions are asked differently and people as 
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interview subjects are more reserved and harder to pick apart. For this pollster 
and his small team, knowledge of these differences is wielded as a strength and 
lends them credibility. 
The pollster’s operations draw strength from simplicity. Taking an anti-
technology stance, the team seems to revel in the human activity of the fieldwork 
process. “The most important part of the entire research process is the 
fieldwork”. It requires you to reject your ego and engage with the field in body 
and in mind. While the team is aware that polling is becoming increasingly 
computerised, paper and pen are still used to conduct their face-to-face 
interviews. As another pollster working in the company described, “It’s 
something material, something to touch. It’s personal, and is really more 
efficient”. It is a difficult task to maintain neutrality, but the pollster stressed that 
the personal beliefs of researchers “mean nothing and should not appear”. She 
also described fieldwork as a form of entertainment, and in this sense it is 
performative. There is entertainment for the interviewer, who comes into contact 
with unique perspectives and never repeats the same experience, and the people 
who are interviewed “are entertained. They get to talk to someone, have a 
conversation about things they might not normally speak about”. They are 
listened to and are found to be appreciative of the experience. This level of care 
and attention for the field was not expressed in any other interview conducted, 
but it is a sign that public opinion research need not be impersonal, with 
participants held at arm’s-length as a matter of methodological course.  
Actor 3: The Small Fish 
Described by other Lebanese pollsters as a boutique operation, this pollster’s firm 
represents a “small fish in a big pond” market scenario. Based in the Hamra 
district of Beirut, the small scale of his operations precludes him from conducting 
costly face-to-face interviews, instead choosing computer-assisted telephone 
interviewing (CATI) as the main method. But rather than a conversation about 
data and comparing methods, the interview veered more toward assessing the 
state of the polling industry in Lebanon, which in the pollster’s view had 
changed tremendously since the civil war ended, when restrictions were lifted for 
researchers conducting politically sensitive studies.  
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The freedom to poll in Lebanon on nearly any subject is one reason for the high 
density of actors in the field. This explosion of polling has resulted in negative 
runoffs, some progress, and realisations about what the field should strive to be. 
For instance, a negative byproduct has been the phenomenon of “fake” or 
impressionistic research, where inaccurate results from questionable polls are 
purposefully published because data sells easily, and methods are subjected to 
less scrutiny when data is in demand. The pollster was willing to assume that 
eighty percent of published research in Lebanon was false or impressionistic, and 
by contrast, unpublished (private) data backed by heavy funding can be trusted 
to be far more thorough and accurate. Another negative runoff is the 
subcontracting problem in polling, i.e., the outsourcing of different parts of the 
polling process to third parties. Often, three to four contractors will separate the 
body who commissions the poll from the people on the ground. The 
subcontracting problem comes about when actors prioritise cost-effectiveness (it 
is cheaper to outsource the research process) and fail to see the benefit of working 
in close proximity to the public. 
The increase of polling has positively resulted in a more politicised civic culture. 
“Especially in Lebanon where leadership is not close to the public, research helps 
policymakers to understand what the people want. Polling keeps people in 
contact with democracy”, and further “we need polling for citizens to see who 
they are part of more broadly”. For the pollster, polling democratises Lebanon 
and breaks down false understandings and stereotypes because it floods the 
system with information. Especially when polling is made public, the pollster 
argued that people and the communicative discourses they enact become richer. 
He saw an informed public as a way to counter the “indifference” of leaders. 
The pollster also lamented the compartmentalisation of the industry in Lebanon 
and of the Arab region more broadly. For him, a more participatory community 
of epistemic actors who build each other up is the ideal. In his mind, this means 
that researchers should partake in conferences, engage in deeper discussions 
with one another, compare their methodologies and try to advance practices by 
comparing themselves to regional actors, as opposed to aiming for total global 
standardisation. Importantly, he felt that the cultural context cannot be ignored; 
the same questions cannot be asked everywhere at all times. Therefore, the field 
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needs “real researchers” who have a second sense for the local as opposed to 
“people who just execute” methodological processes without care for the people 
whose opinions have the potential to transform political systems.   
3.3 The Case of Palestine 
Palestine presents a unique case for the study of public opinion, and one for 
which we have some existing research on the emergence of the practice. In 
particular, two unpublished doctoral dissertations (Hawatmeh 2001 and 
Schwarze 2012) on polling in Palestine, as well as research on the development of 
the field of social science (Hanafi 2018) provide an adequate starting point. The 
systematic study of public opinion in Palestine has flourished since the signing of 
the Oslo Accords in 1993; indeed, the twelve main actors I identified emerged 
between 1993 and 2007. These centres, almost all of which are headquartered in 
Ramallah, have been led by pollsters and researchers whose careers effectively 
began during the process of negotiations with Israel; far from neutral observers, 
many were participant in multilateral discussions around peace and security and 
had a personal stake in Palestinian self-determination. Polling here is an 
inherently political act: “from inception, opinion polls were seen by civil society 
pollsters as an instrument used to exert pressure on leadership, warning 
decision-makers off straying too far from public expectations” (Schwarze 2012, 
142). Polling as a form of epistemic inquiry has thus belonged to the local level 
from the outset. For Schwarze, “Palestinian polling has been at the forefront of 
survey research in the Arab world, lauded for its overall reliability and 
professionalism” despite setbacks faced in the sector of research (2012, 136). 
While her study presents a nuanced analysis of supporters and sceptics of polling 
in Palestine, it is the insights from pollsters themselves that are the most relevant 
for my purposes and against which I can compare my own findings. I detail three 
key actors in the field below, but the overarching sentiment that binds all 
interviews is in line with Schwarze: “pollsters expressed a profound belief in the 
ability of their work to contribute positively, if slowly, to the increasing 
importance of public opinion in decision-making” (2012, 137). It is this normative 
dimension that makes the Palestinian case especially noteworthy. 
Actor 1: The Activist 
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Like others in the field, this pollster and pioneer of Palestinian research 
completed a PhD abroad, at the University of Michigan in the field of Sociology. 
Returning to Palestine in 1993 with a social science background, his first poll was 
conducted a few days before the Oslo I Accord was officially signed in 
September, and probed how Palestinians felt about the agreement. He described 
early survey research as non-scientific, especially as the demographics of 
Palestine were not well understood, and adequate sampling frameworks could 
not be drawn up. While he and other Palestinian pollsters acknowledged that 
foreign development aid and American democratic institutions like the IRI and 
NDI “gave way to regular local polling”, these foreign bodies with their specific 
interests and targets were not the reason that polling has grown and succeeded. 
The market for Palestinian public opinion data has thus always been under the 
control of local researchers. The Palestinian pollster’s activist position is a unique 
and unexpected characteristic, especially when one imagines a pollster in the 
abstract. In his own words, he “has always operated from the Palestinian 
perspective and for the Palestinian cause”. Acting as an uninvolved or removed 
external observer would betray the opportunity to better society. Over the twenty 
years spent running a polling centre in the West Bank, he has ensured that “the 
process of polling and analysis is owned by Palestinians, from question design to 
research dissemination”. This is not “polling for the sake of polling” but a 
political activity imbued with purpose. His maxim—“polling for all”—effectively 
means that questions are designed to incorporate minority views and the needs 
of different subgroups and marginalised voices in society. This maxim, he 
contends, must be reflected in the workplace as well. For instance, training must 
be offered for all employees so that the experience of the job allows employees to 
contribute to society. The feminist perspective of the researcher must be present 
as well, and he seeks a gender balance in his hiring practices so that the field of 
polling in the Arab world can be further diversified. Of all the interviews 
conducted with male pollsters in the region, this was the only one in which the 
unequal status of women in the field was lamented.  
The growing closeness between Palestinian pollsters and their publics has 
allowed for him to poll on some of the most politically sensitive topics. Questions 
relating to violence and religion and the peace process have been probed in 
depth, and in recent years, the diversification of questions has sparked deeper 
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social conversations about issues ranging from perceptions of corruption, 
opinions on leadership, and positions toward honour killings, to attitudes about 
sex and awareness of sexually transmitted diseases (traditionally taboo subjects). 
The success rates for research are measured by the ability of polls to affect 
political decision-making, and the activist-pollster gave examples of moments 
when policy changes were precipitated by particular polls. These examples also 
certainly help to bolster faith in the polls. But importantly, he viewed a parallel 
relationship between pollsters and policymakers, and pollsters and civil society. 
The pollster thus sits directly between the two and must serve both. As to how he 
distinguishes himself from others in the field, he said that it comes down to this 
positioning. While pollsters are commonly strategists, commercially-inclined, or 
journalistic, he describes himself as based in the community. 
Pollsters in Palestine are known public figures who publish their own analyses in 
newspapers and feature prominently in the media. As the pollsters remarked, 
“public opinion leaders are influencers in Palestine” and must be aware of the 
normative aspects of their role. Rather than prioritising scientific objectivity and 
accuracy, the work of pollsters is legitimated by their attention to nuanced 
contextual knowledge. The pollster argued that polling is approached more as a 
sociological field of study in Palestine rather than as a science, the reason being 
that “culture of polling” existed first, and a “culture of science” was added to it 
later as technologies became available and international training and knowledge-
sharing became more accessible. For this reason, he maintains close links with the 
academic community. He established a research centre at Birzeit University in 
1998 and is one of a number of pollsters and practitioners who engage in teaching 
public opinion polling and survey methods at the undergraduate level. As he 
sees it, pollsters have the capacity to be educators in addition to their roles as 
activists, influencers, and policy specialists. They are uniquely positioned to 
participate in the emancipatory project of the Palestinian state. 
Additionally, the pollster considered the Palestinian case in relation to other 
markets. In his view, polling in Jordan serves either the regime (from a security 
perspective) or marketing, and Lebanon is closer in kind to Jordan than Palestine. 
“In Jordan, all polls have to be accredited formally, so big personalities in 
universities, or in the royal court, or UN people make it through the gates. The 
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problem with this is that they already have a self-censoring system for 
information, and a controlled system leads to corruption. It is a self-reinforcing 
system”. By contrast, Lebanon is more commercial and sectarian in nature and 
this creates its own challenges. “The first centres in Palestine became its own 
industry and its own field. Here, you can defend academic freedoms. There is a 
free culture”. Despite these differences, he is an advocate for creating a formal 
network of Arab pollsters (he mentioned that while he has been trying to create 
something like an ARABPOR, modelled on AAPOR, this has not yet 
materialised). He has cross-trained researchers in Lebanon, Jordan, Oman, and 
Yemen and has polled in Iraq, Syria, and Libya with the help of EU funding. He 
has also worked with a Jordan-based women’s leadership group for which 
polling was done in Saudi Arabia and Tunisia. 
Finally, he shed some light on obstructions to polls under non-democratic 
governments by revealing that if you understand the system, polling is possible. 
Research bans have come into effect in Palestine from time to time, recently in 
Hebron. In Morocco, political polling has been heavily restricted by the state. 
When it does take place, it is usually through market research companies and the 
questions are politically benign. Building relationships with these actors may be 
one way to gain access and ask more sensitive questions. In any case, this 
Palestinian pollster and others I interviewed operate on the basis of being able to 
do their job unobstructed. They do not appear to concern themselves with 
authoritarian control over the production of knowledge, because more often than 
not, these periods of silencing are temporary. They know well that polling is both 
in demand and a “mobile” endeavour that allows them to move in and out of 
countries, adapt, and persist. As the pollster emphasised, “There is always a 
way”. 
Actor 2: The Elite Negotiator 
As one of the most prominent actors in the region, this pollster, born in Gaza, 
recalled teaching Palestinian politics during the 1980s only to realise that while 
history could be readily accessed, any attempt to understand the current value 
system in Palestine required empirical knowledge that was altogether missing. 
He earned a PhD in Political Science and Statistics from Columbia University in 
1985 and remained in the United States until his involvement in peace 
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negotiations with Israel in 1992 allowed for him to return and establish a research 
centre in the West Bank. Here, he trained researchers in the method of face-to-
face interviewing and produced his first major poll in 1993. His research interests 
were centrally focused on state-building and peace-building, and he noted that 
the scarcity of actors in the field in 1993 necessitated work-sharing between his 
centre and the only other existing survey research centre at the time, the 
Jerusalem Media and Communications Center (JMCC), a Palestinian NGO based 
in East Jerusalem. Since then, he has maintained a working relationship with the 
JMCC, who commenced polling activities in 1993 with their data used directly in 
the negotiations process. Together, the two work-sharing organisations aimed to 
“strengthen the voice of the public by providing information on public attitudes 
to Palestinian negotiators” (Schwarze 2012, 141). Negotiators and leaders did 
listen; there was a lot of interest in data at the time, it was taken seriously, and it 
had the effect of shaping and constraining strategic decisions, speeches, and the 
priorities of social research.  
Obtaining data, however, was not so simple. While learning to draft 
questionnaires required a mix of precedent, training, and intuition, basic 
demographic information like census data was simply unavailable in the early 
1990s. Knowledge of the self (as a population) was therefore extremely limited 
and relied on the piecemeal collection of statistical data from the United Nations 
Relief and Works Agency (UNWRA), which certainly did not amount to a census. 
In the years that followed Oslo, Israel amassed census data on Arab populations, 
but often purposefully withheld it. The negotiator-turned-pollster described the 
ways in which “Palestinians have developed their own capacity to get data” in an 
environment of missing information. This included creating their own territorial 
and urban maps and other “self-identifying” documentation. These early actors 
were more than just pollsters and negotiators; their role required them to become 
proxy demographers and social scientists, as well as to build relational links with 
NGOs and international institutions who might help to provide and procure data 
when needed. The Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics (PCBS) was founded in 
1993 and only released a full first census in 1997, which forced the methodology 
of polling to undergo change and resulted in earlier studies being treated with 
scepticism due to missing this necessary element for scientific sampling. 
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The pollster’s reputation precedes him. He has conducted joint Israeli-Palestinian 
polls since 2000, which have proven to be a point of contention for Palestinians 
who have sensed political motivation in his poll results (he was attacked by 
mobsters and his offices ransacked in 2003). Still, he has persevered and today is 
as involved in polling at the regional level as on the level of Palestinian politics. 
He has strong partnerships with the Arab Barometer, the Arab Democracy Index 
(led by the Arab Reform Initiative, an independent think tank engaged in 
democracy-building), and the Arab Security Sector Index. He has conducted 
many studies of Palestinian refugees living in Jordan and Lebanon. Through his 
work with international actors like the Brookings Institute, the Wilson Center, 
and the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR), he has polled in a dozen Arab 
countries and has access to hard to reach publics, for instance in rural Egypt. 
While he views American institutions like Gallup and Pew as technically adept, 
questions, language, and wording are the leading cause of the “failure” of 
Western polls in markets other than their own. He explained that “People are 
more careful in their own societies. Western pollsters will naturally pay more 
attention to their people, and so they will succeed more in the West. They do not 
have the capacity to adapt their questions”. And while he often works with 
Western pollsters, he sees his main contribution as being able to adapt their 
surveys to suit the setting and the people being interviewed, and there remains a 
perceptible discord that can only be mended with strong indigenous research 
contributions. 
Finally, Palestine’s unique “culture of polling” necessitates particular 
methodological specificities. Face-to-face interviewing has been proven to be 
among the most effective (in terms of depth of responses) and “friendliest” 
method to reach people. While methods such as online and telephone surveys are 
favoured in other markets for their ease of administration, diminishing costs, and 
wider reach, the data that they produce is found to be comparatively stilted—a 
more reserved and less expressive form of public opinion emerges. There is 
something in the moment of human interaction between pollster and public that 
creates a space for trust and a channel for civic participation. Each form of polling 
(whether face-to-face, online, and telephone) has its own specific “culture” that 
differs, especially when comparing across countries in the region. Once one 
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understands the culture of polling in Palestine, “Public opinion is no longer a 
mystery as it used to be in the past”. 
Actor 3: The Networked Expert 
Another American university-trained statistician, this pollster began his career in 
1996 under the wing of Actor 2 above. He was described by pollsters in several 
different interviews as one of the best statisticians in the region, and defines 
himself as a technical expert in survey research. He built early ties to the CSS in 
Jordan through a Ford Foundation grant that commissioned joint-surveys in 
Palestine, Jordan, Lebanon, and Egypt, and it was at the CSS where he laid the 
technical infrastructure for incoming researchers and spent time training 
international participants. As a statistician, the normative aspect of Palestinian 
research propelled him to create indices for different variables, such as a fear 
index and a democracy index as a composite measure of change. These indices 
were based on polling data, and his early work in this area was sponsored by the 
IRI and NDI. He has also been involved in polling for foreign institutions like 
NORC, IFES, USAID, and the World Bank.  
In these early years of polling in Palestine, the pollster explained how the practice 
was met with distrust on a number of levels. People as interview subjects were 
weary of the technical abilities of pollsters and their motives, some feared the 
ramifications of sharing their political views, and others were hesitant about the 
predictive quality of election polling. Interviews had to be conducted outside 
homes or in communal places before the practice became normalised. And 
people were reticent to speak freely for fear of being held accountable for their 
political views, especially if they expressed a minority position. But he noted a 
rising confidence over time that strengthened the relationship with the public 
and ultimately led people to enter into open dialogues with pollsters. Early 
pollsters were thus keen on building a culture of civic participation in Palestine. 
They saw themselves primarily as activists, as opposed to neutral social 
scientists, and felt themselves to be just as much a part of the public sphere and 
as involved in its construction. This had an encouraging effect on the culture of 
polling in Palestine. Further, pollsters were increasingly seen as acting in the 
interests or on behalf of the people, as opposed to political parties, religious 
factions, or foreign donor agencies. Ideas about polling in the minds of the public 
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thus shifted from “public opinion as elite opinion” to “public opinion as the voice 
of everyday people”. Yet pollsters are also monitored and tested on their 
predictive skills. Polling around elections is a tricky endeavour (the mixed 
political system allows separate votes for an individual and a party), and the 2006 
general election in which Hamas claimed victory created a crisis for pollsters, 
who had predicted a safe win by the ruling Fatah.  
Finally, reflecting on the ties built with pollsters in Jordan, Lebanon, Egypt, and 
elsewhere, this pollster asserted that polling could serve as a gateway to regional 
participation. He sensed a desire among the research and expert community to 
work more closely as an identifiable network specifically because “this is not a 
united region” and the relationships and infrastructure to enable a strong 
network already exist. In the end, he expressed the hope of creating a more 
prominent regional body of Arab pollsters, expanding on the legacy of the “old 
boys’ club” as a forum for future generations of researchers. 
4 Conclusion 
In this chapter, I have sought to uncover a new stage in the pursuit of public 
opinion in the Arab world—one characterised by increased agency on the part of 
local, indigenous actors whose ability to shape and speak for the field is 
especially palpable in the wake of the Arab uprisings. Up to this point, we have 
seen the ways in which local public opinion has been extracted, (re)framed, 
spoken for, and put to use by foreign actors. At the same time, the adaptation of 
standard polling practices by local actors trained in the West have been adjusted, 
in some instances to fit with local conditions and compensate for missing 
information. Over time, the foreign monopoly of Arab public opinion has been 
displaced. The rate at which the local market has expanded in recent years is 
evidence of this. Further, pollsters are empowered by the inclusion of non-
scientific forms of knowledge as part of their practice. While I do not attempt an 
assessment of data quality (which is a known issue in the region) to determine 
the effects of localisation on the final product of data, I do note a more 
participatory ethics of research and the guiding normative position that appear to 
be unique for each researcher.  
 STAGE 3 253 
 
I identify the Arab uprisings as a transformational juncture that helps to explain 
the advent of Stage 3. Mass social mobilisation brought about the fall of heads of 
state, shifts in power structures, and made way for new voices, generated 
solidarity beyond borders, and opened up new areas for social science research in 
and on the region. Specifically, the opening up of new ways of understanding 
and researching the Arab world has helped to decenter existing ways of 
knowing. To decentre requires us to challenge the politics, concepts and practices 
that enable certain narratives to be central; “decentring is also a way to put forth 
and participate in other kinds of narratives and politics that have different 
‘starting’ points” (Nayak and Selbin 2010, 4). It seeks to challenge privileged or 
dominant perspectives that have traditionally been legitimised by powerful 
actors and institutions. 
Writing in 1973 on the state of social science research in North Africa, Zghal and 
Karoui expected that decolonisation would facilitate a more participatory and 
sovereign approach to social research.  
The recent decolonization and attainment of political sovereignty by the 
former colonies should be logically translated into a new form of 
participation by the societies in sociological thought and more generally in 
social science research. On the level of scholarship, such societies should 
be expected to pass from the state of an object (for foreign researchers) to 
that of the subject (more or less lucidly confronting its own contradictions 
and identifying its own questions) (12). 
The presence of Stage 3 would suggest that, in some ways, this has indeed been 
realised for the study of public opinion. By identifying the branching off of Stage 
3, I do not mean to say that this represents a moment when local curiosity finally 
emerges. Rather, it is from this point that local actors lay greater claim to local 
opinion than foreign actors. The implications of this shift for policy and the 
politics of the region remains to be seen. What I am able to show at a fairly high 
level of abstraction is a continuum of knowledge production punctured by 
transformational junctures, which have ultimately resulted in a reclamation of 
the epistemological positions, practices, ideals, and assumptions by which 
knowledge of Arab public opinion is being pursued, though still under the broad 
banner of global opinion polling.  
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The “stages of inquiry” model used here in Part 3 brings to mind Al-Hardan’s 
question of the legacy of colonial epistemologies in Palestine: he asks, “How does 
the ‘before’ and ‘during’ of the research come to bear on the ‘after’?” (2014, 67). In 
the case of Arab public opinion inquiry, there remains much to be understood 
and there is room to venture further into critical terrain and consider the more 
nuanced applications or problems for the findings. But upon completing a first 
attempt at identifying a field of knowledge and problematising its production, I 
end the Arab case in the same spirit as Al-Hardan, by pondering how the before 
and the during of inquiry come to bear on current and future states of knowledge 
concerning “Arab public opinion”.  
 
  
Chapter 8  
Conclusion 
 
It falls to others, then, less enclosed by the demands of science's own self-understanding, 
to disclose the "thickness" of scientific language, to scrutinize the conventions of practice, 
interpretation, and shared aspirations on which the truth claims of that language depend, 
to expose the many forks in the road to knowledge that these very conventions have 
worked to obscure, and, in that process, finally, to uncover alternatives for the future. 
Evelyn Fox Keller (2001) 
 
The motivating question that propelled this thesis was: How can we explain the 
rise of public opinion knowledge in the Arab region? In the end, it grew to be a 
more complex endeavour, as I have attempted to build a historical account of the 
pursuit of “Arab public opinion” as an epistemic object. This broadening of the 
research agenda derived from necessity; “Arab public opinion inquiry” does not 
appear in any existing (English-language) texts, and very little in the way of 
theoretical research has been produced on the subject. The idea that a field of 
public opinion inquiry on people inhabiting the MENA region has developed in 
unique stages through time was not an a priori assumption; rather it was the 
result of a detailed mapping exercise and a process of identifying relevant actors 
in the field. This process encouraged a comparison between the modes of inquiry 
that dictate the field of research today and past iterations of similar processes, 
assumptions, or procedures for creating and producing knowledge about global 
(and specifically Arab) publics.  
This concluding chapter begins by synthesising and building on some of the key 
learnings of the thesis, followed by a discussion of the limitations and ways in 
which this research endeavour stands to be broadened. This thesis offered an 
unconventional starting point for the interrogation public opinion. In calling for 
conceptual clarity, the question of how dominant ideas or ways of thinking about 
public opinion was first raised. Distinguishing between public opinion as an 
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ideal (public opinion1) and public opinion as an epistemic pursuit, practice, or 
object (public opinion2) allows the analytical lens to narrow in on specific practices 
and artefacts embedded in the dominant modes of knowledge production. Taken 
together, these practices and artefacts render reality knowable in specific ways. 
Further, they are premised on fundamental epistemological assumptions that 
privilege the Western social scientific approach to understanding the world, such 
as the attainability of objective truth through scientific means. What is largely 
absent from conventional critiques on public opinion (in the Arab world and 
beyond) is an analytical engagement with pollsters—the class of actors who 
engender these assumptions through the practices that they enact—as a non-state 
actor operating in the international system. This thesis thus begins the task of re-
framing discussions about power and knowledge as they relate to the production 
of public opinion knowledge. 
More than simply filling gaps in the study of global public opinion in IR, I 
endeavor to contribute to the advancement of “global IR” as described by 
Tickner, especially by recognising and laying bare “the link between knowledge 
and power—that is, whose knowledge, and what kind of knowledge, is counted 
as legitimate (and ‘scientific’) by the mainstream of the discipline” (2016, 157). 
Breaking from the traditional canons of public opinion theory and building on 
some of the more critical and sociological perspectives, this thesis sits at the 
nexus of public opinion, epistemology, and the politics of knowledge. I 
encourage a sociological approach that considers the relevant epistemic actors, 
practices, and the epistemic legacies they carry with them. In this attempt to 
problematise the dominant modes of opinion knowledge production, I see my 
contribution as within the realm of IPS. Beyond IPS, adding the element of 
epistemology into conceptual development is an exercise that benefits IR and 
other fields. 
The conceptual framework that I propose in the thesis is just that—a proposal. A 
“stages of inquiry” approach provided a means of systematising the empirical 
work. As a way of devising a historical and sociological account of Arab public 
opinion inquiry focused on the development of actors and practices in the field 
since the early twentieth century, this particular framework generates several 
conclusions. To start, it broadens the definition of what counts as public opinion 
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research. The earliest examples presented in this thesis (the King-Crane 
Commission and Daniel Lerner’s piece, The Passing of Traditional Society) are not 
based on systematic polls and surveys but were devised using qualitative 
approaches (ethnographic and sociopsychological) combined with acts of 
counting and classifying bodies. By conventional standards, studies such as these 
would not be brought into the fold of discussions about public opinion research. 
Yet, as I have shown, to interrogate public opinion knowledge means to 
recognise it (at any point in history) as the product of a mode of inquiry with 
specific characteristics: a reductionist epistemology, an unchallenged emphasis 
on scientific principles and protocols, an adherence to the act of measurement, 
and a purposeful isolating of the variable of opinion (in statistical and in 
normative terms) from its vital context. 
The conceptual framework, while helpful for the purposes of organising my 
findings and building theoretical discussions, is limiting in the sense that it is 
backward and not forward-looking. Recounting the story of Arab public opinion 
inquiry as a logical progression through space and time leads to the natural 
question: Where do we go from here? The framework I propose does not allow 
us to conceive of a Stage 4 or 5 or beyond. To counter this, I have tried to show 
how the modes of inquiry that emerged in each of the three stages I defined 
perpetuate in some form today. We find vestiges of Stage 1 in war-time 
institutions like the State Department and USIA, who continue to poll in the Arab 
region today. Stage 2 actors maintain their embedded and collaborative research 
trajectories; many are still around. Stage 3 and its processes of localisation are 
relatively recent developments and there is no indication that a major shift or 
reckoning will happen again in the near future, but there is also no guarantee 
that it will not. Instead of trying to adjust the framework to account for future 
possibilities, I am more interested in how we go about deepening the case study 
such that more is learned about localisation and the ways in which it either 
uplifts or compromises the study of public opinion. 
The epistemological arguments in this thesis, while important, are only one piece 
of the puzzle, and solely focusing on epistemology does not help us to 
understand the everyday work of pollsters and practitioners in the field of public 
opinion research. There are many more aspects to their professional activities 
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beyond making methodological decisions and building knowledge claims. Those 
who lead teams and manage offices worry about employee morale and corporate 
culture. Those who work on a commission basis spend time building their client 
base and maintaining relationships and networks, and others who work on the 
basis of government or donor funding cycles are concerned with how to plan 
ahead. But to me, the more exciting findings are found in the localisation of 
inquiry in the sites that I explored.  
Localisation provides an alternative to the push to standardise public opinion 
research globally, which was seen as early as 1946 when opinion research was 
enshrined in liberal international organisations, and as recently as the latest 
annual best practices reports from global professional associations like ESOMAR. 
Localisation reverses this external oversight and control by fostering community-
oriented research. Palestine is one of the strongest cases for this idea of 
community-based knowledge; the ways in which polling is understood as a 
political act with roots in the struggle for self-determination is an entirely unique 
perspective. Evidence of localisation in Stage 3 allows us to draw a thread 
between the participatory and activist ethics of polling invoked in cases like 
Palestine, Lebanon, and at times in Jordan, and the emancipatory definition of 
public opinion discovered in Chapter 3. Thus, the findings in Stage 3 align with 
ideas about public opinion that prioritise the normative potential of polling 
rather than its scientificness. Put otherwise, where public opinion data is seen as 
a public good with the potential to elevate communities and enhance the well-
being of societies, we find instances of localisation at work.  
Another finding from the process of interview research was the existence of a 
strong epistemic network (an “old boys’ club”) of pollsters in the Arab region, 
relationally linked but geographically dispersed. While the interview process 
began with the assumption that actors working in the same fields and markets 
will be aware of one another and may even work closely together, this particular 
finding goes beyond simply identifying an epistemic community of actors 
animated by the same research thematic. These are the self-described pioneers of 
opinion research in the region. Each of them trained in the West, picking up the 
tools, methods, and assumptions of opinion research and helping to transplant 
them in the local setting. Each of them serve as directors or chief representatives 
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in their respective markets, and no two inhabit in the same office. The discovery 
of this unique epistemic network came at a late stage in the research process, and 
once the fieldwork was complete and the existence of this group had been 
verified by multiple actors within it, there was no further opportunity to pursue 
deeper questions about the group. For instance, how do their research practices 
and epistemological positions converge or diverge? Are there common 
perceptions or opinions about the field that I was not able to uncover, and what 
might these be? How does each view their role within this network and within 
the field of global opinion research more broadly? Here lies an opportunity for 
future research.  
Given that the emancipatory view of public opinion (the third discourse outlined 
in Chapter 3) aligns, to some extent, with localisation in Stage 3, what can we 
make of the other findings? In some ways, we can similarly align the scientific 
view of public opinion (the first discourse) with Stage 1 and the malleable view 
of public opinion (the second discourse) with Stage 2. This is summarised below: 
 Public opinion conceived as scientifically objective →  Stage 1 
 Public opinion conceived as a malleable construct → Stage 2 
 Public opinion conceived as emancipatory  → Stage 3 
Depicted visually in Figure 20 below, this historical and conceptual progression 
describes the emergence of different ideas about public opinion: 
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Figure 20: Combining stages of development in Arab public opinion inquiry and 
conceptualisations of public opinion. 
Of course, this is to some extent artificial, and I am not claiming that such a neat 
correlation of ideas is altogether true. The different conceptualisations of public 
opinion can be found in all three stages, at different times by different pollsters. 
Still, the concept of public opinion as scientifically objective was most strongly 
suggested by those researchers who participated in the kind of program of 
epistemic intervention and control we find in Stage 1. Those early actors relied on 
this characterization of public opinion because their work was premised on the 
idea that materials and methods could be extended from one context to another 
without loss in epistemic quality. Contemporary actors who uphold the same 
view of public opinion work in large institutions with prominent reputations 
built on the principles of objectivity and accuracy. More than other actors, the 
pollsters who endorse the scientific view of public opinion are at least partly 
responsible for the hegemony of polling in social research. The second notion of 
public opinion as malleable and socially constructed was found in each stage, yet 
seems to find its most powerful and natural expression in Stage 2. This follows 
because actors in Stage 2 are at a crossroads. “Universally applicable” modes of 
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inquiry have been embedded in a new domain, and in the process these actors 
have faced obstacles to the widespread application of opinion polling. At the 
same time, their findings are publicised and implicated in political decision-
making. One natural way to square this tension is to portray public opinion as 
malleable and only part of the picture. These actors recognize that they are not 
providing “the” public opinion as those in Stage 1 or Stage 3 might, but they do 
not think their efforts are wasted. Rather than simply recording the vox populi, 
they must first (re)construct it. Finally, while the notion of public opinion as an 
emancipatory power is also found in Stages 1 and 2, it is most powerfully 
expressed in Stage 3. In the earlier stages, the emancipation was being conceived 
on someone else’s behalf. Such emancipatory aims are certainly possible and 
sometimes laudable, but they are most easily recognized as emancipatory when 
they are self-directed. 
There are issues that this thesis does not contend with for the sake of maintaining 
clarity and focus but would surely benefit from being discussed in the context of 
my findings. First, I have refrained from analysing the extent to which data 
influences political processes in the Arab region, or the ways by which pollsters 
influence political elites. The decision to omit this, while it would have been 
extremely valuable, came down to a matter of access and the problem of self-
selective bias. From my position and as a doctoral student without prior 
connections in the countries I visited for research, it would have been difficult for 
me to conduct interviews with political elites and people in government (and this 
would amount to a different project altogether). The problem of self-selective bias 
arises when we put the question to pollsters: Does public opinion data shape 
political decision-making and does your work have a bearing on political 
processes? This was a question that I asked every pollster I met through the 
process of in-depth interviews. Unsurprisingly, the answers that every pollster 
gave to the questions were yes, and yes. A technique in social science methods to 
overcome such bias is to ask for particular examples, and some pollsters could 
provide these (particularly in Palestine and Jordan). But naturally some could not 
as they were unaware of how exactly their work was being used in the public 
and elite spheres. Certainly, pollsters would expect and hope that their work 
shapes the political world, and if they thought for a moment that it did not, they 
might face a small existential crisis. Nevertheless, pollsters are not the only actors 
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who we should investigate in order to understand the effect of polling on 
governance, and there is room here to combine insights from pollsters as non-
state actors with a deeper analysis of political processes in the MENA region. 
Second, there are missing cases in my research. I conducted no interviews in 
North Africa, and only a handful in the Gulf region. Insights from both locales 
would have helped to confirm the findings of localisation and the legacies of 
foreign epistemic intervention. The research conducted in Doha provided some 
insights, though not enough to include in the thesis because they are hunches 
rather than findings. The main hunch is that public opinion in the Gulf is closer 
in kind to public relations, and that Gulf states are interested in understanding 
public opinion inasmuch as it performs a function similar to political arithmetic 
or shapes discourses of administration. Many polls are conducted on social 
welfare or community improvement issues, and when governments respond to 
these polls by making facelift changes, it appears as if they are responsive to the 
opinions that the polls poll. Political opinion polling in the Gulf does not appear 
to be growing at the same rate as elsewhere in the MENA. As these are hunches 
based on preliminary interviews, as opposed to clear findings, I refrain from 
making any claims about the Gulf case. Lastly, and relatedly, future research 
trajectories would do well to consider other instances of global public opinion 
research and the empirical construction of other regions of the world through the 
dominant practices of polling. Comparative cases could include other 
postcolonial contexts or non-democracies. 
A third issue that I have not dealt with here is social media, a form of public 
communicative engagement that played a crucial role during the Arab uprisings. 
The reason for not engaging with social media is simply because pollsters have 
little involvement with it. Social media enacts different political processes 
altogether and is analysed using other means, methods, and technologies (we 
should look to the field of digital analytics here, as opposed to polling). Social 
media does not have historical legacies in the same way that polling does 
(though I would like to see this assumption challenged). 
Fourth, I raised the possibility of a feminist critique of polling in Chapter 3. While 
I have not found such a critique in the literature and I am not well-positioned to 
describe what it would entail, Evelyn Fox Keller’s meaningful work on gender in 
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science (2001) and other feminist critiques of epistemology and the hard sciences 
would be a helpful place to start. It might begin with the view that the language 
of science is non-neutral. For instance, consider the distinction between hard and 
soft science, or the terminology used to label experimental and control groups in 
social research. Terms like these can be “understood in a far larger sense than has 
been the custom—describing not only the control of variables, but also of the 
ways of seeing, thinking, acting, and speaking in which an investigator must be 
extensively trained before he or she can become a contributing member of a 
disciple” (Keller 2001, 137). A constructive accompaniment to the critical study of 
global opinion polling might therefore examine the gendered language of (social) 
scientific research and its role in creating hierarchies of knowledge. 
Fifth, and finally, we (often) have on our hands a crisis of the polls. In fact, faith 
in the polls and specifically in their ability to accurately predict short term 
political outcomes rises and falls, and patterns in this flux of faith goes as far back 
as the advent of polls themselves. Most recently, the failure of the polls to predict 
Donald Trump’s presidential win or the success of the Leave campaign in the 
United Kingdom’s Brexit referendum sparked a heated debate over whether 
polls are still meaningful enough to pay attention to. These crises galvanise the 
polling industry, usually causing pollsters to go on the defensive and brush off 
criticism (for instance, pollsters have said that American polls during the 2016 
presidential election predicting a win for Hillary Clinton were accurate if we 
focus on the results of the popular vote). While I did not explore public faith in 
polls in the Arab case, it would be interesting to understand whether similar 
patterns hold. While it is true that polling experiences its moments of crisis, I 
sense that we (global societies) are always keenly observing the polls, and that 
polling remains a “safe science” with no strong alternative. And many who are 
skeptical about today’s or yesterday’s polls typically harbour a general optimism 
about the future of polling, one that coheres with the assumption that scientific 
methods constantly improve. 
Perhaps this is where lessons can be drawn from the pollsters that I engaged 
with. Methodologically-speaking, many of them are more than pollsters. Their 
approaches are eclectic—they employ both quantitative and qualitative 
techniques because the one bolsters the other and because the complex nature of 
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the field, where telephone and online methods are becoming increasingly 
ineffective tools, requires them to employ more innovative modes of research. 
One pollster, in a conversation about the state of knowledge today, lamented that 
this “fact-free time” means that truth itself has an uncertain future outlook, 
which may substantially re-shape future modes of inquiry. Experts feel 
increasingly ostracised, and scientific facts do not inspire public or political trust 
in the same way as they once did—“people and elites are becoming less sensitive 
to facts”. I asked if there is any way through this. The pollster asked whether I 
had heard Khalil Gibran’s story of the Wise King. 
Once there ruled in the distant city of Wirani a king who was both 
mighty and wise. And he was feared for his might and loved for 
his wisdom. 
Now, in the heart of that city was a well, whose water was cool and 
crystalline, from which all the inhabitants drank, even the king 
and his courtiers; for there was no other well. 
One night when all were asleep, a witch entered the city, and poured 
seven drops of strange liquid into the well, and said, “From this 
hour he who drinks this water shall become mad”. 
Next morning all the inhabitants, save the king and his lord 
chamberlain, drank from the well and became mad, even as the witch 
had foretold. 
And during that day the people in the narrow streets and in the 
market places did naught but whisper to one another, “The king is 
mad. Our king and his lord chamberlain have lost their reason. 
Surely we cannot be ruled by a mad king. We must dethrone him”. 
That evening the king ordered a golden goblet to be filled from the 
well. And when it was brought to him he drank deeply, and gave it 
to his lord chamberlain to drink. 
And there was great rejoicing in that distant city of Wirani, 
because its king and its lord chamberlain had regained their reason. 
The pollster explained that this is what it feels like to be an expert in the current 
political climate, and the only way to overcome the “madness” it by producing 
more facts and more research—by engaging in a relentless pursuit of truth. The 
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chamberlain refuses to drink the reason-giving liquid, insisting that it is the 
public who should change its ways. 
While this thesis helps to explain the particular phenomenon of the rise of Arab 
public opinion inquiry as situated within the broader context of the history and 
development of the field of global public opinion polling, I also hope that it will 
be a step towards an inclusive epistemology that draws together the strengths of 
IR, sociology, and cognate fields like the history of science and Science and 
Technology Studies. Such an epistemology must be the end goal of any 
comprehensive attempt to explain the pursuit of global knowledge and the 
dominant practices of inquiry. Importantly, in any such explanation, we must 
reserve a place for the active role of the researcher and the burdens of knowledge 
and history that they might bear. 
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